

Foundation Briefs

Advanced Level January Brief



Resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.



Table of Contents

Table of Contents 1

Definitions 13

 United Nations Force Policy AMS 13

 Diagram Illustrating Difference between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement AMS 14

Topic Analysis One 16

 The United Nations 16

 Justification for Peacekeeping Forces 16

 Beginning of Peacekeeping Operations 16

 United Nations Operation in the Congo 17

 The Cold War 17

 The 1990s 17

 Calls for Reform 19

 Purpose of Peacekeeping 20

 Key Mandates for United Nations Peacekeepers 20

 Definitions 21

 Key United nations Failures and Successes 22

 Definition Arguments 22

 Deterrence 23

 Other Challenges to the UN 23

 Sources 23

 General Advice 24

Topic Analysis Two 25

 Burden structures, the role of peacekeepers, and the nature of conflict. 25

Pro Evidence 29

 Key U.N. Failures 30



United Nations Fails to Arrest Violation of Human Rights AMS 30

United Nations Failure: Rwandan Genocide AMS..... 30

United Nations Failures in Peacekeeping in Bosnia and Darfur Crisis AMS..... 31

Failure in Gaza AMS 31

Record Number of UN Peacekeeping Forces Fail to Stop African Wars. PSM..... 32

Failure in the Ivory Coast, Fj 32

Two Worst Stumbles: Road to Failure by UN Peacekeeping. PSM..... 33

Peacekeepers not very good at peacemaking, Fj 34

Peacekeeping Goes Downward at Debacle in Eastern Congo. PSM..... 35

Blue Helmet and Peacekeeping Failure at Sudan. PSM 36

Sudanese Kill Civilians in the Presence of UN Soldiers. PSM 37

Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre. PSM 38

Failure of UN Soldiers at Congo. PSM 39

Mysterious Killings Prompt Anger at U.N. and Army. PSM..... 40

UN Peacekeepers and Srebrenica and Dutch Court Ruling. PSM..... 41

United Nations Needs Reform 42

 Deep-Seated Structural Problems AMS..... 42

 A lack of offensive capabilities leads to UN failures. ASF 43

 A lack of offensive infrastructure leads to failure: Somalia. ASF 44

 A lack of manpower results in UN weakness. ASF 45

 Offensive forces increase peacekeeper presence. ASF 46

 Why UN Needs Stronger Standing Army. PSM..... 46

 US Supports UN Peacekeeping and Army. PSM 47



US Ambassador to UN praises Rwandan Peacekeepers and Implies Need for More Offensive Powers. PSM 48

Dangerous, Valuable Work of U.N. Peacekeepers. PSM..... 50

In France, UN Chief Praises Peacekeeping and Asks for More Military and Offensive Power. PSM 51

Let U.N. Have its Own Standing Army. PSM..... 52

U.N. Questions Criticisms of Its Peacekeepers. PSM 53

Calls Grow for Creation of U.S. Standing Army. PSM..... 54

UN Peacekeepers Fail when We Most Need Them. PSM..... 55

Failure of Peacekeepers at Lebanon. PSM 56

Permissibility Under International Law..... 57

International law allows for military intervention of UN member states. ASF 57

UN intervention would be limited to armed conflicts. ASF 58

UN may utilize military force in the name of international peace. ASF 58

Securing humanitarian means is basis for intervention. ASF 59

Humanitarian aid when there is no conflict does not justify military force. ASF 59

Goals of Robust Peacekeeping Operations..... 60

Why Offensive Operations Work AMS..... 60

The United Nations’ peacekeepers need to be an enforcement mechanism. DAT..... 61

UN is increasing its focus on women and children. ASF 62

An Increase of U.N. Intervention is Expected..... 63

The UN represents a body of basic universal rights and protections, and will defend them. ASF 63

UN intervention is justified if it’s for security. ASF 64

UN Peace Army Expands with Obama Support. PSM..... 65



UN’s First Offensive Force..... 66

 UN’s First Offensive Combat Force. PSM..... 66

 Participation of UN’s Female Peacekeepers PSM..... 67

 UN Peacekeepers Bring Net Benefit to Society. PSM 68

UAV Use Good..... 69

 The use of unmanned drones saves lives. ASF..... 69

 UAVs are not weaponized. ASF..... 69

 UAVs act as deterrent force on militias. ASF..... 70

 Drone deployment is specifically linked with the purpose of assisting offensive force. ASF 71

 UN drones are not armed. ASF..... 72

 UAVs provide unique advantage with unconventional armed groups. ASF 72

 UAVs Can Eliminate Risks for Civilians AMS..... 73

 UAV Usefulness AMS..... 73

 UAV Success AMS..... 74

Benefits to Developing Countries..... 75

 Giving UN peacekeepers additional duties improves the armed forces of contributing nations. DAT.... 75

 UN troops are more capable of taking advantage of native military resources. DAT 76

Offensives Can Keep Peacekeepers Impactful 77

 Without offensive capability, UNDOF’s impact is diminishing. DAT 77

 Without offensive capabilities, UNDOF cannot survive aggressive militancy. DAT 78

 Citizen protection by any means necessary is the ultimate priority. DAT 79

 A lack of operational options leaves peacekeepers in danger of friendly fire. DAT 80

Con Evidence 81



Key U.N. Successes 82

 Overall, United Nations Brings Violence Down AMS..... 82

 Peace and Peacekeeping AMS..... 82

 U.N. success in Cambodia, Fj..... 83

 U.N. success in Sierra Leone regulating diamond trade, Fj..... 83

 U.N. success in Sierra Leone improving the economy, Fj..... 83

 U.N. helped create a flourishing economy in Namibia, Fj 84

 U.N. helped create a better political situation in Namibia, Fj..... 84

 United Nations Nuclear Nonproliferation AMS 85

 Peaceful Electoral Transition in DRC AMS 85

 Peacekeeping missions have enormous potential, Fj 86

 Increasing funding reduces likelihood of conflict, Fj 86

 Increasing funding reduces the likelihood of conflict in the short term, Fj 86

 Increased funding in the short term reduces expenses in the long term, Fj 87

 UN Peacekeepers prevent repeat war, Fj 87

 Enforcement Peacekeeping is less likely to work, Fj 87

 Fortna study methodology, FJ 88

 U.N. is already better at peacekeeping than the U.S., Fj 88

UN Successes in Relief and Humanitarian Aid 89

 Aid and Relief More Important than Offense AMS 89

 UN Strength Lies in Work with Refugees AMS 90

 United Nations Crucial to Fight Against HIV/AIDS AMS 90

 United Nations Helps Children Worldwide AMS 91



UN Peacekeeping is Cost Effective 92

 The Peacekeeping budget is relatively small, Fj..... 92

 U.N. interventions cost relatively less than that of other countries, Fj..... 92

 UN Peacekeepers Are Generally More Effective, Fj..... 93

 U.N. is more cost effective than U.S., Fj 93

Peacekeepers prevent the spread of conflict 94

 Beardsley study methodology, Fj 94

 Peacekeeping prevents the spread of conflict, Fj..... 95

 Peacekeepers prevents violence from spreading through containment, Fj 96

 Peacekeepers prevents violence from spreading through securing borders, Fj 97

 Peacekeepers prevent conflict from spreading through reducing refugees from leaving, Fj..... 97

United Nations Problems are Not Related to Offensive Power..... 98

 Peacekeeper Budget Falling Short AMS 98

 Government Relations Hurt Peacekeeping Missions AMS 99

 United Nations Issues Unrelated to Offensive Power AMS..... 100

 Funding Problems AMS 101

 Until Other Issues are Resolved, Offensive Force is Inadvisable AMS 101

 The United Nations is operationally and financially inefficient. DAT..... 102

 Force only a “Paper Option” AMS 103

 Other Issues Preclude Use of Effective Force by United Nations Peacekeepers AMS..... 103

UN Peacekeeping Success Depends on Member States 104

 When Member States Are Committed, UN Missions Succeed AMS..... 104

 UN jurisdiction is limited by member-states: Afghanistan. ASF 105



Peacekeeping success is mostly dependent on national investment and efficient organization. DAT... 106

United Nations Peacekeepers Abuse Force 107

 Peacekeeper Misconduct is the Problem AMS..... 107

 Peacekeepers Hurt Victims AMS 107

 Peacekeepers Fail to Act AMS 108

 Peacekeepers Fail to Act at All, Offensive Action will Not Fix the Problem AMS..... 108

 Peacekeepers Fail to Exercise Power AMS 109

 Sexual Abuse by UN Peacekeepers AMS 109

 UN Peacekeepers Abuse Victims AMS..... 110

 UN Peacekeeping Troops and Scandals on Sex Crimes and Corruption. PSM..... 111

 UN Workers Abuse Women in Congo. PSM 112

 Peacekeepers Abuse Power and Engage in Sexual Abuse. PSM..... 113

 Areas with peacekeepers have more child prostitution, Fj 114

 U.N Sexual Abuses in Africa, Fj 114

The Legal Framework for Holding Abusers Accountable is Weak..... 115

 UN peacekeepers often aren't exposed to host countries' justice systems. DAT..... 115

 Troops' home nations are also ineffective at prosecution. DAT 116

 Peacekeeper-contracted civilians are an even greater liability than the peacekeepers. DAT..... 117

 Case studies: Haiti and sexual abuse. DAT 118

Peacekeeping Premise is Flawed 119

 Foreigners Cannot Properly Execute Offensive Action AMS..... 119

 UN intervention weakens state sovereignty. ASF 119

 UN Peacekeeping Activities does not have Administrative Capacity to Maintain an Army. PSM 120



A U.N. Standing Army will be Ineffective. PSM..... 121

U.S. Should Oppose Support for Peacekeepers. PSM..... 122

Foreign forces cannot be seen as side-constrained occupiers. DAT..... 123

Use of force to protect human rights violates international law. ASF..... 124

Peacekeepers Not Able to Properly Exercise Offensive Force..... 125

 By Nature UN Peacekeeping Not Prepared for Robust Operations AMS..... 125

 UN Peacekeepers Not Prepared to Use Offensive Force AMS 126

 Nations Will Be Reluctant to Place Peacekeepers in Harm AMS 127

 Militarized Peacekeepers are a Contradiction AMS..... 128

 Use of Force Would Contradict Purpose of UN Peacekeeping AMS 129

 Past UN military force failed independently. ASF 130

 Peacekeeping Forces Unable to Complete Offensive Operations AMS..... 131

 Operations Add to Local Resistance AMS 131

 Children are forced into the armies of UN targets in the Congo. ASF 132

 Shifting Peacekeeping Environment AMS..... 132

 United Nations Peacekeeping: Problems with Peace Enforcement AMS 133

 Peacekeepers Exacerbate Hostility AMS..... 133

 Peacekeeping Forces: Continued Sexual Abuse AMS 134

 When Authorized to Use Force, U.N. Forces Fail to Do So AMS..... 135

Major Defeats by Peacekeeping Forces..... 136

 Ineffectiveness of Blue Helmet Soldiers. PSM..... 136

Responsibility To Protect (R2P)..... 137

 Responsibility to protect was designed to encourage military intervention. ASF 137



The responsibility to protect is a blank check for super powers to exercise military force. ASF 138

Non-Offensive Peacekeepers Are a Police Asset 139

UN peacekeepers are a valuable asset for the protection of national leaders. DAT 139

Peacekeepers are valuable extensions (and overseers of) local police forces. 140

The integration of peacekeepers and civilians makes peacekeepers good policemen. DAT 141

One of peacekeepers’ major advantages is their operational similarity to civilian police. DAT 142

The UN should assist states’ sovereignty, not usurp it. DAT 143

Further case study: Chad. DAT 144

Offensive Operations Are Unnecessary 145

African governments are investing heavily in their own military infrastructure. DAT 145

Peacekeeper has been crucial to the preservation of UNDOF. DAT 146

Offensive Forces Are Counter Productive and Ineffective 147

Use of military force promotes violence. ASF 147

Poverty casues conflict. ASF 148

Lack of self-sustainability causes state failures. ASF 149

Intrastate conflicts have little to do with international factors. ASF 149

Internal conflict erupts for personal gain. ASF 150

Resource constraints may lead to war. ASF 150

Example: Peacekeeping mission in Sudan. ASF 151

Root cause of problems in Sudan. ASF 151

Bosnia is an example of group inequality. ASF 152

Pro Counters 153

Controversy within United Nations 154



United Nations Forces Differ on Best Approach to Offensive Action AMS 154

United Nations Security Accords Outdated..... 155

 Putin Uses Security Accord to Prevent Intervention AMS..... 155

Force Necessary for Evolution of Peacekeeping Missions..... 156

 Offensive Force Necessary for Change AMS..... 156

 Offensive Operations Necessary AMS 157

 Need for Protection of Peace Process AMS 157

 The weakness of peacekeeping without force AMS..... 158

 Protection over Defense AMS 158

 Retaliation: An Effective Mechanism for Robustness AMS 159

 Properly Trained Robust Forces AMS..... 160

Offensive Operations Are Not Common 161

 Offensive operations are not precedent. ASF 161

 UN forces failed in Somalia due to offensive limitations. ASF 162

Precedent for Offensive Success..... 163

 Success in the Congo AMS..... 163

Abuses of Power are Overstated..... 164

 Putting context to sexual abuse claims. DAT 164

 The UN is taking preventative action against abuse. DAT..... 165

 Legal immunity does not mean UN troops are unaccountable. DAT..... 166

Often the “Power to engage in offensive operations” is enough to deter violence 167

 Often Real force Not Necessary AMS..... 167

 Deterrence Only Credible if Offensive Operations Permitted AMS 167

 Increased Flexibility Needed AMS..... 168



United Nations Peacekeeping Reforms 169

 Conduct and discipline reform AMS 169

No Clear Separation between ‘Peacekeeping’ and ‘Peace Enforcement’ 170

 Initial Use of Force Can Accelerate Other Priorities AMS 170

 Problematic Separation Between Peacekeeping and Enforcement AMS 171

Causes For Conflict Are Not Universal 172

 Green War Hypotheses has contradictory empirics. ASF 172

Con Counters 173

 Ethical Concerns 174

 Dangers of Authority to Kill AMS 174

 Aside from legal immunity, the UN is also difficult to investigate. DAT 174

 Authority Problems with Current UN System 175

 Confused Chain of Command AMS 175

 UN’s official stance on Haiti cholera epidemic indicates systemic accountability gaps. DAT 176

Introduction of Offensive Force Causes Division 177

 Dispute over Definition of Peacekeeping Force AMS 177

 Offensive Force Contrary to UN Principles AMS 177

 A Desperate Action AMS 178

 Thin resources and ambiguous mandates make offensives irrelevant. DAT 179

 The introduction of offensives would marginalize female peacekeepers. DAT 180

Offensive Operations will Discourage Nations from Supplying Peacekeepers 181

 Dangers of Offensive Operations AMS 181

 UN forces and nation building are better on a small scale. ASF 181

 Member nations are hesitant to send troops to heavily-contested areas. DAT 182



UN intervention threatens state autonomy. ASF 183

Drone Precedent Set By UN Is Bad..... 184

 The precedent for drone use by the UN stems from the DRC, which shouldn't be used. ASF..... 184

 Drone use sets unsustainable burden on peacekeepers. ASF..... 185

United Nations Lacks Resources for Offensive Operations 186

 World Community Will Not Supply Enforcement Resources AMS 186

 Troop contributions and quality are too inconsistent to guarantee success. DAT 187

 Offensive operations discourage developing nations from contributing. DAT 188

Offensive Force is a Short Term Solution to a Long Term Problem..... 189

 Forces Threaten International Peace AMS 189

 Peace Achieved by Force Is Not Lasting AMS 190

 Offensives don't accomplish the UN's long-term goals. DAT..... 191

Contentions 192



Definitions

United Nations Force Policy AMS

United Nations. “Principles of UN Peacekeeping.” 2014.

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml> The United Nations peacekeeping website maintains updates on current United Nations’ operations and the organizations overall goals.

Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.

Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

- **Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict.**
- **By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.**


Both teams should come into this debate with a clear understanding of the United Nations’ current peacekeeping laws and history of robust-peacekeeping.

Diagram Illustrating Difference between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement AMS

Terrie, Jim. “The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC.” African Security Review. 2009. Jim Terrie is a former senior analyst with the International Crisis Group’s Africa Programme and research associate at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre.

The current UN ‘Capstone Doctrine’ attempts to define the boundaries of force and consent as follows: Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. **Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.**

Figure 1 The limits of peacekeeping⁴⁴





While this continuum creates a general framework for thinking about operations between traditional peacekeeping and war fighting, the distinction and application of ‘robust peacekeeping’ and ‘peace enforcement’ is a lot greyer than the doctrine implies. Correspondingly so is the distinction between ‘minimum force’ and ‘enforcement’ as different ‘consent prompting techniques’. This is especially so for commanders and troops on the ground in complex conflict environment where the link between ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ can either be indistinguishable (such as General Nkunda’s rebellion) or inconsequential (such as the militias in Ituri).

The grey area between “peacemaking,” “peace-enforcement,” “peace-building,” and peacekeeping will likely dominate some debates. Be sure to have clear definitions for each side of the resolution.



Topic Analysis One

The United Nations

In 1945 the United Nations was created to promote international cooperation. According to its charter, all member states shall settle disputes peacefully without using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The U.N. was considered a body for the peaceful diffusing of crises.

Justification for Peacekeeping Forces

While the charter does not explicitly mention United Nations peacekeeping, the basis for these forces is laid out in Chapter VI. Chapter VI describes the allowed means for solving disputes without military action and Chapter VII goes on to delineate the military and nonmilitary actions the United Nations can take to maintain peace. Peacekeeping operations are sometimes referred to as part of “Chapter VI 1/2” of the UN’s original charter.

Beginning of Peacekeeping Operations

The United Nations peacekeeping force started in 1948 when the UN Security Council sent military observers to the Middle East. The observers were meant to monitor an armistice agreement between Israel and its neighbors. Not long afterwards, UN forces were deployed to monitor India and Pakistan in 1949. Both operations are currently still running, staying to provide objective updates and prevent the outbreak of violence.

The earliest armed peacekeeping mission was the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF), which was used in 1956 to deal with the Suez crisis. The first armed force was established after the 1956 war to maintain peace between Israeli and Egyptian forces. Ten nations contributed soldiers to this mission.



United Nations Operation in the Congo

In 1960 the now famous UN Operation in the Congo (UNOC) was deployed. It was the first large-scale mission, with 20,000 military personnel at its height. After the Congo became independent in 1960, a Belgian Lieutenant announced that he would not “africanize” the officers corps of the army. His inflammatory statements caused mutinies and prompted the Belgian government to intervene to protect Belgians that remained in the country. Belgian forces led by Moïse Tshombé were sent to the Katanga province and declared the independence of the province. The Congolese Prime Minister requested UN support to calm the secession movement and the Council called on Belgian forces to withdraw troops from the area. While fighting the secessionist movement, the peacekeeping force became part of a violent civil war and is the subject of much controversy. While the force did prevent the secession of the Katanga province, it is widely considered the first forceful United Nations force and has been called a “pyrrhic victory at best.”

The United Nations deployed a total of 13 missions before 1988. While some, like the mission in the Congo, attracted controversy with their methodology, most adhered to a set of basic principles: troops should be lightly armed, observation was strictly limited, absolute neutrality, and finally the subject of this debate: force is only justifiable in self-defense.

The Cold War

The constant threat of hostility between world superpowers during the Cold War prevented any serious actions by the United Nations during the Cold War period. The operations that were approved were meant to promote impartiality, consent, and limited force strictly to avoid provoking any conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The 1990s

After the cold war, the United Nations entered a new era. The number and size of all UN operations increased markedly. A large number of countries overthrew their authoritarian regimes during this same time period, leading to the creation of a series of nation-states dedicated to defending human rights and maintaining



international peace. Democracies sprung up in the former Soviet Union, throughout Asia and Africa, and in parts of Eastern Europe, adding fuel to the United Nations' fight. This time period also saw the birth of the Internet, the rise of 24-hour news stations, and other modern achievements making it easier to travel and monitor missions.

The combination of the factors mentioned above led to a big spike in United Nations peacekeeping missions. During the 1990s, 49 of the United Nations' total 67 peacekeeping operations were approved. During this time period, UN forces began to take more aggressive actions to promote peace. Often forces were deployed before a ceasefire had been reached to prevent violence against civilians. In 1992 the current Secretary General Boutros-Ghali released the "Agenda for Peace." This piece spoke of the growing need for "peacebuilding," stressing the importance of globally sustainable peace. This report was used as the justification for further expansion of UN peacekeeping efforts. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of warring parties, or DDR, became a central part of peacekeeping mandates. Whereas earlier missions merely observed ceasefires or sought to diffuse conflict, these new missions began to take an active role in the "peacebuilding" process. The United Nations began to deploy more and more peacekeeping missions considered "robust" to reflect the expanded size and scope of mission goals.

From 1989-1994, the United Nations approved 20 new peacekeeping missions. From 1992-1995 dissent rose out of the missions in Yugoslavia and Somalia. United Nations peacekeepers were now taking an active role in the deterrence of violence. These actions led to controversy with warring parties, although in every case formal approval by the government had been obtained according to UN regulations. It became increasingly clear that United Nations peacekeeping forces were simply not equipped to achieve the ambitious peace-enforcement goals that had been laid out. In particular the 1994 Rwandan genocide exposed the flaws in peacekeeping forces who entirely failed to prevent the tragic occurrence.

Despite the growing disillusionment with peacekeeping forces, 7 new missions were launched in 1998 alone. It became clear that the United Nations' could not sustain this number of ambitious missions with its measly budget.



Calls for Reform

In 1992 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was established to manage the increasing number and size of UN operations. The DPKO is responsible for gathering intelligence on crisis areas, developing the plans for mandates, and overseeing the operation of peacekeeping forces on the ground.

During the 1990s, the most notable United Nations peacekeeping failures include instances in Rwanda, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Somalia. In 1992 the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released a substantive review of United Nations' peacekeeping entitled "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping." While the General agreed that there was a big need for reform, the report maintains that peacekeepers still adhered to the same basic principles: "a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support."

These failures led to cries for reform within peacekeeping forces. In 2000 Secretary General Kofi Amman commissioned an expansive report on United Nations peacekeeping or the "Brahimi report." The report expansively outlines flaws with the United Nations and makes recommendations for future changes. This report, the 2005 World summit which put forth several proposals for reform, and the 2008 Capstone Doctrine contain vital evidence for the historical issues with peacekeeping missions as well as recommendations for reform. After the creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 2000, several new posts were added to department including political officers, logistical experts, financial planners, and others dedicated to the building of sustainable peace during operations.

Recruitment has been a persistent issue for the United Nations. There is no automatic obligation for Member States to provide the recommended amount of personnel to serve as peacekeepers. The 1996 Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) established new recommendations for recruitment but all member states retained the ability to decide whether or not to participate in given operations.



Purpose of Peacekeeping

As mentioned before, peacekeeping has grown out of the United Nations' charter purpose to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Justified under chapters VI and VII, peacekeeping mandates today are released by the United Nations Security Council.

In general, mandates are deployed to oversee the implementation of peace agreements, restore peace and security after a ceasefire, prevent the outbreak of violence during a crisis, and facilitate the transition to a stable government after a conflict. Peacekeeping forces are generally meant to assist with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; oversee political and development; and protect civilian rights.

Key Mandates for United Nations Peacekeepers

In March of 2002 the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations affirmed the peacekeepers' commitment to gender equality. This mandate affirmed the importance of preventing gender-based violence during peacekeeping operations and placed a renewed emphasis on building more equal states. This commitment was reinforced by the 2006 DKPO Directive on Gender Equality. This particular mandate laid out a framework for the protection of women and promotes an increased number of female peacekeepers. Since 2006 the peacekeeping force has released similar documents upholding the same commitment to gender equality.

In 2005 the Security Council adopted resolution 1612 for the express purpose of helping children in armed conflict. The mandate establishes mechanisms for the evaluation of recruitment and use of child soldiers, training to prevent the abuse of children in conflict situations, and methods for building in a new emphasis on child-protection into new governments.

The next year another key mandate, Resolution 1674 was passed to reform United Nations' peacekeeping practices in regards to civilian protection. This is an area of huge controversy and will likely play a central part in many debates. The document reiterates the United Nations' zero-tolerance policy on abuse and new mechanisms for the union of separated families.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 is one of the key pieces of reform for peacekeeping operations. The document was adopted in 2008 in response to accusations of sexual abuse by peacekeeping



forces. It establishes new training programs for all United Nations personnel and calls for the development of political tools to decrease sexual violence in all conflict situations.

The Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR) programs were instituted to provide care for victims of sexual abuse. This mandate established health care and counseling services for all affected people and installed new provisions for the creation of public safety programs in communities with an influx of ex-combatants. Many new United Nations mandates draw off of the DDRR program and instate new resolutions for the prevention of abuse in war-torn states. For example, peacekeepers now work with existing police forces to provide training for the protection of women, promote messages that abuse is never acceptable, and provide physical protection for women when necessary.

Definitions

Both teams should become familiar with United Nations laws on peacekeeping and the differences between “peacekeeping” and “peace enforcement” for this debate. As suggested by the term “keeping,” peacekeepers are traditionally meant to support ceasefires and oversee transitions from conflict into democracy. “Peace enforcement” on the other hand connotes a more flexible use of coercive measures. Some sources refer to “peacemaking,” which generally refers to measures designed to address conflicts in progress and reach an agreement with hostile parties. According to the United Nations, “peacemaking efforts may be undertaken by official and non-governmental groups or by a prominent personality working independently.”

In the now famous “Agenda for Peace” written by United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, the General proposes the existence of “peace-enforcement units” which would be “available on call” and “more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces.” However, these units were highly controversial and never actually materialized on the ground. The 2008 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” contains better guidance on the matter, defining for the first time the concept of “robust peacekeeping.”

Over the past few decades, the differences between these three similar terms of gotten more and more gray. In principle, United Nations peacekeepers are meant to support the implementation of cease-fires. However, in practice these operations must often use force to protect civilians. The United Nations clarifies:



“While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council.”

Key United nations Failures and Successes

This brief contains ample evidence of both key United Nations victories and key United Nations fiascos. Be careful with these arguments on both sides. Pro teams can argue that the United Nations has failed in the past due to a lack of flexibility when it comes to force, but should be careful not to simply emphasize the institution’s failure as a whole. If the United Nations is such a grievous failure, Con teams can easily rebut that it should not be reformed at all and a better institution may be better suited to global peacekeeping.

In the same way it would be unwise for Con teams to argue that the United Nations is an all-around success. While many applaud the institution’s successes and promise for the future, nearly everyone agrees that there is ample room for reform. Instead Con teams should stress the positive qualities of the United Nations, agree that there are issues within the institution, and stress that the use of offensive force will not “fix” the United Nations, but rather, exacerbate current issues.

Definition Arguments

As explained, the definitions of peacekeeping are difficult to distinguish from “peacemaking” and “peace enforcement.” Be careful not to get bogged down in arguments here. You may encounter Con teams who claim that peacemakers cannot exercise offensive force and that this mission is better suited towards “peace enforcement.” This argument is not topical. Explain the gray area between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement and then continue to the arguments for and against offensive force.



Deterrence

The concept of deterrence is central to this issue. Pro teams can argue that even the right to exercise offensive force will make missions more likely to succeed because without some threat of force, United Nations peacekeepers cannot deter threats.

Con teams need to be careful on this subject. Continue to stress the problems with the United Nations to argue that other reforms would be better for the institution as a whole. When it comes to force, Con teams can also argue that the threat of defensive force is a sufficient deterrent.

Other Challenges to the UN

This is one of the most powerful options available for con teams. The failures and issues within the United Nations peacekeeping force are well documented. Con teams should focus on these problems and argue that these issues must be addressed before considering the right to exercise offensive force. Con teams can take this argument a step further to argue that without essential reforms peacekeepers cannot be trusted with the right to exercise offensive force.

Sources

Because this resolution involves the United Nations, teams should be careful about the sources they use in debates and be sure to listen to their opponents' citation. United Nations sources are good for the history of operations and facts of various mandates, but most judges will not consider a critique or appraisal of peacekeeping missions from the United Nations sufficient.

However, one of the most comprehensible and important sources on this topic was commissioned by the United Nations: The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping, known commonly as the "Brahimi Report" for the chairman of the commission that produced it Lakhdr Brahimi. While the Brahimi report has its criticisms, it is certainly a valid analysis of key United Nations problems and potential solutions.



General Advice

1. Listen to your opponents' arguments and respond accordingly. Do not be tempted to make overly simplified arguments in this debate. This topic is not about whether or not the United Nations is "good;" it is about a key question of methodology. Do not get too bogged down in citing the failures or successes of the United Nations on either side of this debate.
2. Learn about the complicated dynamics within peacekeeping forces. The issues within the United Nations are documented by decades of historians. There is no easy fix to the institution just as the job it attempts--international peacekeeping--is anything but simple.
3. Familiarize yourself with the biggest United Nations peacekeeping triumphs and scandals and know how you plan to respond to these issues or use these facts to your advantage on both sides of the resolution.
4. Demonstrate a clear knowledge of past United Nations failures to advocate reforms for the future.

Good luck ☺

--Amanda Sopkin



Topic Analysis Two

Burden structures, the role of peacekeepers, and the nature of conflict.

With many major bid tournaments on the January topic is important to have adaptable cases for the wide variety of judges you may debate in front of. This topic analysis will discuss the role of peacekeeping operations, a burden structure you may use successfully on each side, and contentions that will operate well under those burdens in relation to the nature of conflict.

First, let's discuss peacekeeping operations. Explicitly said by the UN, the goal of peacekeeping is to maintain peace and security, protect civilians, assist in disarmament, protect human rights, facilitate elections and the political process, and restore the rule of law. That's a long laundry-list of goals, essentially saying that peacekeepers can be deployed in almost any conflict under many different justifications. This gives a lot of flexibility to the burden structures we will be discussing on both sides. Good analysis on the impact of peacekeepers in the past, and how the results of referenced missions came about, will be crucial to winning rounds.

Adding the provision of offensive forces does not change a great deal about the peacekeepers themselves, but rather just their policy on conduct and engagement. An offensive force will not uniquely have weaponry, as peacekeepers in the status quo have them for self-defense. The addition of an offensive force more refers to the rules of engagement, meaning that peacekeepers can now plan to overtake certain supply routes, plan attacks on targets, and mobilize to areas they think are advantageous. Implicitly, and in some literature, there would be an increase in the training if this were to become a standard.

When discussing the goals of peacekeeping operations we must examine the nature of these different reasons for deployment, as there clearly cannot be a "one solution fixes all" mindset. Let's take for a comparative example the foals of assisting in disarmament and facilitating elections. Though the two aren't mutually exclusive, to achieve each individually a task-force would probably take different approaches. Usually when deployed to disarm groups, peacekeepers are targeting non-state actors such as factions and gangs. To facilitate elections they need to focus on setting up a system in which votes can be cast and people will turn out. To achieve the goal of disarmament a peacekeeping unit may focus on cutting off supplies to the groups, being able to take control of certain areas, and negotiations to grant the group what they want if it is feasible. An offensive force seems like it is well-equipped to handle a situation as such. In terms of the political process, it



does not seem to require offensive weaponry and engagement unless the political process is specifically hindered by violent groups. The vast diversity of goals make this topic much more complex than simple holistic analysis from either side. For clean rounds, don't be afraid to get into the specifics.

Even though goals can be vastly different it is rare that a state will meet only one criteria for peacekeepers to be deployed. In all likelihood, the states to which peacekeepers get deployed are in dire need of assistance and reform. That actually makes debating this topic significantly easier in relation to burden structures for either side.

Let's begin with analysis of the affirmative side. In order to win the affirmative needs to prove unique advantages to integrating an offensive force into the status quo. As it stands an offensive force seems to be the exception the UN rules and charters. In the most obvious way, an offensive force would be most useful in operations regarding armed conflicts. In order to protect civilians, peacekeepers would no longer need to wait until civilians are directly at risk in order to engage an enemy. Peacekeepers would be able to be proactive about weakening an enemy through cutting off supplies, ambushing units, and destroying their infrastructure and communications. There would be an increased stress on information gathering and actual research as to when enemies are prepared to engage or not. This is the most upfront argument to make, and probably the most logical. Logic is good, but rarely enough to win rounds on it's own. We need to set up a playing field for the round that gives us the advantage when debating.

There are two framework arguments that can be made that makes the affirmative world significantly easier to defend and win. First is a stock argument from debates about policy implementation, the "tool in the toolbox". The tool in the toolbox allows the affirmative which goals to discuss from peacekeepers and really makes the negative defend a universal world that cites harms intrinsic to peacekeepers being able to mobilize and act. Though that is implicit, sloppy work by the affirmative can put them on the defensive in the way the round is framed, and you don't want that. The tool in the toolbox argument essentially says that in certain scenarios we will have unparalleled success from this method, unachievable by any other means. We don't have to use this method every time we are deployed, but should have the option to do so. This framework functions well with arguments that reference the "threat of use of force" as well as the actual use of the force itself. The threat of use of force (as a deterrent factor, essentially a tool of harsh diplomacy) relies on the actual capability and willingness to use offensive forces. If peacekeepers could not engage offensively at any given time then we lose the efficacy of this diplomatic tool.

In attacking the tool in the toolbox the negative can have two or three responses. First is that it is an abusive argument to make. The affirmative is defending a world that never needs to link into harms. This is theoretically true, however the negative team also should be making an argument that says the legitimacy for the threat of the use of force derives from implementation of the use of force. In order for the affirmative to gain access to threatening to use a tool they must actually use it. Threats only gain legitimacy on the willingness to act. The negative can also say that the threat of use of force exists in the status quo without making it offensive



January 2015

Topic Analysis Two

force standard policy. The UN has approved the use of offensive force before, and thus can threaten to do it again, but only in limiting, unique circumstances. The negative can then go on to cite harms of having access to such a tool at all times.

Briefly, in order to respond to abuse arguments, the affirmative can say that their framework is the realistic implementation of policy. We don't use every policy at our disposal every day in any scenario. To force the affirmative to defend anything else would be unrealistic and unfair.

After the tool in the toolbox argument, the affirmative can also set up weighing mechanisms as to why offensive forces would be important. This goes back to the fact that a state rarely has one problem before peacekeepers are deployed, but rather a multitude of issues. Usually there is some level of violent conflict in areas where peacekeepers are deployed. The affirmative can make the argument that violent conflict hinders the long-term stability and ability to influence other issues and must be addressed first. If solving for violent conflict is a prerequisite for solving other issues then the use of offensive force is integral to having an effective peacekeeping force.

This argument can be made in many different ways. It can say that in violent regions violence hinders the efficacy of the political process (through warrants such as a loss of faith in the system, etc.) and promotes corruption. It can also say that violence makes people and communities divided along racial or socioeconomic barriers, and thus will have to be solved in order to maintain long-term peace. It is important to note that negative teams may respond by saying the nature of conflict cannot simply be solved by military force but will require social, economic, or political reform. Even though this is true, the affirmative can once again fall back on the tool in the toolbox argument and say it will only implement the offensive forces when it has potential to actually solve, or simply say that military power can diffuse conflict regardless of the underlying cause. Essentially, if the affirmative says that solvency for violence is a pre-requisite to solve other issues, then the affirmative only needs to contend for solvency, which it should already be doing anyway.

On the negative side the case and framework should more heavily focus on the nature of conflict that peacekeepers are normally deployed to. There are plenty of different reasons for conflict around the world, but in this brief there is substantial evidence that shows there is rarely a conflict that has no basis. Insofar as this is true, having a party that is not invested in the result poses multiple problems. The underlying cause for violence in many reasons (as mentioned just above) is usually not solvable by strict, unbiased military force. If there is violence it is due to economic differences, social discourse being too severe for a party, or political problems. For all of those there are non-military solutions ranging from humanitarian aid to the standard peacekeeping operations in the status quo. The burden on the affirmative is to prove that there is a unique advantage to *always* having access to offensive forces. Civilians can still be protected and defended without provoking aggressive responses from armed groups. Specifically the UN has actually done a great deal in the status quo to promote peace globally.



The negative should also focus on some evidence in relation to what the nature of offensive forces are. In regards to protecting human rights, an offensive force may actually make matters worse. With many recruits being from the local area, there is a high probability that sexual assault (which is already a problem amongst peacekeepers) will become worse. Offensive forces move around more, and the types of characters who may be recruited may simply be drawn to violence. Moreover, recruiting from local areas (which are already plagued with violence if an offensive force is being deployed) may decrease accountability depending on the country, as each state is responsible for trying its own representatives in a court of law if there are complaints and violations.

Ultimately, the negative should focus on two things. First, it should have many historical examples ready to go to prove that the UN can succeed in any scenario with proper planning and resolve any potential conflict without engaging an offensive force. Second it should focus on harms, not of peacekeepers, but more of offensive forces. These harms do not necessarily need to be unique to UN offensive forces, but can also be harms to offensive forces in general, as long as the warrants are general and not country specific. A final, secondary focus, can also be on motivation. The UN has no vested interest other than peace. Military engagement by nature, when involving states, is not fighting for peace, but fighting for change. Intervention means picking a side and influencing a country's internal affairs, which may be very very bad.

Best of luck in your rounds,

Adam Freilich

Pro Evidence





Key U.N. Failures

United Nations Fails to Arrest Violation of Human Rights AMS

Maps of World. “Has the United Nations Failed?” 2014.

<http://www.mapsofworld.com/poll/has-the-united-nations-failed-facts-infographic-text.html> **The World Maps site collects data from the CIA World Factbook, the United Nations, and other authorities to provide easily accessible information on essential political events.**

Some of the major criticisms faced by the United Nations stem from the failure of the organization to prevent armed conflicts in member nations and an inability to arrest the violation of human rights/civil liberties.

The UN has, in the past often been a means to further US interests, opening it up to much criticism. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge - an extremist communist administration - had eliminated all opposition between 1975 and 1979 and killed over 2.5 million Cambodian nationals. When the Vietnamese government intervened to free the country and to establish self-administration of Cambodia, the UN had condemned the intervention and recognized Khmer Rouge till about 1994 since Vietnam had till recently been at war with the US.

United Nations Failure: Rwandan Genocide AMS

Maps of World. “Has the United Nations Failed?” 2014.

<http://www.mapsofworld.com/poll/has-the-united-nations-failed-facts-infographic-text.html> **The World Maps site collects data from the CIA World Factbook, the United Nations, and other authorities to provide easily accessible information on essential political events.**

The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which claimed the lives of nearly a million Rwandans - about 20% of the entire population, was another instance where the peacekeeping troops present at the site were not authorized to use force to prevent mass murder. While the inactivity of the UN was largely attributed to a US unwillingness to intervene, the gross negligence to protect human life remains a blotch at the credibility of the UN.

United Nations failures hurt both short term mission goals and the overall credibility of peacekeeping missions. Allowing missions the flexibility to protect citizens will help prevent disasters like the Rwandan genocide.



United Nations Failures in Peacekeeping in Bosnia and Darfur Crisis AMS

Maps of World. “Has the United Nations Failed?” 2014.

<http://www.mapsofworld.com/poll/has-the-united-nations-failed-facts-infographic-text.html> **The World Maps site collects data from the CIA World Factbook, the United Nations, and other authorities to provide easily accessible information on essential political events.**

The 1995 massacre during the Bosnian War came to be known as the worst act of mass murder in Europe following World War II. The site for this mass murder was Srebrenica, a UN safe-zone. The UN had removed armed forces guarding the Bosnians and had replaced them with Dutch peacekeeping forces. In July 1995, Serbs had launched a full-fledged attack murdering over 7,800 Bosnians, molesting women and injuring children as the UN team looked on.

The Darfur Crisis in the Sudanese Civil War (2003 – 2010) has been cited as one of the prime examples of a UN failure to intervene and save the lives of 300,000 civilians from Sudan who had faced systemic murder at the hands of a militant group called the Janjaweed, which was funded by the Sudanese government. The UN’s reluctance to intervene despite reports of outrageous violations was considered weakness on its part. In more recent times, the UN admitted its failure in the Sri Lankan Civil War (2009) to confront the government over the killing of the separatist groups and posing obstacles to providing humanitarian relief to hundreds of thousands of Tamils who were murdered by the military troops. UN officials in the country downplayed the death toll and the severity of the crisis in an attempt to provide member states “what they wanted to hear”.

Failure in Gaza AMS

Venkataraman, N.S. “The Failures of United Nations to Maintain World Peace.” August 9, 2014. <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/society/the-failures-of-united-nations-to-maintain-world-peace-1.1369914> Gulf news has established itself as the leading English language newspaper of the Gulf region - a position it has occupied for many years. Gulf News reaches more readers than all the other English dailies, combined. In addition, the Arab Media Outlook 2011-2015, the independent survey of Arab media published by the Dubai Press Club, rated Gulf News as “the most read newspaper” of the UAE.

The ongoing war between Israel and Palestine in Gaza, where more than one thousand people have been killed shows the United Nations in a very poor light. Similarly, in conflicts such as those in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; United Nations has practically played no role in promoting peace.

The Secretary General of United Nations appears to be satisfied simply by issuing statements and writing letters to the concerned nations in conflict. The ground reality is that the governments in different countries do not seem to be paying any attention to the appeals of UN for peace and harmony.



Record Number of UN Peacekeeping Forces Fail to Stop African Wars. PSM

Raghavan, Sudarsan. "Record number of U.N. peacekeepers fails to stop African wars." . The Washington Post, 03 Jan 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/record-number-of-un-peacekeepers-fails-to-stop-african-wars/2014/01/03/17ed0574-7487-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html>.

The United Nations has dispatched a record number of peacekeepers in Africa in recent years, deploying soldiers to trouble spots such as the Central African Republic and South Sudan. **Yet the “blue helmets” and thousands of other soldiers sent by African regional groups have failed to prevent fresh spasms of violence.**

The peacekeeping forces **have cost billions of dollars**, largely paid by the United States and European nations. But they have been hobbled by weak mandates and a shortage of manpower and equipment. Some critics also say Washington, its allies and U.N. officials are at **fault in the peacekeeping failures, for not following through with enough political pressure to prevent crises.**

“The political and diplomatic elements of the international response to most Africa conflicts have been slow and ineffective,” said John Prendergast, a longtime Sudan and South Sudan activist with the Enough Project, a human rights group. That, he said, **“has put more pressure on peacekeeping missions to fulfill objectives for which they are totally unprepared.”**

Failure in the Ivory Coast, Fj

Schaefer, Brett. “Cote d’Ivoire Tragedy: Rigorous Oversight of U.N. Peacekeeping Needed” The Heritage Foundation. April 6, 2011.

It was recently discovered that as many as 1,000 people in Duekoue, Cote d’Ivoire, were killed between March 27–29. It is unclear who is responsible for the killings. The U.N. claims that forces loyal to former President Laurent Gbagbo—who lost the recent election but has refused to leave office, sparking the current conflict—are responsible. However, the area where the killings occurred was controlled at the time by fighters loyal to President Alassane Ouattara.

There were 1,000 U.N. peacekeepers based in Duekoue. Reportedly, most of them were protecting about 15,000 refugees at a Catholic mission. However, the killings occurred despite “robust” patrols by U.N. troops. According to one news report, the victims “were mainly men who had been shot and left where they fell ... either alone or in small groups dotted around the town, which lies at the heart of Ivory Coast’s economically crucial cocoa producing region.



Two Worst Stumbles: Road to Failure by UN Peacekeeping. PSM

Boot, Max. "Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping." . Council on Foreign Relations, n.d. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55875/max-boot/paving-the-road-to-hell-the-failure-of-u-n-peacekeeping>>.

The United Nations itself has recently released reports documenting **two of its worst stumbles**. According to these confessions, U.N. peacekeepers in **Rwanda stood by as Hutu slaughtered some 800,000 Tutsi**. In Bosnia, the U.N. declared safe areas for Muslims but did nothing to secure them, letting the Serbs slaughter thousands in Srebrenica. The organization's meddling was worse than useless: its blue-helmeted troops were used as hostages by the Serbs to deter a military response from the West. **Presumably, Secretary-General Kofi Annan -- who was head of the U.N.'s peacekeeping department at the time --** hopes that an institutional mea culpa now will wipe the slate clean and allow the organization to play a more vigorous role in the future.

The arrival of *Deliver Us From Evil*, a new book by British journalist William Shawcross, provides a good opportunity to ponder whether this is a realistic expectation. **Shawcross presents a highly readable, if at times repetitive and scattershot, chronicle of U.N. diplomacy and humanitarian interventions in the past decade. Though predisposed to favor U.N. peacekeeping --** much of this book is written from the viewpoint of Annan, with whom the author traveled the world -- Shawcross is too honest a reporter to gloss over its failures. He even concedes that humanitarian aid may sometimes do more harm than good by prolonging a war.

... Wherever possible, Shawcross blames such messes on the permanent members of the Security Council, whom he indicts for blocking the expansion of these missions. **He dutifully quotes U.N. bureaucrats who complain that they did the best they could with inadequate resources, and he suggests they be given more support in the future. He's being too kind by half.**

The failures of the United Nations should not be blamed just on the great powers. They owe as much to the mindset of U.N. administrators, who think that no problem in the world is too intractable to be solved by negotiation. These mandarins fail to grasp that men with guns do not respect men with nothing but flapping gums. A good example of this incomprehension was Annan's opera bouffe negotiations with Saddam Hussein. In 1998, **Annan undertook shuttle diplomacy to Baghdad, reached a deal with Saddam to continue weapons inspections, and declared him "a man I can do business with."** Almost immediately Saddam flouted his agreement with Annan. But even then the secretary-general told Shawcross, **"I'm not convinced that massive use of force is the answer. Bombing is a blunt instrument."**



Peacekeepers not very good at peacemaking, Fj

Greg and Diehl. “The Peacekeeping- Peacemaking Dilemma” International Studies Quarterly. 2005.

As was the case in the ordered probit selection models, peacekeeping reduced the likelihood that either mediation or negotiation would take place among enduring rivals. The peacekeeping coefficients in the mediation and negotiation outcome models were negative, as they were in the ordered probit analysis.

The peacekeeping term in the mediation model approached nominal significance and the term in the negotiation model was statistically significant. Peacekeeping had a larger negative effect on the likelihood of a full agreement through negotiation than any other variable. The presence of peacekeeping forces made a full agreement less likely than even an increase in the complexity of the issues under negotiation.

These results are consistent with the pessimistic view generally, and the differential effect, with a stronger impact on negotiation than mediation, fits with the predictions of the rational choice approach specifically.

Although peacekeeping may have little impact in producing partial settlements, it has a negative influence in promoting broader conflict resolution.



Peacekeeping Goes Downward at Debacle in Eastern Congo. PSM

Hatcher, Jessica. "Defining Peacekeeping Downward: The U.N. Debacle in Eastern Congo." . TIME, 26 Nov 2012. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<http://world.time.com/2012/11/26/defining-peacekeeping-downward-the-u-n-debacle-in-eastern-congo/>.

At 9 a.m. on Monday, Nov. 20, one of the few tanks belonging to the M23 rebels of eastern Congo fired a single round into the international airport on the outskirts of Goma, the second biggest city in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The townspeople, who looked up to see the first of 1,000 or so guerrillas marching on the city, began walking and running toward the city center, carrying their children and anything else they could. After a short while they were overtaken — by two large trucks packed with foreign soldiers from the U.N. peacekeeping force for Congo, Monusco. Mandated to protect Congo's civilians, with 19,000 men in uniform and **costing \$1.4 billion a year, the world's biggest and most expensive peacekeeping operation was literally leaving its charges in its dust.** Later in the day Monusco, far better armed and more numerous than the rebels, simply stood and watched as the M23 — easterners who oppose the central government in Kinshasa — took Goma almost without firing a shot. France called Monusco's conduct "absurd."

The Congolese were less forgiving. Across the east of the country, angry mobs surrounded U.N. positions, threw stones at aid workers and burned U.N. compounds. Asked what they thought of Monusco, a group of young men standing by the shore of Lake Kivu in Goma cried out in unison: **"Useless." Amani Muchumu, 18, had a message for the peacekeepers. "You could not defend us," he declared. "You are dismissed."**

Perhaps worse even than failing to keep or establish peace, Monusco has also failed spectacularly in its most fundamental mission: protecting civilians. In 2005, **MONUC expelled 63 of its soldiers for paying refugee children for sex. A separate internal inquiry the same year found that Pakistani peacekeepers sold weapons to militias in exchange for gold. While those incidents may be exceptional, TIME has seen in repeated trips to eastern Congo how, at the first sign of trouble, blue-helmet peacekeepers habitually barricade themselves into their bases, leaving crowds of several thousand refugees who tend to gather outside to fend for themselves.**



Blue Helmet and Peacekeeping Failure at Sudan. PSM

Smith, David. "UN admits peacekeepers failed in Sudan clashes." . The Guardian, 06 Jun 2011. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/06/un-admits-sudan-peacekeepers-failure>>.

The UN has admitted peacekeepers were wrong to stay in barracks during recent fighting between northern and southern Sudan that left scores of people dead and caused tens of thousands to flee.

General Babacar Gaye, the UN peacekeeping department's top military adviser, found that **"we could have and should have had more visibility to deter any violence against civilians," a spokesman said.**

The fighting and continued tensions over the fertile, oil-rich Abyei region have raised fears of renewed civil war a month before southern Sudan secedes from the north.

UN diplomats reportedly criticised the peacekeepers from Zambia for failing to carry out their mandate to patrol and protect civilians last month.

"They locked themselves up for a couple of days," one was quoted as saying by Reuters. "They were then instructed to come out of their barracks and start patrolling, but they had already lost a crucial 48 hours."

The failings were confirmed when Gaye visited the unit. Michel Bonnardeaux, public affairs officer for the UN department of peacekeeping operations, said: "The military adviser went to Sudan to meet the force commander and troops on the ground.

"He found that we could have and should have had more visibility to deter any violence against civilians and the destruction of property. He has given the appropriate guidance to the force commander and troops to be more proactive and visible."

The UN Missions in Sudan (Unmis) troops were themselves under fire at their base, Bonnardeaux added. "In terms of the physical protection of civilians, it must be recognised that most civilians left the area before the peak of the crisis and that Unmis troops and civilians were themselves in imminent danger as the Unmis compound itself was hit."

Zambian peacekeepers in Abyei have been criticised before. **In 2008, they refused to allow civilians caught in crossfire between northern and southern Sudanese soldiers into their compound.**



Sudanese Kill Civilians in the Presence of UN Soldiers. PSM

Howden, Daniel. "UN accused of standing by while Sudanese forces killed civilians." . the Independent, 08 Jul 2011. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/un-accused-of-standing-by-while-sudanese-forces-killed-civilians-2308896.html>>.

The UN mission in Sudan stands accused of serious failures in its duty to protect civilians who have been killed in their hundreds during a month-long campaign of violence by the Khartoum government on its restive southern border.

Eyewitnesses described to The Independent how they saw peacekeepers standing by while unarmed **civilians were shot dead outside the gates of a UN base before being dragged away "like slaughtered sheep"**. They also said that local leaders have been handed over to government forces after seeking shelter with UN officials.

The violence has driven tens of thousands of civilians into hiding in the Nuba Mountains, which are controlled by rebel fighters and where public anger at the UN has left peacekeepers afraid to leave their bases, according to officers from the mission's Egyptian contingent.

When fighting erupted in the South Kordofan state capital of Kadugli in early June, tens of thousands of terrified civilians flocked to a "safe haven" directly outside the gates of the UN Missions in Sudan (Unmis) base.

Hawa Mando, a school teacher, reached the camp for internally displaced people on 5 June with her family after fighting in the town **forced her to flee her home**. She witnessed government agents and irregular troops – notorious from atrocities in Darfur – known as the Popular Defence Force entering the camp hunting for people on a list of government critics.

"They had lists of people they were looking for," said the mother of seven. "Local spies would point people out and they would shoot them." **She continued: "In front of my eyes I saw six people shot dead. They just dragged the bodies away by their feet like slaughtered sheep.**

"People were crying and screaming and the UN soldiers just stood and watched in their watchtowers." Kouider Zerrouk, an Unmis spokesman based in Khartoum, denied that peacekeepers had stood by while civilians were killed but did not elaborate.



Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre. PSM

Crossette, Barbara. "U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre." . The New York Times, 16 Nov. 1999. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/un-details-its-failure-to-stop-95-bosnia-massacre.html>>.

Secretary General Kofi Annan laid out in a somber, self-critical report today the tragic story of how the United Nations allowed the Bosnian Muslim "safe area" of Srebrenica to be overrun in **July 1995 by Bosnian Serbs, who then systematically killed thousands of the town's men and boys.**

The fall of Srebrenica became a damaging symbol of **the United Nations' failure at peacekeeping in a new era of civil wars, and it demonstrated the inadequacy of a system that allowed political considerations to color military decisions when troops were under the command of the United Nations.**

"The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever," the report concludes.

The fall of Srebrenica and other towns that the Security Council had identified as safe areas, but then refused to authorize enough troops to defend, led four months later to the **American-sponsored Dayton peace agreement and the introduction of a NATO-led international military force in Bosnia.**

While blame is widely distributed in the report, the self-examination of the United Nations' own record in Srebrenica breaks new ground by effectively condemning the organization's tendency to try to remain neutral in a civil conflict.



Failure of UN Soldiers at Congo. PSM

Crossette, Barbara. "U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre." . The New York Times, 16 Nov. 1999. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/un-details-its-failure-to-stop-95-bosnia-massacre.html>.

There is urgent need to focus on the protection of civilians by fighting Congo's **culture of impunity toward law-breaking**. **There should be absolutely no tolerance for those responsible for sex crimes.**

The illegal exploitation of minerals is one of the major disruptive sources of the conflict. Many believe Congo is cursed with its rich natural resources. The exploitation of those resources needs to be done legally and peacefully.

At the most basic level, we need to restore Congo by investing in the country's civilians, not just its army. Proceeds from mining should fund social projects such as schools and hospitals.

I believe change will come from the ground up. The fact that the Congolese people survived so many hardships shows our strong **will to live in a peaceful society**. **We want to help ourselves, but without security, it will not work.**

Right now it is evident that the Congolese government and the UN have failed to provide basis security to Tosha, Jumaa and thousands of others. **If a state is failing to protect its citizens against such crimes and atrocities, then the international community can be justified in intervening. In the globalised world that we live in today, instability and human insecurity easily cross borders, and inaction may lead to more costly interventions down the line.**



Mysterious Killings Prompt Anger at U.N. and Army. PSM

Ross, Aaron. "Mysterious killings in east Congo prompt anger at U.N. and army." . Reuters, 09 Nov. 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/09/us-congodemocratic-rebels-idUSKBN0IT05N20141109>>.

Since last month, 120 people have been **slaughtered in a wave of mysterious overnight massacres** near Masika's hometown of Eringeti, sowing panic and shattering confidence that Congolese and U.N. forces were making progress in stabilizing the region.

The 23,000-strong U.N. mission has spent years, and billions of dollars, trying to bring peace to the east of this vast central African nation, where more than five million have died since a 1998-2003 civil war.

Dozens of armed groups prowl the region but the success of a tough **new U.N. Intervention Brigade in helping the Congolese army** to rout the largest of these, the Tutsi-led M23 militia, had raised hopes of an end to years of instability.

A year later, the killings in Beni, a territory rich in timber and minerals near the Ugandan border, have stirred up anger against the U.N. mission and President Joseph Kabila. Violent protests have targeted U.N. bases in Beni.

"We are right near these military camps. How has this happened?" Masika asked, standing across the road from where a U.N. helicopter had touched down in an open field.

Authorities have blamed the killings on the Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan Islamist group that has operated in the rugged border region for two decades. Yet the ADF has not claimed responsibility and there is scant evidence.

... Several residents disagreed. "We live in insecurity here in Beni," said Mami Kashirwandi, a local woman. "When the night comes, we don't sleep. Everyone is afraid."

The U.N. mission says it has stepped up patrols and is reinforcing its presence to help the army fight the ADF. Troops from Tanzania, Nepal and Jordan are highly visible in the area. But for people who have grown accustomed to waking up to news of fresh carnage, such reassurances ring hollow. **"We are waiting for solutions and we don't see them,"** said Stephane Kandoli, a technician in Beni.



UN Peacekeepers and Srebrenica and Dutch Court Ruling. PSM

Bosco, David. "When the Blue Helmets are to Blame." . Foreign Policy, 22 Jul 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/22/when_the_blue_helmets_are_to_blame_un_dutch_ruling_srebrenica>.

What happens when international peacekeepers turn their backs on people seeking protection? **Recently, a Dutch court decided that a government can be held legally responsible for the failures of peacekeeping troops it has sent abroad. For victims' families, the ruling is an important victory, one that not only identifies the peacekeepers' failures but paves the way for compensation.** For countries that dispatch peacekeepers to crisis zones around the world, however, the decision could be a worrisome precedent.

Nineteen years ago this summer, **Bosnian Serb forces operating near the town of Srebrenica committed the worst massacre in Europe since World War II.** In all, Serb forces executed more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys. As the town fell, **a Dutch battalion of U.N. peacekeepers assigned to protect the area fired not a single shot at the advancing Serbs.** Warplanes dropped a total of one bomb before U.N. commanders decided that a military operation to save the enclave was too risky. **The Dutch peacekeepers, outnumbered and outgunned, later turned over to Serb forces Muslims who were sheltering on their compound; many of these people were later executed.**

There have been multiple international legal cases over what transpired in Srebrenica, most notably the trial of former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic (who died before a verdict was reached) and Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. In 2004, international judges found Bosnian Serb general Radislav Krstic guilty of abetting genocide in Srebrenica. The failure of the international community to prevent the massacre also spawned a series of commissions of inquiry, including one completed by the United Nations in 1999. **It concluded that the organization "failed to do [its] part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder."**

For the families of those killed, the process of more precisely identifying the responsible parties and holding them accountable has been agonizingly slow and incomplete. In 2007, one frustrated group of Srebrenica victims opted to focus on the culpability of the country that sent the peacekeepers to Srebrenica -- the Netherlands. Several relatives of Srebrenica victims filed claim in Dutch court against both the Dutch government and the United Nations for the failure of the peacekeepers. The judges decided quickly that the United Nations itself enjoyed almost impenetrable legal immunity (as Haiti's cholera victims have discovered). But determining whether the Dutch government bears responsibility has proved to be more complicated. In 2013, the highest Dutch court finally decided that the government could be held responsible for **some limited aspects of the failure in Srebrenica, including not protecting refugees who sought protection.**



United Nations Needs Reform

Deep-Seated Structural Problems AMS

Lederer, Edith. "Syria, Ebola Failures Highlight UN Shortcomings." December 1, 2014. Yahoo News. <http://news.yahoo.com/syria-ebola-failures-highlight-un-shortcomings-175041286.html> **Yahoo News collects vital information on current events as a part of the major media organization, Yahoo.**

"If you can imagine any big multinational corporation keeping its structures the same as in 1945, it would have been destroyed by now in the marketplace," said Patricia Lewis, a nuclear physicist who led the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

The paralysis shows in the debate over what the U.N. itself should be. Most nations agree that the 15-member Security Council — the U.N.'s most powerful body — must adapt to address threats to international security. Yet all reform proposals are repeatedly rejected.

"Those who wield the power don't want to lose the power and they don't want to share it," said Lewis, who is now at the Chatham House think tank in London.

United Nations failures are attributed over and over again to a lack of flexibility in the field. United Nations operations must have the capacity to exercise offensive force to achieve the ambitious goals often laid out for these peacekeepers.



A lack of offensive capabilities leads to UN failures. ASF

Buer, Major Eric F. “United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOMII): A Comparative Analysis of Offensive Air Support” US Marine Corps. 2001.

[http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235146541_United_Task_Force_Somalia_\(UNITAF\)_and_United_Nations_Operations_Somalia_\(UNOSOM_II\)_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Offensive_Air_Support](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235146541_United_Task_Force_Somalia_(UNITAF)_and_United_Nations_Operations_Somalia_(UNOSOM_II)_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Offensive_Air_Support)

The United Nations had more than 16 countries participating in UNOSOM. These nations were mandated to provide troops and equipment per United Nations charter. Yet, these **forces had little offensive capability. They lacked integrated fire support and had no operational mobility and limited tactical mobility.** To the participating nations, there were no vital interests at stake. This lack of support was not atypical for previous United Nations missions. Never had participating countries provided air mobility in support of operations nor had they provided OAS assets. The shift into Chapter VII was a large leap from traditional United Nations roles; **the mission under UNOSOM was designed and manned as most other United Nation missions were organized worldwide.**

There are other pieces of evidence in this brief noting that UNOSOM was a failure for a multitude of reasons. If you require the evidence noting UNOSOM failed look under “Past UN military force failed independently” and “UN forces failed in Somalia due to offensive limitations.” taglines.



A lack of offensive infrastructure leads to failure: Somalia. ASF

The UNOSOM II OAS assets through June of 1992 were primarily the AH-1s from the 10th Mountain and the AV-8B Harriers and AH-1Ws from the 24th MEU. **There was no command and control at the UNOSOM II level. Bir's staff had no standing JFACC and had no established procedures to effectively coordinate requests.** The airport was still under the control of United Nation and United States controllers, **but the infrastructure to process and coordinate any type of OAS was lost.**

The 10th Mountain had used their OAS assets as an independent maneuver element and had not been heavily tasked by the JFACC during UNITAF. The JFACC had primarily concerned itself with naval OAS assets. The Marines had coordinated the use of attack helicopters as part of the JFACCs air tasking order (ATO).

UNOSOM II would only indirectly have the 24th MEUs AV-8Bs as fixed wing assets⁴⁹. **The MEU was not a participating UNOSOM II force member; they were attached to the QRF⁵⁰.** The AV-8Bs did have the ability to conduct long-range visual reconnaissance through the use of their heads-up-display cameras. This information provided the MEU commander and the QRF commander raw data on large convoy movements coming from Kenya.

The lack of an integrated air picture was a major limitation to the UNOSOM II staff. The lack of OAS assets combined with the expanded mandate would frustrate UNSOM II. The United States Army would begin to remove all of their assets from outside Mogadishu by May of 1993. They would consolidate and support UNOSOM II from the airport. The 24th MEU would depart in July of 1993, a departure highlighted by an attempt to capture Aideed. Aideed was considered the catalyst of the 5 June attack of a Pakistani ground patrol that left more than 25 KIA.

As the operation in Somalia switched from US control to UN control, the UN did not have the infrastructure to properly lead offensive air support, and thus had many setbacks. The UN should have offensive infrastructure, such as the peacekeepers, to at least have a system in place to deal with trading off leadership positions of military operations. This argument becomes unique because it doesn't derive its impact from the benefit of the UN being justified in intervening, but rather being able to sustain operations without creating further problems.



A lack of manpower results in UN weakness. ASF

Dobbins, James. Jones, Seth G. Cran, Keith. Rathmell, Andrew. Steel, Brett. Teltschik, Richard. Timilsina, Anga. “The UN’s Role In Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq” RAND Corporation. 2005.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf

Over the years, the United States and the United Nations have developed distinctive styles of nation-building derived from their very different natures and capabilities. **The United Nations is an international organization entirely dependent on its members for the wherewithal to conduct nation- building.** The United States is the world’s only superpower, commanding abundant resources of its own and having access to those of many other nations and institutions.

UN operations have almost always been undermanned and under- resourced. This is not because UN managers believe smaller is better, although some do. **It is because member states are rarely willing to commit the manpower or the money any prudent military commander would desire. As a result, small and weak UN forces are routinely deployed** into what they hope, on the basis of best-case assumptions, will prove to be post- conflict situations. Where such assumptions prove ill founded, UN forces have had to be reinforced, withdrawn, or, in extreme cases, rescued.

This evidence sets up a decent link as to why increasing offensive, military manpower would solve UN failure and increase efficacy.



Offensive forces increase peacekeeper presence. ASF

Jorgic, Drazen. "Somalia, peacekeepers launch offensive against militants: U.N." Reuters. March 12, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-somalia-un-idUSBREA2B1ST20140312>

U.N.-backed peacekeepers pushed the Islamist fighters out of Mogadishu in 2011, but the al Qaeda-linked group has continued to launch guerrilla-style attacks there and kept control of several towns and many rural areas.

A new offensive to capture the remaining territory had been expected ever since the U.N. Security Council in November authorized an increase of more than 4,000 peacekeepers for the African peacekeeping force known as AMISOM, from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Sierra Leone.

This just notes that the deployments of offensive forces are in addition to non-offensive UN forces.

Why UN Needs Stronger Standing Army. PSM

Rachman, Gideon. "Why the world needs a United Nations army." . The Financial Times LTD., 20 Jul 2009. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/325b3c42-7558-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0.html>

But while there really is something like an "international community" at work in the seas off Somalia, the picture is a lot less impressive on dry land. In the capital, Mogadishu, a 4,600 strong African Union force is struggling to hold off Islamist insurgents who recently got within half a mile of the presidential palace.

Both the land and sea operations in Somalia show the need to do some urgent thinking about international peacekeeping. The naval operation is impressive, but also disjointed. The land operation is simply inadequate.

In both Somali operations, it would make obvious sense to give the United Nations a bigger role as the co-ordinator and mobiliser of peacekeeping efforts.

Over the longer term, the growing demand for international peacekeeping forces means that it is time finally to bite the bullet and give the UN a permanent, standing military capacity.



The idea of a “UN army” remains deeply controversial. Critics can point to some horrendous peacekeeping failures. In the 1990s UN forces failed to prevent the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre. More recently, UN-mandated troops were involved in sex crimes in the Congo. Like many international bureaucracies, the UN is often not a pretty sight when viewed from close quarters.

Many nations also have understandable qualms about a permanent, multinational military force, intervening all over the world. The Americans do not put their forces under UN commanders. It often falls to poorer countries, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia, to provide most of the troops for UN operations. **But they worry that setting up a permanent force would mean that they would lose the ability to pick and choose which missions they take part in.**

Yet the demand for UN peacekeeping forces keeps going up. There are currently 116,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the world in 17 different operations – an eightfold increase since 1999. Only the US has more troops deployed around the world than the UN.

Alongside the well-publicised UN peacekeeping failures, **there have been many quiet successes – Cambodia, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Nepal, to name a few.** For the west’s over-stretched armies, international peacekeepers often look like a cheap and attractive option. **Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN, says that for every dollar the US spends on an equivalent military deployment, the UN spends 12 cents.** The UN flag also brings a global legitimacy that a Nato or EU operation cannot muster.

US Supports UN Peacekeeping and Army. PSM

Anna, Cara. "US, others vow to strengthen UN peacekeeping." . Associated Press News, 26 Sept. 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/4e372422d25f46ca95eb17a228970fed/us-others-vow-strengthen-un-peacekeeping>>.

The U.N. doesn't have its own standing army and relies on contributions from its 193 member states. In recent years, stress has soared as peacekeepers have been sent to the front lines of everything from ethnic conflict to Islamic extremism. This month, the U.N. withdrew its peacekeepers from many positions on the Golan Heights after 45 Fijian peacekeepers were held for two weeks by fighters from the al-Qaida-linked Nusra Front.

According to the U.N., 102 peacekeepers died in 2013, 36 from direct attacks and others from accidents and illnesses. The secretary-general on Friday included the Ebola outbreak as a looming security issue.



At the end of the meeting, U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power said more than 30 countries had **stepped up with "concrete commitments" to improving operations that range from South Sudan to the India-Pakistan border.**

The speed of U.N. peacekeeping response is crucial. Its operation in the Central African Republic took over from the African Union on Sept. 15, nine months after violence between Christians and Muslims erupted. **The force remains only about 65 percent of what the Security Council authorized in April. Timing of deployment of U.N. peacekeepers depends greatly on when member states send money, troops or both.**

The budget for U.N. peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year from July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015, is just **over \$7 billion.** It is separate from the U.N.'s regular operating budget and the U.S. pays the largest share, over 28 percent, followed by Japan at nearly 11 percent. Rwanda is the fifth-largest contributor of troops to U.N. peacekeeping.

Leaders and foreign ministers **pledged aid ranging from helicopters to police to intelligence support**, but with few specifics. Earlier this week, Mexico said it would return to U.N. peacekeeping after decades, and China said it was sending a 700-member infantry battalion to help the operation in South Sudan, where tens of thousands of people have taken shelter for months in U.N. bases to escape ethnic violence.

The U.S., which says it **plans to contribute \$1.9 billion to peacekeeping this fiscal year, down from \$2.1 billion the previous year**, announced it would review its contribution to peacekeeping efforts.

Friday's meeting came as the U.N. is about to begin its first wholesale, high-level review of peacekeeping operations in 15 years. "This will be a particularly exciting year," peacekeeping chief Herve Ladsous said.

US Ambassador to UN praises Rwandan Peacekeepers and Implies Need for More Offensive Powers. PSM

Long, Nick. "US Ambassador to UN Praises Rwandan Peacekeepers." . Voice of America, 31 Jul 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.voanews.com/content/un-could-learn-lessons-from-rwandan-peacekeepers-says-us-ambassador/1968820.html>>.

Referring to this report, Ambassador Power described it as troubling. She contrasted the U.N.'s performance with that of regional organizations, such as the African Union and the **Economic Community of West African States, which she said have been willing to take on robust protection mandates.**



She suggested the U.N. could draw **lessons from Rwanda's leadership in particular, as well as that of other countries like Ethiopia and Nepal.**

Rwandan troops are in demand as peacekeepers, and currently **about 5,500 of them are deployed with U.N. and AU missions, mainly in Darfur, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.**

Kasper Agger, of the U.S. based **anti-genocide organization the Enough Project, has observed the Rwandan troops with the AU mission in the C.A.R.**

"I think they've done a good job. I mean they've been willing to put themselves on the line to protect civilians, to protect humanitarian workers. They also **come from a country with a terrible history of genocide and particularly when the fighting was hitting a high (in C.A.R.),** you got the feeling that the local population and the Rwandans could identify with each other's experiences," stated Agger. VOA observed Rwandan peacekeepers at work in the C.A.R. and asked local people what they thought of them. Truck drivers transporting essential supplies into C.A.R. told **VOA that when Rwandan soldiers were deployed to guard their convoys, they took the job seriously. For example, they would stay with any trucks that broke down instead of abandoning them, as other peacekeepers had.**



Dangerous, Valuable Work of U.N. Peacekeepers. PSM

Schlesinger, Stephen. "The dangerous, valuable work of U.N. peacekeepers." . The LA Times, 18 Sept. 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-schlesinger-endangered-peacekeepers-20140919-story.html>>.

In mid-August, two United Nations peacekeepers from Burkina Faso were killed and several wounded in a suicide attack in the Timbuktu region of northern Mali. In early September, also in **Mali, four peacekeeping troops from Chad lost their lives and many were injured when their convoy hit a mine.**

This brings the total number of U.N. personnel who have died so far this year due to hostile action to 12; last year, 36 lost their lives. In **addition, in late August, 45 U.N. peacekeepers from Fiji monitoring the Golan Heights were seized by a Syrian militant group allied with Al Qaeda and held as hostages for two weeks before being released Sept. 11.**

In short, the U.N.'s famed corps of neutral troops and observers has been under attack around the globe.

Most U.N. peacekeeping enterprises have taken place under extraordinarily tricky and dangerous conditions. **That's not surprising since they are looking after openly contested terrain in the aftermath of vicious conflicts.**

Today, there are more than 100,000 U.N. peacekeepers, uniformed and civilian, in the field. There are 17 missions; the longest has lasted 66 years (in the Middle East involving Israel and its Arab neighbors); others are more recent, such as Mali in 2013 and the Central African Republic this year. **The remainder are Afghanistan, the Ivory Coast, Haiti, Darfur, the Republic of the Congo, Abyei in Sudan, South Sudan, Western Sahara, Lebanon, Kosovo, Liberia, India-Pakistan (since 1949) and the Golan Heights.**

The U.N. peacekeeping budget is **about \$7 billion a year.** The United States is the largest financial contributor to the operations, though it disputes some of its share of the costs and still lags in its payments.

...Still, the missions seem to get at best only cursory attention from the global community — and usually only when peacekeepers come under attack, are detained or are killed. As the world grows more dangerous, the role of peacekeepers will only become more vital. Member states of **the U.N. should keep up their financial and political support for the operations to ensure the planet's safety for the coming decades.**



In France, UN Chief Praises Peacekeeping and Asks for More Military and Offensive Power.
PSM

United Nations, . "In France, UN chief praises peacekeeping contributions, urges political progress in Mali." . United Nations News Center. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

"I highly appreciate the very important contribution and sacrifice of France toward bringing about peace, security and development for the Malian people," Mr. Ban told the press after meeting with French President Francois Hollande at the Elysee Palace in Paris.

In early 2013, a rebellion of ethnic Tuareg groups followed by an insurgency of Islamist extremists displaced hundreds of thousands in Mali and prompted the Government to request assistance from France to halt the southward march of the extremists, as an African-led force, known as AFISMA, gradually built strength.

Earlier this month, the **UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), took over from the African-led force, with a Security Council mandate "to use all necessary means" to carry out security-related stabilization tasks, protect civilians, UN staff and cultural sites and create the conditions for provision of humanitarian aid.**

In today's meeting with Mr. Hollande, the Secretary-General said he told the French President that he counted on his continued leadership and support in Mali. **"As you know well," he told correspondents, "the mandate of MINUSMA requires many capabilities such as armed military helicopters.**

"I asked the President to consider providing such capabilities," he added.

Yesterday, he said, as he watched the parades celebrating Bastille Day, **"I was very moved to see the Blue Helmets at the side of Malian forces as well as French Forces – in particular those of Operation Serval." The Operation is the French security mission in Mali.**



Let U.N. Have its Own Standing Army. PSM

Vanhulle, Patrick. "Criticism grows over United Nations' peacekeeping concept." . Deutsche Welle, 19 Aug. 2009. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.dw.de/criticism-grows-over-united-nations-peacekeeping-concept/a-4582007>>.

The UN currently has 16 peacekeeping operations on the go around the world with more than 110,000 troops and staff and **questions are being raised about costs and efficiency.**

Not surprisingly the United Kingdom put peacekeeping on the agenda this month, as chair of the Security Council's rotating presidency. **London has long been critical about the increasing number and costs of UN peacekeeping missions. Since 2000, the annual budget for blue helmet missions has more than tripled to \$8 billion (5.63 billion euros).**

In his opening statement to the Security Council earlier this month Sir John Sawers, the UK ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations, called peacekeeping "a unique global partnership" and peacekeepers "a scarce asset ... (who must be) deployed to maximum effect in the places where they are needed most."

There was plenty to read between those lines. **Britain and France have been at the forefront of a debate demanding exit strategies before signing off on new peacekeeping mandates. London and Paris have also stressed the necessity of political solutions going hand in hand with peacekeeping missions.**

... Poor countries deliver most peacekeepers. At the same time their voice is barely heard in the Security Council, says Zumach: "Two of the five permanent members of the Security Council never sent out a single peacekeeping soldier - the US and China - and Russia or the former Soviet Union only very reluctantly. There is not much protest among the other members, because they don't like it when one of the big five gets involved militarily, which also then implies a heavy national interest. In background talks you hear ambassadors of poor countries complaining about these discrepancies, but for political reasons they would not go public with their criticism."

The German expert favours an alternative solution: let the UN have its own standing army. Only then, says Zumach, "would the secretary-general no longer have to go around the world like a beggar asking for national contingents."



U.N. Questions Criticisms of Its Peacekeepers. PSM

Gladstone, Rick. "U.N. Questions Criticism of Its Peacekeepers." . The New York Times, 10 Oct. 2013. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/world/un-questions-criticism-of-its-peacekeepers.html?_r=0>.

The United Nations responded on Thursday with a **mix of diplomatic decorum and criticism to a report asserting systemic flaws in the way that it selects and trains peacekeeping troops**. The conclusions of the report, undertaken by Transparency International UK, a prominent corruption monitoring group, appeared to have surprised and **angered some United Nations officials**.

The report, released on Wednesday, focused on the practices of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, responsible for managing multinational contingents of nearly 100,000 uniformed personnel in 16 operations around the world. Based on examples of malfeasance investigated and made public by United Nations internal auditors, the **report suggested that the organization was not paying enough attention to preventing corrupt behavior by its peacekeepers, particularly in conflict zones where corruption is endemic**.

...At the same time, he said, “the report tries to cover a multitude of issues related to the broad subject of corruption — **in some parts this leads the report to some superficial analysis and findings**.” While the report suggested the United Nations confronted a crisis in its peacekeeping work, he said, there was no explanation provided of the research methodology to reach such a conclusion. He also said the **report did “not provide much substantiation or sense of scale or the risk.”**

Some United Nations officials **questioned** how Transparency International UK had **selected the examples of corruption and whether the organization should have contacted them during its research**.



Calls Grow for Creation of U.S. Standing Army. PSM

Perelman, Marc. "Calls Grow for Creation of Standing U.N. Army Read more:
<http://forward.com/articles/11552/calls-grow-for-creation-of-standing-un-army-/>

With the unchecked violence in Darfur exposing the United Nations' continued inability to respond quickly to unfolding crises, several members of Congress have joined an international coalition of nongovernmental organizations in calling for a standing emergency peacekeeping force.

The envisioned U.N. Emergency Peace Service would be 15,000 to 18,000 strong and include not only military and police personnel but also engineers, relief workers and judicial experts. While most member states are reluctant to create such a permanent force, it has a measure of bipartisan support and legislation recommending its creation may be taken up by the House International Relations Committee this fall.

"We feel the U.N. does not have an adequate rapid response structure, and this could be the solution," said Brian Baluta, a spokesman for Republican Rep. James Walsh of New York. Walsh, a former Peace Corps member, is co-sponsor of the bill supporting the U.N. force, along with Maryland Democratic Rep. Albert Wynn. Backers of the U.N. Emergency Peace Service, known as Uneps, say that their **main objective is not to replace the growing number of U.N. peacekeeping missions but rather to address the lag time between deciding to send a mission and actually deploying the troops.** The process can take months, and it often includes time-consuming negotiations among U.N. member states and within the U.N. bureaucracy.

The concept of a standing U.N. peacekeeping force has been around since the world body's creation in 1945; however, **due to member states' concerns about preserving their sovereignty, it never materialized.** Now a coalition of 37 civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Refugees International, Rainbow/PUSH and a variety of Christian groups, believes that conditions are conducive to the formation of such a force.

The coalition points to two developments at the U.N. as signs that the peacekeeping department, which has conducted a number of successful operations in recent years but is widely perceived to be overstretched, is ready to take on a more permanent mission.



UN Peacekeepers Fail when We Most Need Them. PSM

Rohde, David. "The UN Keeps Failing, Right When We Really Need It." . The Atlantic, 12 Apr 2013. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/the-un-keeps-failing-right-when-we-really-need-it/274962/>>.

This week a former United Nations employee described a pervasive culture of impunity inside the organization - one in which whistle-blowers are punished for exposing wrongdoing. James Wasserstrom, a veteran American diplomat, said he was fired from his job and detained by U.N. police - **who searched his apartment and placed his picture on wanted posters - after he reported possible corruption among senior U.N. officials in Kosovo.**

"It's supposed to be maintaining the ideals of human rights, the rule of law and anti-corruption," Wasserstrom said in an interview. "And it doesn't adhere to them on the inside."

The United Nations is under attack as well for its decision last month to pay no compensation to the families of 8,000 Haitians who died and 646,000 who fell ill from a 2010 cholera outbreak that experts believe Nepalese U.N. peacekeepers set off in the country.

The organization, though, remains a vital tool. On Thursday, President Barack Obama used a White House meeting with U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to pressure North Korea. Administration officials hope that punishing new U.N. economic sanctions , supported by China for the first time, will cause North Korea to end its saber rattling.

"It's important for North Korea, like every other country in the world," Obama said, "to observe the basic rules and norms that are set forth, including a wide variety of U.N. resolutions."

The United Nations has been, and will always be, an imperfect institution. Its greatest strength - and weakness - is its 193 member states. Getting a majority to agree on major issues, pass reform or refrain from political patronage can be maddening. Russia's shameful blocking of Security Council action against Syria, for example, has shown the continued limitations of that antiquated body.



Failure of Peacekeepers at Lebanon. PSM

Rosett, Claudia. "Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping in Lebanon." . Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 06 Jan. 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping in Lebanon>.

The Iranian-spawned terrorist group Hezbollah is smuggling advanced guided-missile systems into Lebanon, according to a report last week in *The Wall Street Journal*. This development highlights the failure of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, and raises urgent questions about whether the U.N. should continue to be entrusted with this job.

Known as UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), this U.N. peacekeeping mission is hardly interim. It has been in place for more than 35 years. Set up in 1978, UNIFIL expanded greatly after the brief 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel that began with Hezbollah attacking an Israeli patrol, killing three Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two others (their bodies were ultimately ransomed by Israel after the U.N. failed to recover them).

Under terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, prompted by the 2006 war, **UNIFIL was to be part of the U.N. effort to ensure that Hezbollah did not rearm, and that southern Lebanon, bordering on Israel, would be, “an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons,” apart from those of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL itself.**

Since 2006, billions of dollars have been spent on UNIFIL, with more than one-quarter of the funding coming from U.S. taxpayers. Currently, UNIFIL has an annual budget of more than \$492 million, and employs well over 10,000 troops and almost 1,000 civilian staff.

UNIFIL contingents provide services to the local community, such as computer training, and free dental, medical and veterinary care. UNIFIL also provides training in bread making, yoga, knitting and taekwondo, and last year tried to enhance its image with a “Women of UNIFIL” calendar.

But in its prime mission of keeping weapons out of the hands of Hezbollah, UNIFIL has failed. Hezbollah has been engaged for years in a massive arms buildup, which by now includes far more weapons, with far greater range and sophistication, than it had in 2006. The Israeli government in 2009 released information -- complete with maps -- that Hezbollah had tripled the size of its arsenal, building almost 1,000 military facilities, including more than 550 weapons bunkers.



Permissibility Under International Law

Using International Law and UN Charters and precedents can easily be skewed to sound biased, after all, the UN made the law. When examining the restrictions set on them (read the analysis that goes with the evidence) you see that the UN actually limits itself to acting only on member states when using military force (meaning that those countries opted in knowing that condition). A second reason why these mandates and statutes are preferable as a good guide to moral authority is that the global community at large seems to deem them fit for how the world is run, and thus these laws have collective approval by the majority of the world's leaders and countries.

International law allows for military intervention of UN member states. ASF

Simma, Bruno. "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" European Journal of International Law. 1999. <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/567.pdf>

The law of the UN Charter provides two exceptions from the prohibition expressed in Article 2(4) (the mechanism of the so-called 'enemy-state-clauses' (Articles 53 and 107) should be left aside as it is now unanimously considered obsolete). **The first exception**, embodied in Article 51 of the Charter, **is available to states which find themselves to be victims of aggression:**

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. **Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.**

The exception to the international prohibition on military intervention seems to be based on conditions that 1) the victimized country is a member of the UN and 2) the UN force is deployed in the name of restoring peace and security.



UN intervention would be limited to armed conflicts. ASF

Simma, Bruno. "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" *European Journal of International Law*. 1999. <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/567.pdf>

According to the UN Charter, then, individual or collective self-defence through the use of armed force is only permissible in the case of an 'armed attack'. Like Article 2(4), Article 51 has become the subject of certain gross (mis-)interpretations, most of them put forward during the Cold War when the Security Council regularly found itself in a state of paralysis. Against such attempts to turn a clearly defined exception to the comprehensive Charter ban on the threat or use of force into a convenient basis for all sorts of military activities, it should be emphasized once again that Article 51 unequivocally limits whatever farther-reaching right of self-defence might have existed in pre-Charter customary international law to the case of an 'armed attack'. In particular, any offensive self-help by threats or use of armed force without a basis in Chapter VII has been outlawed by the *jus cogens* of the Charter.

Even though the force itself is offensive, it is being deployed in the name of self-defense of a state. The definition of an offensive force is one that may independently engage in conflict. This should not be confused with a state's self-defense actions, under which offensive forces may be deployed to retain sovereignty and protect human rights.

UN may utilize military force in the name of international peace. ASF

Simma, Bruno. "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" *European Journal of International Law*. 1999. <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/567.pdf>

With regard to the second exception to the Charter ban on armed force, Chapter VII constitutes the very heart of the global system of collective security. According to its provisions, the Security Council, after having determined that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression has occurred, may, if necessary, take military enforcement action involving the armed forces of the Member States. In actual UN practice, it is now common for such enforcement action to be carried out on the basis of a mandate to, or more frequently of an authorization of, states which are willing to participate, either individually or in *ad hoc* coalitions or acting through regional or other international organizations, among them prominently NATO. While the implementation of Chapter VII through a 'franchising system' of this kind creates numerous problems of its own, it is universally accepted that a Security Council authorization granted under Chapter VII establishes a sufficient basis for the legality of the use of armed force employed in conformity with the respective Council Resolution(s). Conversely, any threat or use of force that is neither justified as self-defence against an armed attack nor authorized by the Security Council must be regarded as a violation of the UN Charter.



Securing humanitarian means is basis for intervention. ASF

Simma, Bruno. “NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” European Journal of International Law. 1999. <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/567.pdf>

The question of the legality versus the illegality of so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’ must be answered in light of the foregoing. Thus, **if the Security Council determines that massive violations of human rights occurring within a country constitute a threat to the peace, and then calls for or authorizes an enforcement action to put an end to these violations, a ‘humanitarian intervention’ by military means is permissible.** In the absence of such authorization, military coercion employed to have the target state return to a respect for human rights constitutes a breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter.

Humanitarian aid when there is no conflict does not justify military force. ASF

Simma, Bruno. “NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” European Journal of International Law. 1999. <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/567.pdf>

Further, **as long as humanitarian crises do not transcend borders, as it were, and lead to armed attacks against other states, recourse to Article 51 is not available.** For instance, **a mass exodus of refugees does not qualify as an armed attack.** In the absence of any justification unequivocally provided by the Charter ‘the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure . . . respect [for human rights]’, to use the words of the International Court of Justice in its 1986 *Nicaragua* judgment.⁸



Goals of Robust Peacekeeping Operations

Why Offensive Operations Work AMS

Nadin, Peter. “Peace Support: A New Concept for UN Peacekeeping?” May 29, 2013.

<http://unu.edu/publications/articles/peace-support-a-new-concept-for-un-peacekeeping.html> Peter Nadin is an independent researcher based in Sydney, Australia. He has worked previously as a research assistant at the United Nations University, and interned with the UNU Institute for Sustainability and Peace and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

When confronted with a robust peace support operation, armed groups have three options open to them:

- **Option 1:** pursue peace; negotiate an agreement; and then disarm, demobilize and reintegrate
- **Option 2:** pursue peace; negotiate an agreement; but renege on the agreement and continue the conflict
- **Option 3:** continue the conflict (status quo)

Armed groups pursuing insecurity for their own gains are likely to continue their peace-spoiling activity, unless they can be persuaded otherwise. The job of a peace support operation is to convince armed groups of the futility of pursuing Options 2 and 3 by attaching a cost to violence. To do this, UN forces (or a separate multinational force) should adopt a robust posture — the idea being to coerce (or preferably co-opt) armed groups into pursuing Option 1: peace.

Adopting a robust posture requires an understanding of the complex environments (characterized by complex physical and human terrain), in which peace support missions are tasked to operate. It also requires a strategy and a set of tactics to match.

Good peacekeeping (as with good counter-insurgency) is akin to “armed social work”, wherein military means serve a political strategy. It’s all about undermining a spoiler’s strategy (“fight his strategy, not his forces”) by building trust with the local population. The end goal is not necessarily the complete defeat of an armed group, but the disarmament of its combatants through coercion.

Once a spoiler understands that he can’t pursue war, at zero cost, peace through disarmament becomes a real possibility. Obviously, UN forces must be adequately equipped to deal with and deter spoilers. This requires bridging of the gap between mandate and means, through the provision of force enablers (such as close-air support, logistics, intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities) and the establishment of cross-mission coordination mechanisms (such as joint operations headquarters).

This piece carefully explains how robust peacekeeping operations can work. Use this piece to explain the process to opponents that claim robust operations will make peace more difficult to achieve.



The United Nations' peacekeepers need to be an enforcement mechanism. DAT

**Hempson III, Donald A. "Avoiding the Scourge of War: the Challenges of United Nations Peacekeeping." Origins, vol. 5, issue 1. Ohio State University. October 2011.
Web. <http://origins.osu.edu/article/avoiding-scurge-war-challenges-united-nations-peacekeeping>**

Donald A. Hempson, III runs the Global Studies program for the College of Engineering at The Ohio State University.

In the nearly two decades since the United Nations ventured into second-generation peacekeeping in both Bosnia and Somalia, the organization has come to recognize the limitations of its approach to peacekeeping. **Still haunted by the memories of UNOSOM and conscious of a mixed record of peacekeeping elsewhere in Africa (perhaps most notably in Rwanda), the United Nations has repeatedly refused to deploy a third peacekeeping mission to Somalia.**

Yet as this crisis continues to unfold, the United Nations must reflect upon its own commitment to the principle of peacekeeping and determine whether an appropriate strategy exists that can responsibly and effectively balance its ideal of saving the world from the "scourge of war" with the realities on the ground in these conflict zones.

Beginning in the 1990s, peacekeeping became more complex and in reality became less about keeping an existing peace and more about implementing and enforcing an externally imposed peace.

The United Nations expanded the function of peacekeeping to meet the challenges of a post-Cold War landscape. As peacekeeping increasingly responded to internal conflicts and civil wars, the political, economic, social, and security functions became more complex and required greater participation by a broad array of international and regional organizations.

Beginning the 1990s, the UN began its "second generation" of peacekeeping. This entailed increasing the scope of peacekeeping operations to include policing, elections enforcement, and generally greater levels of integration with local populations. This has been in tandem with increased levels of sectarian violence which the UN involves itself with. The addition of offensive capability is logically in parallel with the increased responsibilities of UN peacekeepers in increasingly hostile zones.



UN is increasing its focus on women and children. ASF

Clancy, Mary Alice C. Hamber, Brandon. “Trauma, Peacebuilding, and Development: An overview of key positions and critical questions”. INCORE and IDRC. September 9, 2008. http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Topics/Dealing_with_the_Past/Resources/Clancy_Mary_Trauma_Peacebuilding_and_Development.pdf

Moreover, there has been a greater recognition that peacebuilding activities need to be understood in more nuanced ways. For example, **reflecting wider UN debates regarding the rights of children and women’s political participation** (United Nations, 1989; 2000), **and particularly the passing of UN Resolution 1325, it is now recognised that “peacebuilding” should encompass both efforts to address how conflict differentially affects both women and children** and attempts to render them agents, rather than just objects, of peace and development activities (McCallin, 1991; Porter, 2007). That said, **despite advancement in this area and the recognition of the role of women in the peacebuilding process, the evidence suggest that “many of the peacebuilding and reconstruction institutional frameworks and their implementation continue to fail to address underlying gender roles and associated power dynamics** that lay the basis for institutionalized gender discrimination” (Strickland & Duvvury, 2003, p. 2; for more recent discussions on this topic see Mukhopadhyay & Singh, 2007; and Binder, Lukas & Schweiger, 2008).

The UN is attempting to reform in the status quo in order to more properly treat and address women and children. This should at least mitigate some harms the negative may cite in relation to these two agents.



An Increase of U.N. Intervention is Expected

The UN represents a body of basic universal rights and protections, and will defend them.

ASF

Mirbagheri, Farid. [Director of Research at Centre for World Dialogue] “Conflicting Interests: The United Nations versus Sovereign Statehood” Centre for World Dialogue. Global Dialogue Vol. 2 Num. 2 Spring 2000 <http://www.worlddialogue.org/print.php?id=79>

One of the United Nations’ most enshrined principles is state sovereignty. **States are viewed as untouchable entities which may do as they please within their internationally recognised borders.** This principle, however, **is both theoretically and practically problematic.** At the theoretical level, **the world neither can nor should sit by and watch** an oppressive state commit **genocide or violent repression.** The example of the former apartheid regime in South Africa clearly illustrates the point. The apartheid government continually rejected criticism of its policies as interference in South Africa’s internal affairs. But **the international community did not allow the doctrine of state sovereignty to protect the country’s system of institutionalised racism.** Accordingly, resolution after resolution by the General Assembly condemned the South African government for its conduct.

There is precedent set protecting state sovereignty, but when the U.N. takes an action against a specific state, diplomatic or militaristic, it would be stopped by former doctrines if a member of the global community deemed the action unfit or unjust.



UN intervention is justified if it's for security. ASF

Mirbagheri, Farid. [Director of Research at Centre for World Dialogue] “Conflicting Interests: The United Nations versus Sovereign Statehood” Centre for World Dialogue. Global Dialogue Vol. 2 Num. 2 Spring 2000 <http://www.worlddialogue.org/print.php?id=79>

At the practical level, **the world’s growing interdependence increasingly links internal and international peace and security.** If the new interpretation of security is stability and growth, as opposed to the traditional definition of military might, then instability in one corner of the world can have a global impact. The phenomenon of **globalisation**, which is itself at odds with the state system, **requires the “desanctification” of borders and a gradual erosion of state sovereignty.**

The “neurosis of independence”, as referred to by the late John Holmes² (these days “neurosis of sovereignty” might be more apt), is a direct result of the current state system. Independent statehood, that most elevated form of recognition, appeals to an ever-growing number of communities. Part of its attraction is the protection it is believed to offer oppressed minorities. The Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, the Basques in Spain, Chechens in the Russian Federation and many other communities feel it legitimate to demand sovereignty. **Yet the very fabric of the international system, which is reflected in the UN Charter, cannot sanction such transformations [to independent statehood*]**—at least, not if complete anarchy is to be avoided. In short, the state system cannot answer the very questions it itself raises. The United Nations, working within such a framework, is given the impossible task of producing miraculous solutions for a variety of conflicts which share the same core element.

***Brackets inserted for clarity purposes**

UN intervention focuses on maximizing the stability of the world. This means that if they intervene they are attempting to avoid larger potential fallout and reduce the overall cost of lives. This card can help weigh arguments for opportunity cost.



UN Peace Army Expands with Obama Support. PSM

Newman, Alex. "UN "Peace" Armies to Drastically Expand with Obama's Support." *The New American*, 02 Oct 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/item/19233-un-peace-armies-to-drastically-expand-with-obama-s-support>>.

Meeting on the sidelines of the 69th session of the dictator-dominated UN General Assembly, the summit last week on **global "peacekeeping" was hosted by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and UN boss Ban Ki-moon.** Other senior politicians and representatives of tyrants whose governments contribute large numbers of troops or major amounts of taxpayer funding were also in attendance. Among them: Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. High-level representatives for over 30 governments and dictatorships also attended to make pledges. **Right now, the UN has more than 130,000 troops deployed around the world — a record — but insists that is not enough.**

"The global security landscape is shifting dramatically," Ban argued in his pitch for a stronger, faster, and more heavily armed military force under UN command to intervene around the world in an increasingly broad range of issues. "Civil conflicts coupled with terrorism, organized crime and health crises such as Ebola are threatening millions of people. More often than not, these dangers transcend borders. United Nations peacekeeping missions are a leading part of the international response to a wide array of threats."

At the top of the controversial UN boss's list of demands were greater "rapid response" capabilities to get troops "to the right place at the right time" using, for instance, more helicopters. He also called for greater coordination between UN forces and troops under the command of regional regimes such as the African Union and the European Union, among others. "What our missions need from all of you is sustained political and diplomatic backing," explained Ban, who was recently in Latin America for a meeting of more than 130 regimes promoting what they all touted as a "New World Order."

American taxpayers already pay the largest share of the UN's military budget at almost 30 percent. For the Obama administration, however, that is not enough. At the summit last week, Biden again touted the administration's plot to supersize contributions from the American taxpayer, with plans to boost U.S. funding levels by a massive 33 percent over 2014's already high levels. As *The New American* reported in April, despite unfathomable levels of odious debt and the economic hardship being **suffered by tens of millions of Americans, the White House is pledging and demanding billions more for military schemes by the UN and various illegitimate "regional" regimes it supports such as the African Union (AU).**



UN's First Offensive Force

UN's First Offensive Combat Force. PSM

Sudarsan, Raghavan. "In volatile Congo, a new U.N. force with teeth." . The Washington Post, 02 Nov 2013. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-with-teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html>.

The U.N. soldiers are in Congo with an ambitious goal: to reverse the trajectory of one of the world's most horrific and complex conflicts, one that has killed more than 5 million people since 1998, the deadliest war since World War II. **They are also here to rescue the image of the troubled U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Congo.**

"To be a peacekeeper doesn't mean you need to be passive," their top commander, Gen. Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, said hours before the offensive began. "To be a peacekeeper, you need to take action. The way to protect the civilians is to take action. If you see the history of atrocities here, it justifies action."

Inaction is precisely what the U.N. mission here has been criticized for in the 14 years since the United Nations dispatched soldiers to Congo, the first members of what has become the largest peacekeeping force in U.N. history. Now, the U.N. Security Council has launched the Forward Intervention Brigade in a bold attempt to defeat the dozens of militias that pillage this mineral-rich central African country, which is roughly the size of Western Europe. The brigade, composed of 3,000 soldiers, is the United Nations' first offensive combat force and is seen as a possible model for defusing crises in other chaotic parts of the world.

But the force is also an unparalleled gamble for the United Nations that challenges the basic principles of peacekeeping. It has orders to react offensively to enforce peace, essentially transforming peacekeepers into combatants. And it is openly supporting Congolese government forces, a move away from the principle of neutrality that has guided other U.N. missions.

That could affect the United Nations' ability to negotiate peace deals with the militias and risks deepening conflicts. Humanitarian agencies are worried that **Congo's brutal militias could see the entire U.N. mission, which also includes aid workers, monitors and civilian experts, as non-neutral potential targets.**

There are also concerns that the U.N. force is propping up a corrupt government and aiding an undisciplined military that has a history of human-rights abuses, including mass rapes. Many Congolese remain skeptical of the new brigade's potential to eradicate the militias. **Others have lofty expectations that could bring disappointment and further antagonism toward the U.N. mission.**

But senior U.N. civilian and military officials, as well as some analysts, say the brigade could be the **United Nations' best chance to help bring meaningful change, and perhaps even a sustainable peace, to Congo.**



Participation of UN's Female Peacekeepers PSM

Shire, Emily. "The UN's Female Peacekeepers." . The Daily Beast, 04 April 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2014/04/04/mothers-of-invention-day-one-response-s-tricia-compass-markman-addresses-disaster-relief-on-an-individual-level0.html>>.

Of the 56 United Nations peacekeeping units in the world, **only three are composed entirely of women**. And their **impact is out of all proportion to their numbers**: often hailing from countries and cultures where they were oppressed and held back simply because they were women, they exert a strong yet soothing presence in war-torn, ravaged nations where they are stationed.

Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, Academy award-winning documentary filmmaker and CEO of SOC Films, is currently at work on *Peacekeepers*, a documentary about the the all-female peacekeeping unit from Bangladesh that has been deployed to Haiti.

Through her time with the Bangladeshi peacekeepers, she saw how much not only the women, but their entire families sacrificed for their year of deployment. "One of the women, her husband could not look after her children, so they had to be sent off hundreds of miles away to other family members," Obaid-Chinoy said. "**The men are taunted: 'You're not man enough. Your wife is so many miles away. I wonder what she's up to.'**"

Despite these sacrifices, Melanne Verveer, the former U.S. ambassador for Global Women's Issues, stressed that having women as peacekeepers—**and in all aspects of the peace-building process—is critical**. "**You desperately need to have the participation of women,**" she says.

Verveer praised the unique and necessary role played by the three all-female peacekeeping units stationed in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti. "Rape is a tool of war. It is the preferred tool in many cases," Verveer said. "**Having women in a peacekeeping force is very comforting to many women. It is a situation in which they can feel better protected.**"

But these female peacekeepers do more than provide security for their fellow women; they inspire them. "Female peacekeepers are so important because they model possibilities for women in the security sector that they never could have imagined for themselves," says Verveer.



UN Peacekeepers Bring Net Benefit to Society. PSM

Kamenir-Reznik, Janice. "Readers React In praise of U.N. peacekeepers." . LA Times, 25 Sept 2014. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.latimes.com/opinion/readersreact/la-le-0926-friday-peacekeepers-20140926-story.html>>.

Stephen Schlesinger highlights the grave dangers facing peacekeepers in a world plagued with escalating turmoil and violence. **With growing turmoil comes a growing need for United Nations peacekeeping missions.**

It is evident that peacekeeping missions are increasingly dangerous and have an imperfect record of success. **Nevertheless, the overwhelming net effect of these missions is indisputably positive. They have stemmed violence, advanced global stability and saved millions of innocent lives.**

We must not allow the recent spate of tragic deaths to blind us to the positive role that peacekeepers play in safeguarding our national security interests and protecting the innocent. As the world's largest funder of global peacekeeping, the United States must continue to provide leadership and wisdom in deploying these forces along with other diplomatic, political and military tools to prevent and resolve conflict.



UAV Use Good

The use of unmanned drones saves lives. ASF

IRIN. [A service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] “NGOs against MONUSCO drones for humanitarian work” IRIN. July 23, 2014.

<http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=100391>

During a 5 May 2014 training exercise involving drones and a patrol vessel to develop strategies to thwart the trafficking of goods to and from neighbouring Rwanda on Lake Kivu, **drones identified a capsized ferry with about 20 people in the water. Helicopters and the patrol boat were alerted and 14 people were rescued.** Without “the coincidence”, all those in the water would probably have drowned, the British officer said.

MONUSCO drones have a maximum range of about 250km and can spend 12 hours in the air, though operations are generally restricted to eight hours. They can be airborne within 30 minutes of being tasked, and on average fly two missions a day.

UAVs are not weaponized. ASF

Oakford, Samuel. “Drones, drones, everywhere: UN ramping up peacekeeper surveillance flights” Aljazeera. August 27, 2014.

<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/27/united-nations-drones.html>

In November 2013, one year after Rwandan-backed M23 rebels dealt U.N. and Congolese soldiers a terrible blow by capturing Goma, the U.N.’s novel attack-minded Force Intervention Brigade retook the city and forced the remaining rebels to surrender. A month later, the first U.N. drone went airborne.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as the U.N. calls them to distinguish them from weaponized drones, have since been deployed consistently, even though their 125-mile range is a limitation in the DRC, which is the size of Western Europe.

“If you understand the geographic dimensions of this country and the difficulty to move around, you can understand why UAVs are very useful,” said Col. Félix Basse, a military spokesman with MONUSCO, the U.N. stabilization mission in the DRC. **“With drones we can observe all armed groups’ movements and their activity, and we can track them down. All these things can be done without deploying troops.”**

The deployment of UAVs helps overcome the terrain challenges peacekeepers face by covering more ground in less time for surveillance purposes. Moreover there are fewer troops on the ground, so it mitigates the human cost, as well as the tension that stems from troop presence.



UAVs act as deterrent force on militias. ASF

Oakford, Samuel. “Drones, drones, everywhere: UN ramping up peacekeeper surveillance flights” Aljazeera. August 27, 2014.

<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/27/united-nations-drones.html>

The UAVs pinpoint illegal mining operations and weapon smugglers and been used along with Congolese forces to attempt to neutralize Ugandan ADF rebels and Mai Mai groups that have been terrorizing North Kivu. MONUSCO is also using them to track Hutu FDLR rebels. Peacekeepers have found that flying the drones unmuffled — so they can be heard better — deters militias and offers civilians a feeling of security from killing and rape.

Though the incident on Lake Kivu did not involve armed groups, it showed the speed with which drones can change the calculus when civilians are in danger.

Because militia don't want to be spotted and trigger offensive aggression, the sound of drones surveying them can cause them to reduce the frequency and occurrence of murder and rape at a faster rate than just troops alone.



Drone deployment is specifically linked with the purpose of assisting offensive force. ASF

Blyth, Fiona. [Fiona Blyth is a former military intelligence officer with the British Army who is interning in the Africa program at the International Peace Institute.] “UN Peacekeeping Deploys Unarmed Drones to Eastern Congo” IPI Global Observatory. February 27, 2013. <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/02/un-peacekeeping-deploys-unarmed-drones-to-eastern-congo/>

The latest decision to deploy UAVs is, however, not solely for force protection, but to support the mandate of MONUSCO by improving the mission’s ability to protect civilians. In a letter to the UNSC in December 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon backed the use of UAVs citing their contribution to “timely decision making.” Here, the value of their deployment is questionable, a query ironically posed by Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame when he asked in a press conference on January 22, “How are these drones going to contribute to the maintenance of peace?” The acquisition of information relating to troop dispositions may not necessarily mean an enhanced ability to fulfill MONUSCO’s mission of protecting civilians, as past failures to protect of civilians have not necessarily always come from a lack of timely information or knowledge that the event was about to or was taking place, but the limited mobility and/or reluctance of troops to act on the information (for a number of reasons ranging from imperfect information to national caveats). In order for the information to be worthwhile, **troops will need to have the capacity to provide decisive responses to the information.** It risks otherwise creating new expectations (particularly in terms of protection of civilians) which blue helmets will (again) not be able to meet.

This card should not be used for impact analysis, as it does cite some potential faults or shortcomings of the drone program overall, however there are no faults specific to the drones other than the last line. It does, however, explicitly say these drones were deployed with the intent of assisting the offensive military force, giving you a link into the argument.



UN drones are not armed. ASF

Blyth, Fiona. [Fiona Blyth is a former military intelligence officer with the British Army who is interning in the Africa program at the International Peace Institute.] “UN Peacekeeping Deploys Unarmed Drones to Eastern Congo” IPI Global Observatory. February 27, 2013. <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/02/un-peacekeeping-deploys-unarmed-drones-to-eastern-congo/>

The drones slated for deployment by the United Nations are unarmed surveillance assets designed to collect information with no strike function, a role that has benefits to the peacekeepers in providing situational awareness and tactical detail. But this information is only valuable if troops have the capability and will to act on it. Otherwise, it risks creating new expectations (particularly in terms of protection of civilians) which blue helmets may (again) not be able to meet.

This is more of a defensive card just to avoid the harms of offensive drones.

UAVs provide unique advantage with unconventional armed groups. ASF

Karlsruud, John. Rosén, Frederik. “In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and the Use of Drones to Protect Civilians” *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 2(2): 27, pp. 1-10. Fall 2013.
<http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/download/sta.bo/85>

Complex operational environments - along with the fact that unconventional armed groups do not travel in easily detectable military equipment such as tanks and ships, but rather move by foot, pickup, or motorbike - call for a different approach to situational awareness besides radar and high-altitude imaging. Drone technology’s possibility of delivering high-quality, close-up images in real time could significantly improve the situational awareness of UN peacekeepers. Consider one possible scenario: an attack on a village a few kilometers from the compound is being reported, yet currently the only way to assess the situation is by moving troops into the area, which could take hours. **With drones, it would take only minutes from the arrival of a report before high-quality images could be reviewed.**

With unconventional groups such as militia, drones could prove to be a key aspect in noting where trouble strikes, as our men on the ground do not have the range, and our radar and traditional surveillance is not equipped to find civilian means of transport that militia use.



UAVs Can Eliminate Risks for Civilians AMS

Sengupta, Somni. “Unarmed Drones Aid U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa.” July 2, 2014. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/world/africa/unarmed-drones-aid-un-peacekeepers-in-africa.html?_r=0 **The New York Times (NYT) is an American daily newspaper, founded and continuously published in New York City since September 18, 1851, by The New York Times Company. It has won 114 Pulitzer Prizes, more than any other news organization.**

One United Nations official recalled an episode this spring in which peacekeepers came under fire from a rebel group that had taken position on a forested hilltop. The peacekeepers had a good idea of where the rebels were shooting from, but they had no idea whether there were civilians around. Sending a reconnaissance helicopter meant risking having it shot down by rebels armed with heavy weapons.

So a drone was sent from Goma. It quietly circled over the ridge line, flashing video images to the screens in the control room. **The drone confirmed the coordinates of the gunmen. More important, it showed that there were no civilians nearby. An attack helicopter was sent immediately. After a couple of strikes, the rebel base was finished, the official recalled.**

The potential use of UAVs in United Nations peacekeeping missions makes an effective rebuttal for arguments that introducing offensive missions will harm civilians. UAVs can be used as an effective monitoring tool to prevent civilian casualties.

UAV Usefulness AMS

Sengupta, Somni. “Unarmed Drones Aid U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa.” July 2, 2014. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/world/africa/unarmed-drones-aid-un-peacekeepers-in-africa.html?_r=0 **The New York Times (NYT) is an American daily newspaper, founded and continuously published in New York City since September 18, 1851, by The New York Times Company. It has won 114 Pulitzer Prizes, more than any other news organization.**

The United Nations insists on calling the aircraft unarmed, unmanned aerial vehicles, the term drone having acquired a bad reputation because of the armed versions that American forces use against targets in Pakistan and elsewhere. United Nations officials insist that they do not plan to use drones to kill anyone, only to get a picture of trouble and grief on the ground, to protect civilians and their own troops.

“We have a mandate here to neutralize armed groups — you can’t do it without intelligence,” said Martin Kobler, who leads the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

“They have also a psychological effect,” he added. “Everyone knows they are flying.”



UAV Success AMS

United Nations. “Delegates Argue Merits of Unmanned Arial Vehicles, Other Technologies as Security Council Considers New Trends in Peacekeeping: 7169th Meeting.” June 11, 2014. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11434.doc.htm> This source contains a summary of the ideas presented at the 7169th United Nations Security Council meeting. It provides valuable insight into the Security Council mindsight and interests of key delegates.

Many delegations shared the view that new technologies had potentially useful applications. Rwanda’s representative highlighted their ability to identify and monitor the movements of armed groups and weapons, to assist patrols in hostile territory, and to assess refugee flows. Other delegates held that peacekeeping operations must have all the tools needed to carry out their mandates, pointing out that the intervention brigade deployed within the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) had helped to neutralize M23 and other armed groups.

The latter country’s representative spotlighted the “notable and effective” role played by both MONUSCO and the intervention brigade, noting that surveillance drones (UAVs) had “broken the mould of traditional concepts” of peace operations and opened the way to the use of modern technology. For the long-suffering populations of countries in the region, today’s meeting was evidence of the will to evaluate remaining challenges “together and without complacency”, she added

Evidence on UAVs can be an effective rebuttal to Con teams claiming the impotence of United Nations peacekeepers or arguing that allowing the use of offensive force will make missions too dangerous. Pro teams should explain the field benefits of UAV technology and show how this advance can help give the UN a necessary boost in combat.



Benefits to Developing Countries

Giving UN peacekeepers additional duties improves the armed forces of contributing nations.

DAT

“Helping to Calm a Continent.” The Economist. 9 June 2012. Web.

<http://www.economist.com/node/21556608>

A key to success for UN peacekeeping is the provenance of the troops: horses for courses. Poor countries send by far the most men on UN missions. **Asians predominate, with Bangladesh, Pakistan and India in the top three spots. They fund their armed forces by sending them abroad at the UN's expense. China has rapidly increased its contribution in recent years, hoping to win prestige and trust.** But these armies are less well trained and equipped than Western ones. Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian general who ran the UN operation in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, has written about the problem of deciding where to deploy his small contingent of Belgians to get the best results, as they were much more effective than his more numerous third-world soldiers.

In Sierra Leone the UN peacekeeping mission was saved by a small contingent of British crack troops that stopped a rebel advance on the capital, Freetown, in 2000. At the same time, Jordanian soldiers are said to have tried to charter a ship to flee. **Only once peace is secure can inferior UN troops be usefully employed. A lack of helicopters is a frequent snag.** Richard Gowan at the New York-based Centre on International Co-operation, says, “What the UN really fears is a situation where they solely rely on really low-end militaries.”

Developing countries' armed forces are heavily reliant on UN funding for their troops. The seemingly clear Con point in this card is that the UN is ill-equipped to run complex offensive operations. The flip side, however, is more appealing and can be the cornerstone of a Pro advocacy: by broadening the scope of its troops' engagements, the UN is forced to invest more heavily in their training and development (developed countries are notoriously averse to sending extra troops for UN missions, compared to their developing counterparts). Given that these troops are predominantly from poorer nations, increased levels of operation can be the impetus for the investment in the modernization of inferior armies.



UN troops are more capable of taking advantage of native military resources. DAT

“Arms and the African.” The Economist. 22 November 2014. Web.

<http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21633901-continents-armies-are-going-spending-spree-arms-and-african?zid=301&ah=e8eb01e57f7c9b43a3c864613973b57f>

A big issue is whether troops have enough training to handle sophisticated new gear. Chad makes good use of its Sukhoi SU-25 jets—with the help of mercenaries. **On the other hand, Congo-Brazzaville only manages to get its Mirage fighter jets into the air for national-day celebrations. South Africa bought 26 Gripen combat aircraft from Sweden but has mothballed half of them because of budget cuts.** Uganda spent hundreds of millions of dollars on Sukhoi SU-30 combat aircraft but little on the precision weapons to go with them.

The reasons for African governments to boost arms spending vary. High commodity prices over the past decade (they are now falling) have filled the coffers of many. Some leaders have been tempted to buy expensive arms to gain prestige. Other are suspected of inflating deals to siphon off money for themselves.

Given the growing excess of military equipment, opportunity cost is minimized by UN peacekeepers using equipment purchased by host nations in Africa for their intended use purposes (generally offensive operations).



Offensives Can Keep Peacekeepers Impactful

Without offensive capability, UNDOF's impact is diminishing. DAT

Saab, Bilal Y. "The Incredible Shrinking Buffer." *Foreign Affairs*. 28 October 2013. Web. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140225/bilal-y-saab/the-incredible-shrinking-buffer>

It should come as a slight relief to peacekeepers that the prominent commander, whose group is active just a few miles away from their area of operations, did not seem to care much about UNDOF's presence -- as opposed to actively trying to target it. **But that will hardly be enough to reassure the international forces. Thanks to the raging civil conflict in Syria and the resurgence of extremists in the country and across the Middle East, UNDOF's role is at serious risk for the first time in its history. The weakening of UNDOF will further destabilize an already dangerously unstable region.**

UNDOF's initial task, in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, was to monitor the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian troops from the buffer zone (a geographical area of separation that is approximately 50 miles long and ranges from 9 to 186 miles wide). **It would be a gross exaggeration to credit UNDOF alone for the 40 years of peace that held along the border; what has maintained the calm all these years is the simple fact that neither country has wanted a war. Israel, for the most part, benefits from the status quo, particularly since the Golan Heights continues to provide it with strategic depth.** Syria's loss of territory to its historical enemy, although humiliating, was in many ways good for Damascus, too. All in the name of fighting Israel, the Assads were able to justify the consolidation of Alawite rule, build a police state, and eliminate any political opposition. Less concerned about Israeli military designs, the Assad regime has settled for waging proxy warfare against Israel through Hezbollah and Hamas.

UNDOF is the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, tasked with overseeing the Israel-Syria buffer zone.



Without offensive capabilities, UNDOF cannot survive aggressive militancy. DAT

Saab, Bilal Y. "The Incredible Shrinking Buffer." Foreign Affairs. 28 October 2013. Web. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140225/bilal-y-saab/the-incredible-shrinking-buffer>

Meanwhile, increasingly active Islamist rebels in the area are already making UNDOF's job nearly impossible. **One UNDOF official, Major General Iqbal Singh Singha, told reporters in June that "troops have come under fire, been abducted, hijacked, had weapons snatched and offices vandalized in the region." As a result of the deteriorating security situation, UNDOF has been forced to suspend night patrols and reduce its operational footprint, thus constraining its ability to monitor the cease-fire line.** Apart from jihadist terrorism, UNDOF will also have to deal with criminal activity by opportunistic rebels who desperately need funds and may target UNDOF to extract concessions from the international community.

The March 2013 kidnapping of 21 Filipino peacekeepers caused the biggest shock and scare to UNDOF's member states. The peacekeepers were seized by an Islamist rebel unit called the Martyrs of Yarmouk Brigade near the border with Jordan and released three days later. **The rebels claimed that UNDOF was cooperating with the Syrian regime and demanded that Syrian troops move 12 miles away from the village of Jamla, and that the International Committee of the Red Cross guarantee the safe exit of civilians from the area.**

It is not surprising, then, that UNDOF is halfway out the door. Worried about the extremist threat and the safety of their troops, Cambodia, Canada, Japan, Croatia, and Austria have already pulled out of the mission. Before the Syrian uprising, UNDOF employed 2,164 personnel from six countries. Today, there are only 1,166 left (501 from Fiji, 193 from India, 339 from Philippines, 130 from Nepal, and three staff officers from Ireland). Ban recently asked the Security Council to increase the number of troops to 1,250, but such a paltry increase will have little effect; **even UNDOF's pre-uprising size and level of technology were insufficient for it to effectively do its job. As the fighting escalates, the force will likely continue to shrink.**

Any offensive action would simply make the groups initial purpose harder to fulfill. Turning UN peacekeeping forces into side-bound armies goes against the fundamental peacekeeping mandate.



Citizen protection by any means necessary is the ultimate priority. DAT

“Last Line of Defense: How Peacekeepers Can Better Protect Civilians.” Refugees International. 24 February 2010. Web. <http://www.refintl.org/policy/in-depth-report/last-line-defense>

Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.

The first challenge peacekeeping missions face is that protection of civilians is not the only priority of a peacekeeping mission. For example, the mandate for the UN peacekeeping mission in the DR Congo incorporates over 40 discreet tasks. Modern peacekeeping operations are asked to support everything from ceasefire agreements to long-term peacebuilding activities. **Further, the strategies needed to protect people vary significantly depending on the type and scale of the threat. Peacekeepers may have to protect people from large-scale attacks as well as banditry and day-to-day violence. They must protect UN staff, humanitarian workers, and, of course, the peacekeepers themselves.**

Commanders on the ground should not be placed in the politically difficult position to choose between competing priorities. Security Council members must craft mandates that are realistic in scope and reflect the political context and actual resources available to carry out the job. To help the Security Council do this, it is essential that early assessment teams identify the nature, persistence and scale of threats to civilian safety. The UN Secretariat and mission leadership must also clearly advise the Security Council on their actual mission requirements.

It is also essential that the Security Council consider the political implications of protection vis-à-vis other mission tasks. **The very presence of peacekeepers creates expectations among local people that they will be protected if violence erupts. The failure to meet these expectations can result in a breakdown of wider mission legitimacy that will make it extremely difficult for peacekeepers to accomplish other, long-term peacebuilding objectives.**

The establishment of security is the primary obligation before ancillary functions get fulfilled. Offensives are simply a tool for establishing safety as a baseline for further missions.



A lack of operational options leaves peacekeepers in danger of friendly fire. DAT

Raz, Guy. "No Agreement on Lebanon Cease-Fire Terms," NPR. 26 July 2006. Web. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5584097>

Though most countries demanding a cease-fire have called for international observers, few nations have volunteered their own soldiers for that possible mission.

The United States and Israel would want to see a robust force, prepared to engage in combat with Hezbollah guerrillas, if necessary. Israel has suggested, perhaps, a NATO-led force to patrol the border.

The United Nations and several European states are seeking to bolster the existing U.N. peacekeeping mission along the Israel-Lebanon border. UNIFIL, as it's known, has operated in the area for more than two decades, proving to be weak and ineffectual.

UNIFIL posts line the border between the two countries but, in many cases, Hezbollah guerrillas have set up outposts within a few yards of the U.N. posts. It often puts U.N. peacekeepers in danger, a reality underscored by the death of four UNIFIL observers in an apparent Israeli airstrike. Israel has apologized for what it said was an "error" and will launch a full investigation. But U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan didn't mince words: he called the airstrike "deliberate."

UNIFIL peacekeepers have a very limited mandate and cannot eject Hezbollah guerrillas by force. In the past, UNIFIL has appealed to the Lebanese government to deploy its army in the south.

This is a helpful card to combat the notion that a lack of offensive mandates for UN peacekeepers implies a complete lack of offensive capability. A lack of clearance to conduct offensive operations simply leaves UN peacekeepers vulnerable to sovereign national operations in contested regions, increasing the risk of friendly fire incidents, as demonstrated in this card.

Con Evidence





Key U.N. Successes

Overall, United Nations Brings Violence Down AMS

Kenny, Charles. “The United Nations Isn’t Failing, Its Members Are.” Business Week. August 26, 2013. <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-26/the-united-nations-isnt-failing-its-members-are> **Bloomberg Businessweek, known until 2010 as BusinessWeek, is a weekly business magazine published by Bloomberg L.P. Founded in 1929, the magazine was created to provide information and interpretation about what was happening in the business world. It is currently headquartered in New York City.**

[T]he U.N. has become increasingly central in the global effort to “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” the first aim of the United Nations charter. Multilateral peacekeeping operations cost a little over \$7 billion—or less than half a percent of the global military budget. But research suggests they’re having a significant impact on reducing global levels of violence. In an effort to assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, Jacob Kathman of SUNY Buffalo, with Lisa Hultman at Uppsala University and Megan Shannon of Florida State University, analyzed monthly data on the number and type of U.N. peacekeepers—alongside civilian deaths—from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa. **Based on their sample, they find that an average of 106 civilians are killed in a given month in conflicts that lack UN presence. In places with a blue-helmet presence of at least 8,000—the size of the UN’s larger operations—the expected number of civilian deaths per month drops to fewer than two.**

Con teams may want to start out by reminding judges that the United Nations has had several successes. This creates the groundwork for arguing that while United Nations peacekeeping forces may need reforms, the missions should maintain the same underlying principles.

Peace and Peacekeeping AMS

Maps of World. “Has the United Nations Failed?” 2014.

<http://www.mapsofworld.com/poll/has-the-united-nations-failed-facts-infographic-text.html> **The World Maps site provides easily accessible information on essential political events.**

Since 1948, the United Nations has deployed 68 peacekeeping missions across the world including the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the First and Second United Nations Emergency Forces, the United Nations Protection Force, and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force. Most of these missions have been largely successful. The UN has initiated peace talks and negotiated 172 successful regional peace settlements in the world since its inception. The opinion of the UN, though not enforceable, is usually accepted by member nations due to the backing of the international community implicit in it.



U.N. success in Cambodia, Fj

Becker, Elizabeth. "A U.N. Success Story" The New York Times. April 28, 1995.

The Paris plan has worked, however imperfectly. **It ended the war, brought 350,000 refugees home and set up democratic elections, in which 90 percent of the population voted. Today, the lives of the people are improving and the national mood favors work, not rebellion. A small middle class is growing. The gross national product is up 5.2 percent, to about \$2.2 million. The currency is stable. The budget is balanced.**

U.N. success in Sierra Leone regulating diamond trade, Fj

United Nations Peace and Security Section. "Sierra Leone: A success story in peacekeeping". 2006.

Over the course of its mandate, the UN disarmed more than 75,000 ex-fighters, including about 7,000 child soldiers; assisted in holding national and local government elections, which enabled people to participate in decisions that affected their daily lives; helped to rebuild the country's police force to its pre-war strength and contributed towards rehabilitating the infrastructure and bringing government services to local communities.

The UN also helped the government stop illicit trading in diamonds and regulate the industry. **During the war, rebels had used money from "blood" or "conflict" diamonds to buy weapons which then fuelled the conflict. Now diamonds have become an engine of growth, with government income from diamonds soaring from just \$10 million in 2000 to \$160 million in 2004, according the International Monetary Fund figures.**

U.N. success in Sierra Leone improving the economy, Fj

United Nations Peace and Security Section. "Sierra Leone: A success story in peacekeeping". 2006.

As a sign of continued international community confidence in the future of Sierra Leone, donors pledged \$800 million in aid at a conference held in London in November to raise money for development.

Economic revival is also being boosted by returning refugees and other displaced persons eager to rebuild their communities. Former ghost towns like Kono and Tongo Fields are now havens of commercial activities, as diamond-producing areas attract thousands of young people. **Since 2002, the economy has expanded at an average of about 7 percent, and the IMF predicts future growth of 6-7 per cent per year if the political and economic situation remains stable.**



U.N. helped create a flourishing economy in Namibia, Fj

**Howard, Lisa. “U.N. Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success”
International Peacekeeping. September 8, 2010.**

In terms of the economy, Namibia’s GDP has been growing faster since independence than before. **Real GDP grew by 5 per cent in 2001, due to increased offshore diamond mining and a new zinc factory. The population is now at about 1.7 million, and GDP per capita stands at approximately US\$1,640.**

U.N. helped create a better political situation in Namibia, Fj

**Howard, Lisa. “U.N. Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success”
International Peacekeeping. September 8, 2010.**

Twelve years after the end of the UN’s peace implementation efforts, Namibia is still largely at peace. There is no ongoing widespread

military confrontation, nor is the level of crime or private violence high.⁸⁵ According to Freedom House’s most recent 2000–2001 ratings (on a 1–7 point scale, one being the most positive), Namibia was given a 2 for political rights, a 3 for civil liberties, and is rated ‘free’.

There have been three elections since the one overseen by the UN. In the 1992 regional elections, both SWAPO and the DTA received support from all regions (although SWAPO more so from all), indicating a waning north–south political bifurcation. In the 1994 national elections, President Sam Nujoma, a popular personality among both advocates and foes, won by a wider margin than in 1989, with very high voter turnout.⁸⁶ Nujoma ran and won again in the

United Nations. In the words of Namibia’s Prime Minister Hage Geingob, ‘UN diplomacy in Namibia played a major role in the independence process. Namibia today is the child of international solidarity. It’s because of the UN connection that we’ve been so successful.’⁸⁹ Moreover, often in peace processes, it is the minority side that feels it has been unjustly treated, and is ready to resume conflict. But as Dirk Mudge, former leader of the DTA opposition party attests: ‘When people ask me about political stability in Namibia, I say that I can see no possibility whatsoever of any group, and I am not talking about individuals, wanting to take over the government by any other means than democratic ones. I say this without fear.’⁹⁰ Thus, for the most part, the outlook for Namibia remains, in contrast to most post-civil conflict states, decidedly positive.



United Nations Nuclear Nonproliferation AMS

Maps of World. “Has the United Nations Failed?” 2014.

<http://www.mapsofworld.com/poll/has-the-united-nations-failed-facts-infographic-text.html> **The World Maps site provides easily accessible information on essential political events drawn from sources including the United Nations and the CIA World Factbook.**

The United Nations has played an important role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Partial Test Ban Treaty and such negotiations were signed under the auspices of the United Nations. UN inspectors conduct regular inspections of nuclear reactors in about 90 countries of the world through the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to ensure that nuclear material are not used for armament.

Peaceful Electoral Transition in DRC AMS

Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences. Ogunrofia, Bayo. “The Factors Behind Successes and Failures of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions: A Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo.” 2012.

http://www.academia.edu/1902524/The_Factors_Behind_Successes_and_Failures_of_United_Nations_Peacekeeping_Missions_A_Case_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_Congo **The author is a Graduate Student at the Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh, UK specializing in UN operations in the region.**

The Congolese peace treaty was brokered in Lusaka (Tanzania) in 1999. This ushered and withdrawal of foreign troops in the DRC, ceasefire agreement by the warring parties, and the establishment of UN peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Peacekeeping operations in the DRC (MONUC) was created on 30 November 1999 by resolution 1291 of the UN Security Council.

(...)

One of the major achievements of UN peacekeeping (MONUC) is the organisation of peaceful electoral transition (Malan and Boshoff, 2002). A key important MONUC’s mission was to ensure enforcement of peace agreements and facilitation of political transitional processes and to ensure credible elections, with a view to restoring and maintaining political stability in the country. **MONUC’s success in this regard is best illustrated by successful national elections, with an estimated 25 million voters at 53,000 polling stations in 2006 in the DRC. Prior to the transition process in 2006, UN peacekeepers helped to facilitate: the nomination of various groups that are signatory to the 2002 peace accord, for positions in President Kabila cabinet; the drafting of the new constitution and Multi-Party elections.**



January 2015

Con: Key successes

Few, if any, United Nations failures can be attributed solely to the lack of a right to exercise offensive force. Remind judges of the many instances where peacekeepers achieved all their goals and then point out the crucial organizational flaws that prevented other missions from the same success.

Peacekeeping missions have enormous potential, Fj

**Hegre, Harvard. “Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations”
Centre For the Study of Civil War. June 11, 2013.**

Our findings show that peacekeeping works. The more the UN is willing to spend on peacekeeping, and the stronger the mandates provided, the greater is the conflict-reducing effect. **We estimate that an ambitious UN peacekeeping policy will reduce the global incidence of armed conflict by two thirds relative to a no-PKO scenario. This reduction is maintained throughout our 25-year time frame.** This is a substantial effect for an intervention that often is practical to implement if the political will is present. **Even if a strong commitment scenario means an initial sharp increase in the total UN PKO budget, our simulations show that the budget would only increase for approximately ten years, and then start decreasing as a consequence of the global reduction in the incidence of conflict.** PKOs can thus be viewed as a long-term investment for peace.

Increasing funding reduces likelihood of conflict, Fj

**Hegre, Harvard. “Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations”
Centre For the Study of Civil War. June 11, 2013.**

In addition, when estimating the determinants of post-conflict risk Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) find that ‘doubling [PKO] expenditure reduces the risk from 40% to 31%’. While some missions receive an annual budget of well over a billion USD, other budgets are limited to less than 50 millions. Since the budget sets clear limits to the number of troops that can be employed, it should influence the prospects for peace.

Increasing funding reduces the likelihood of conflict in the short term, Fj

**Hegre, Harvard. “Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations”
Centre For the Study of Civil War. June 11, 2013.**

A conflict country where a peace-keeping operation with an annual budget of USD 15 million per year is in place, has a 50% lower risk of major conflict than a conflict country without any PKO. A mission with an annual budget of 500 million has more than 80% lower risk than the no-PKO country.



Increased funding in the short term reduces expenses in the long term, Fj

**Hegre, Harvard. “Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations”
Centre For the Study of Civil War. June 11, 2013.**

These findings have some clear policy implications, since they illustrate the effect of different PKO policies. **In one of the most extensive scenarios, in which major armed conflicts are met with a PKO with an annual budget of 800 million USD, the total UN peacekeeping budget is estimated to increase by 50–70 percent. However, in this scenario, the risk of major armed conflict is reduced by half relative to a scenario without any PKO. This indicates that a large UN peacekeeping budget is money well spent. Moreover, the total PKO budget would increase for about ten years, and then start decreasing again as a result of a reduced number of conflicts in the world. In another scenario, which specifies that major conflicts get a PKO with a transformational mandate in the first year, the risk of conflict is reduced by two-thirds in 2035 compared to a scenario without any PKO.** If the UN is serious about maintaining international peace and security, it is important to consider the impact of different policies regarding mandates and budgets, as well as the reaction-time from a conflict outbreak to the deployment of a mission.

UN Peacekeepers prevent repeat war, Fj

**Hegre, Harvard. “Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations”
Centre For the Study of Civil War. June 11, 2013.**

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) was the first quantitative analysis of the effect of PKOs on the duration on post-conflict peace. The authors find a significant and substantial positive effect of peacekeepers on peace building, measured two, five, or ten years after the end of the conflict. This conclusion holds in several later studies. This conclusion holds in several later studies. **Fortna (2008) finds that the risk of repeat war drops ‘by 75%–85% or more when peacekeepers are present’ (Fortna 2008, 125).**

Enforcement Peacekeeping is less likely to work, Fj

**Fortna, Virginia. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the
Duration of Peace After Civil War” International Studies Quarterly. 2004.**

In the post-Cold War era, all four types of missions have decreased the risk of another war, all else equal. **Traditional peacekeeping missions and observer missions have been the most successful, reducing the risk of war by about 86% and 81%, respectively. Multidimensional peacekeeping appears to cut the risk of war by more than half, and enforcement missions by just under half.**



Fortna study methodology, FJ

Fortna, Virginia. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War” International Studies Quarterly. 2004.

This article examines a data set consisting of 115 spells of peace (some of which are ongoing) in or after civil wars. The cases are listed in the Appendix. The data are adapted from the data set put together by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) (hereafter called D&S). Their data cover civil wars that started after 1944 and ended, at least temporarily, before 1997. They define a civil war as an armed conflict that caused more than 1,000 battle deaths (total, rather than in a single year as in the Correlates of War definition); that represented a challenge to the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; and occurred within the recognized boundary of that state; that involved the state as one of the principal combatants; and in which the rebels were able to mount an organized military opposition to the state and to inflict significant casualties on the state.

U.N. is already better at peacekeeping than the U.S., Fj

“United Nations Peacekeeping: Promoting Stability around the World” Better World Campaign.

A 2005 RAND report suggested that the United Nations is better suited for peacekeeping missions than unilateral U.S. action, finding that of the “eight UN-led cases, seven are at peace. Of the eight U.S.-led cases, four are at peace; four are not—or not yet—at peace.” The study also touted the United Nations’ decision-making apparatus and command and control structure as superior to those of similar international organizations.



UN Successes in Relief and Humanitarian Aid

Aid and Relief More Important than Offense AMS

Maps of World. “Has the United Nations Failed?” 2014.

<http://www.mapsofworld.com/poll/has-the-united-nations-failed-facts-infographic-text.html> **The World Maps site provides easily accessible information on essential political events drawn from sources including the CIA World Factbook and the United Nations.**

Despite the criticism that has been raised against the United Nations and its various organs or specialized agencies, it is beyond doubt that its outreach of the organization and the immense it has brought to millions of people from across the world cannot be denied. **In the past 30 years, the UN has helped over 370 million rural poor combat poverty and live better lives. About 90 million people in 73 countries receive food and assistance from UN aid. The organization’s work in the field of healthcare is commendable. It is estimated that the WHO saves about 3 million lives each year by vaccinating and providing inoculations to over 58% of the world’s children.** Additionally, the lives of 30 million women are saved each year due to the agency’s maternal health promotion work. Be it flood, drought, or any emergency, the UN mobilizes \$12.4 billion in humanitarian aid to provide relief to people from around the globe. Over 36 million refugees fleeing war, poverty and hostile conditions benefit from UN aid. Each year, the United Nations facilitates over 80 treaties and declarations through its human rights advocacy efforts and helps 30 nations conduct free and fair polls in an effort to further the cause of democracy. The UN deploys over 1,20,000 peacekeeping troops in 16 different operations spread across 4 continents. The United Nations are also champions of the planet and nature and has now spearheaded climate change campaigns in over 100 countries of the world. The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals have now become the most successful worldwide anti-poverty campaign in human history. Given this scale of outreach and aid, the impact of the United Nations on human society cannot be undermined.



UN Strength Lies in Work with Refugees AMS

The United Nations International School of Hanoi. “Top 9 Greatest Achievements of the United Nations.” October 30, 2013.

<http://theflame.unishanoi.org/opinion/2013/10/30/top-9-greatest-achievements-of-the-united-nations/> **The UNIS (United Nations International School) Hanoi newspaper is the leading student newspaper at UNIS and dedicated to raising awareness of key political events and critiquing United Nations policy.**

UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) is another success of the United Nations. Founded in 1949, UNHCR has helped 17 million asylum-seekers and refugees. The officers of UNHCR help the refugees directly, working to ensure governments meet their responsibilities to the expatriates. Two Nobel Peace Prizes in 1954 and 1981 are persuasive evidences for the success of UNHCR. Right now, UNHCR is facing a problematic financial issue, trying to protect and assist 700,000 people who had fled conflict in Syria, Mali, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is truly the hope of millions of refugees all over the world.

United Nations Crucial to Fight Against HIV/AIDS AMS

The United Nations International School of Hanoi. “Top 9 Greatest Achievements of the United Nations.” October 30, 2013.

<http://theflame.unishanoi.org/opinion/2013/10/30/top-9-greatest-achievements-of-the-united-nations/> **The UNIS (United Nations International School) Hanoi newspaper is the leading student newspaper at UNIS and dedicated to raising awareness of key political events and critiquing United Nations policy.**

The UN is the leader when it comes to the global battle against HIV/AIDS. Between the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, and the Global Fund to find Aid, the UN is at the heart of every aspect of dealing with this epidemic, from heightening awareness to raising funds to making sure appropriate programs for prevention and treatment are implemented. The UN has wisely recognized that the organization itself cannot shoulder this one alone, and has set up the Fund and other mechanisms aimed at drawing governments, other multilaterals, NGOs and corporations into the fight. According to the most recent report of UNAIDS, the number of people who died from AIDS and the opportunistic disease caused by AIDS has decreased from 2.3 million in 2005 to 1.6 million in 2012. There are more and more people who have HIV and who are supported by the UN and its sub-organizations.



United Nations Helps Children Worldwide AMS

The United Nations International School of Hanoi. “Top 9 Greatest Achievements of the United Nations.” October 30, 2013.

<http://theflame.unishanoi.org/opinion/2013/10/30/top-9-greatest-achievements-of-the-united-nations/> The UNIS (United Nations International School) Hanoi newspaper is the leading student newspaper at UNIS and dedicated to raising awareness of key political events and critiquing United Nations policy.

Perhaps, many of us are too familiar with the phrase “UNICEF” because it is repeated myriad of times on the media. Yes, UNICEF (United Children’s Fund) is an agency belonging to United Nations whose headquarters are based in New York. This organization protects the rights of children everywhere in the world and works to enhance the living standards of children. **With the significant contribution of UNICEF, the number of deaths for children under the age of 5 has declined from nearly 12 million in 1990 to 6.9 million in 2011.**



UN Peacekeeping is Cost Effective

The Peacekeeping budget is relatively small, Fj

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. “United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet”. March 2010.

The approved peacekeeping budget for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 is approximately US \$7.9 billion. This represents about 0.5 per cent of global military spending (estimated at US\$1.464 trillion).

U.N. interventions cost relatively less than that of other countries, Fj

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. “United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet”. March 2010.

A study by the US Government Accountability Office estimated that it would cost the United States approximately twice as much as the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) – \$876 million compared to the UN budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of the mission.

◁ “If the US was to act on its own – unilaterally – and deploy its own forces in many of these countries; for every dollar that the US would spend, the UN can accomplish the Mission for twelve cents.” [Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative – “Can UN Keep the Peace”
<http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/520/index.html>]



UN Peacekeepers Are Generally More Effective, Fj

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War”, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, 26 March 2004.

Our fifth, and most effective instrument is also the most problematic politically. This is external military intervention under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to enforce peace in an immediate post-conflict situation and to maintain it throughout the prolonged period – a decade – during which the risks of reversion to conflict are very high. The pay-off to this instrument we estimated using the example of Sierra Leone. This choice was not, however, a matter of picking a rare success, but rather a matter of investigating a new strategy. This was the first substantial Chapter VII intervention by a major power (as distinct from using UN forces under Chapter VI) for many years. It has recently been followed by similar French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire, and most recently (February, 2004) by the creation of a Franco-British ‘rapid reaction force’ of 1,500 men. The pay-off to such a strategy adopted universally in post-conflict situations is massive, at around \$392bn, even on the rather pessimistic assumption that after withdraw risks revert to what they would have been without the military presence. The pay-off is all the more remarkable given the relatively unpromising returns to some of the other interventions.

U.N. is more cost effective than U.S., Fj

“United Nations Peacekeeping: Promoting Stability around the World” Better World Campaign.

A 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study concluded that U.S. investment in UN peacekeeping is eight times less expensive than funding a U.S. force. The study also found that UN missions operate at a much lower cost than similar U.S. missions; the United Nations’ annual peacekeeping budget, for instance, equals about what the United States spends on Iraq in one month. In addition, the United Nations is more experienced in peacekeeping, can more successfully incorporate developmental aid, and has a much lower overhead, with about 1 staff member at headquarters in New York for every 100 personnel in the field, compared to a ratio of about 1 to 4 for Operation Iraqi Freedom.



Peacekeepers prevent the spread of conflict

Beardsley study methodology, Fj

Beardsley, Kyle. "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 73:1051–1064. 2011.

The data used to test the hypotheses follow all the states in the the international system from 1946 to 2005 or from time of entrance into the international system until 2005. The outcome of interest is whether a state experienced an armed conflict episode onset in a particular period, where the definition of an armed conflict episode comes from version 4-2009 of the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002). An armed conflict episode occurs when there is a dispute that involves at least one government actor and results in 25 battle-related fatalities in a year. Involvement in armed conflict is defined as whether a state is coded as the location of an armed conflict and not just a participant.

Peacekeeping forces are defined using the International Military Intervention (IMI) data (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). These data include information on all forceful interventions across state lines from 1946 to 2005.⁸ For the purposes of this analysis, peacekeeping is defined as the deployment of military personnel to a foreign state by the UN, a regional security organization or a coalition of states. The purpose of the force also must be for observing, patrolling, monitoring, disarming, intimidating or combating. **Since such a definition could also include collective security actions that clearly are not peacekeeping, I have excluded such interventions as the US-led UN force in the Korean War. The missions are listed in the online appendix.**



Peacekeeping prevents the spread of conflict, Fj

Beardsley, Kyle. "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 73:1051–1064. 2011.

To fully grasp the substantive meaning of the results, we must consider the reverberating effects as would-be conflicts in neighboring states and at home become less likely to diffuse further when peacekeeping is present. **As discussed above, in the absence of peacekeeping when a conflict episode breaks out, the likelihood of conflict in neighboring states is 75% higher. Moreover, an increase in conflict history in a particular state by one will increase the probability of new conflict in that state by 40%.** So, when peacekeeping prevents conflict from spreading across space, there is great potential for additional benefits, as neighboring states will become more stable and, in turn, their neighbors will become more stable.

Figure 3 presents what the increased probabilities of conflict would be in a hypothetical nine state system during the twelve periods (one year) after conflict occurs in the central state, with and without peacekeeping in that central state. **Without peacekeeping in the central state when conflict occurs there, we see that the central state becomes 55% more likely to experience a conflict at some point in the following year, while its neighbors are 77% more likely to experience a conflict and the corner states are 8% more likely. With peacekeeping in the central state, the probability of conflict during the next year only increases by 43% in the central state, 13% in the bordering states, and less than 2% in the corner states. That is, peacekeeping reduces the increased-propensity for conflict to occur during the following year by more than 20% in the state that experienced conflict, and by about 80% in both the bordering and corner state.**



Peacekeepers prevents violence from spreading through containment, Fj

Beardsley, Kyle. "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 73:1051–1064. 2011.

Containment Hypothesis: States with neighbors that have recently experienced armed conflict will be less likely to experience new interstate or intrastate conflicts when peacekeepers deploy to such neighbors.

Aside from securing borders, peacekeepers can also prevent conflict from spreading by minimizing its potential to weaken the security of surrounding areas. **The displacement of large groups of people provides a key source of such a negative conflict externality. These displaced persons often flee across state borders where, as refugees, they create political and economic problems for the surrounding host states (Forsberg 2009, Salehyan 2008b, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). The refugees can upset political dynamics, exacerbate competition for resources, and otherwise spread arms, combatants and ideologies that make conflict more likely (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). As another means for conflict to weaken a neighbor's security, armed conflicts can create destabilizing disruptions to the flow of trade, people and capital that will be most strongly felt by the states with economies and societies that are interconnected with the states experiencing conflict (Enterline 1998, Maoz 1996, Murdoch and Sandler 2002).**

In response, peacekeepers can decrease the spread of conflict by solidifying peace in the area of deployment and in the process curtail other destabilizing changes. This especially relates to the role of peacekeepers in reducing the displacement of large groups of people. When effective at securing post-conflict environments, peacekeepers will enable displaced persons to return to their homes and prevent noncombatants from becoming vulnerable to further hostilities. With fewer displaced persons, refugee flows will be diminished, which means that there will be less disruptive pressure in neighboring polities. Or, in conjunction with the UNHCR, regional organizations or humanitarian organizations, peacekeepers can reduce the local burdens from internally displaced persons and refugees. **For example, ONUB was crucially involved in the resettlement of refugees in Burundi, as has been MONUC in the DRC. Similarly, Howard (2008, 77-80) relates how UNTAG's coordination with the UNHCR to resettle over 42,000 refugees from mainly Angola and Zambia into Namibia was crucial for that operation's success. Indeed, the Namibian conflict did not cause much disruption to the stability of the surrounding states once UNTAG deployed, in spite of close ties to dynamics in Angola and the so-called frontline states.**



January 2015

Con: Key successes

Peacekeepers prevents violence from spreading through securing borders, Fj

Beardsley, Kyle. "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Conflict." Journal of Politics 73:1051–1064. 2011.

Border Security Hypothesis: States with neighboring rivals or neighboring weak states will be less likely to experience new armed conflicts when peacekeepers deploy to such neighbors.

More specific testable implications of how peacekeeping can interrupt the mechanisms by which conflicts spread also emerge from the discussion. **Salehyan (2007, 2008a, 2009) posits that transnational insurgencies are more of a problem in spurring conflict when a state has neighbors that are enduring rivals or are economically weak. Insurgents can better find support or escape from policing in such neighbors. If peacekeeping succeeds in securing borders and shutting down the potential for transnational insurgencies to find relief abroad, then we should observe less of a conflict-aggravating effect from having such neighbors when peacekeepers are present.**

Peacekeepers prevent conflict from spreading through reducing refugees from leaving, Fj

Beardsley, Kyle. "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Conflict." Journal of Politics 73:1051–1064. 2011.

Refugee Hypothesis: States with neighbors that have many refugees will be less likely to experience new armed conflicts when peacekeepers deploy to such neighbors.

Peacekeeping might also work through containing refugee problems. We should expect that if peacekeeping succeeds in reducing the burden of refugee flows, then we will observe less conflict in neighbors of refugee-producing states when peacekeepers deploy to those states. In contrast, states will be much more susceptible to new armed conflict when neighbors have many refugees and no peacekeepers.



United Nations Problems are Not Related to Offensive Power

Peacekeeper Budget Falling Short AMS

Lederer, Edith. "Syria, Ebola Failures Highlight UN Shortcomings." December 1, 2014. Yahoo News. <http://news.yahoo.com/syria-ebola-failures-highlight-un-shortcomings-175041286.html> **Yahoo News collects vital information on current events as a part of the major media organization, Yahoo.**

The members often fall short in funding the U.N. and owed about \$3.5 billion in early November for regular operations and peacekeeping. Countries slashed the budget of WHO, the agency addressing the Ebola crisis, by nearly \$600 million in 2011, and the U.S., its biggest contributor, has dropped its donation by at least 25 percent since then.

The WHO's botched initial response to Ebola was blamed on a shortage of funds, overstretched staff and a dysfunctional organizational structure. A draft internal document obtained by The Associated Press in October describes how WHO country offices in Africa are led by "politically motivated appointments."

Meanwhile, U.N. peacekeeping forces have been criticized for failing to protect civilians against attacks. Peacekeeping chief Herve Ladsous recently said his department is under the most severe strain since the U.N. was founded, pointing to the deaths of over 100 peacekeepers this year.

Additional financial backing is essential to the future success of United Nations peacekeeping missions. In fact, these missions cannot achieve their goals without additional equipment and it would be unwise to allow the exercise of offensive force with such strained operations.



January 2015

Con: Problems not offensive

Government Relations Hurt Peacekeeping Missions AMS

Lynch, Colum. "They Just Stood Watching." Foreign Policy. April 7, 2014.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/07/special_report_darfur_united_nations_peacekeeping_investigation **With more than 3.5 million online monthly readers, Foreign Policy is one of the most credible names in international politics and global affairs, Foreign Policy delivers highly influential corporate, policymaker, and professional audiences in print and online.**

"[UNAMID's] effectiveness is seriously constrained by access restrictions and, in case of the uniformed components, mobility constraints and shortfalls in the operational capabilities of several troop and police contingents," according to a strategic review produced in February by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In a statement to FP, the U.N.'s top peacekeeping official, a former French diplomat named Hervé Ladsous, said that it was "no secret that the relationship with the government has always been challenging."

"In every mission there is a tension between the necessity to preserve the consent and good will of the host government required to allow our peacekeepers to do their jobs and the sometimes contradictory imperative to report accurately and candidly on any and all incidents of violence," he wrote. "Bad relations with any host government can make it impossible for a mission to operate -- to move around the country, to have their equipment cleared by national customs, to deploy new personnel."



United Nations Issues Unrelated to Offensive Power AMS

The American Interest. “The United Nations Today: A Case Study in Failure.” April 16, 2012. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/04/16/the-united-nations-today-a-case-study-in-failure/> **The American Interest is an independent news source devoted to the broad theme of “America in the World.” The source works to analyze America’s global conduct and the forces that shape it.**

The increasing feebleness of the UN reflects several developments.

(...)

[A crucial problem is] incoherence. The General Assembly is based on an absurdity: the patently false idea that the governments of the world are equal in some real (as opposed to formulaic) sense to each other. India has as many votes in the General Assembly as Chad. As the number of weak states and irrelevant states grow, the political importance of the General Assembly declines to the vanishing point. Nobody cares what a collection of micro states, weak states and corrupt, shambolic states thinks about anything.

The absurd and inconsequential nature of the General Assembly is reflected in the bodies and commissions that depend on it. Groups like the Commission on Human Rights are international laughingstocks and rightly so. At best they are irrelevant; at worse they actively undermine the causes they were, theoretically, established to advance.

[Another problem] is outdatedness. The Security Council represents a 1945 compromise between power realities and political correctness. That is, the UK, the US and the USSR were great powers in 1945. China and France weren’t, but it was convenient to pretend otherwise. Today, a majority of permanent Security Council members aren’t great powers, and there are significant powers (like India and Japan) who aren’t permanent members.

A majority of the Security Council’s permanent members are European states and ex-great powers to boot. This is farcical, and the Security Council’s growing weakness is the natural and inevitable result.

Finally, the UN punches below its weight because it is so badly run. Corrupt and incompetent governments insist on placing political favorites in UN jobs because, well, because they can. Despite commendable efforts at reform, UN bureaucracies remain notoriously poorly managed, inefficient and the whiff of scandal is never far away. The UN designs its objectives badly and spends money inefficiently in pursuit of them.

Before the UN can debate changing rules about offensive power, crucial reforms are necessary. The UN cannot accomplish any objectives with its current structural problems and inefficiency.



Funding Problems AMS

Kenny, Charles. “The United Nations Isn’t Failing, Its Members Are.” Business Week. August 26, 2013. <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-26/the-united-nations-isnt-failing-its-members-are> **Bloomberg Businessweek, known until 2010 as BusinessWeek, is a weekly business magazine published by Bloomberg L.P. Founded in 1929, the magazine was created to provide information and interpretation about what was happening in the business world. It is currently headquartered in New York City.**

All of which suggests that the failings of U.N. peacekeeping operations are due in large part to the unwillingness of U.N. member countries—and in particular, the U.N. Security Council—to support operations aggressively enough. **Again, the limited capacity of the UN to deal with other global challenges, from disease to global warming, is not just about the weaknesses of the institution—it is closely connected to its pathetic levels of funding. The U.N. family’s donor budget for maintaining planetary public goods from climate to basic agricultural research to biodiversity amounts to about \$3 billion a year, roughly the cost of a recently proposed street repair program for the City of Los Angeles, or what Americans spend partying on the Fourth of July.**

Until Other Issues are Resolved, Offensive Force is Inadvisable AMS

Blyth, Fiona. “Too Risk-Averse, UN Peacekeepers in DRC Get New Mandate and More Challenges.” Global Observatory. April 10, 2013. <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/04/too-risk-averse-un-peacekeepers-in-the-drc-get-new-mandate-and-more-challenges/> **The Global Observatory provides timely analysis on peace and security issues by analysts, scholars, journalists, and policymakers. It is published by the International Peace Institute.**

Major General Patrick Cammaert, a former UN Force Divisional Commander for MONUC in the DRC, says he supports reinforcement of MONUSCO, but he questions how the new forces will sit alongside the existing force, and is critical of the lack of analysis of the current MONUSCO requirements.

Says Cammaert: “No one has conducted an analysis of why, over the last five years or so, MONUSCO has been unable or unwilling to fulfill its mandate of protecting civilians, and until we have the outcome of this analysis we cannot determine if the solution is an intervention brigade.”

In Cammaert’s opinion, “The issue is not that proactive operations are not already authorized, but that troop contributors are risk averse, and show time and again a lack of political will to employ a full reading of the mandate, leading to accusations that it lacks robustness.” In the end, “the mandate is only as strong as the will of the leadership and the TCCs to implement it.



January 2015

Con: Problems not offensive

The United Nations is operationally and financially inefficient. DAT

“First, Do No Harm.” The Economist. 28 April 2012. Web.

<http://www.economist.com/node/21553450>

Even as Haitians have been outraged by Minustah's wrongdoing, they have become increasingly doubtful of the benefits it provides. The UN originally deployed the force in 2004 to stabilise the country during the civil unrest that followed the ejection of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a populist former priest, from the presidency. There has been no serious armed conflict in Haiti since 2006—which can be taken as evidence either of Minustah's effectiveness or of its irrelevance. **Even if the troops do contribute to security, critics of the force note that a single year of its \$800m budget might be enough to revamp the country's decrepit water infrastructure. That might well have prevented cholera from spreading in the first place.**

Minustah's footprint in Haiti is getting somewhat lighter. **Assuming that 1,600 troops leave by June as scheduled, the force will be cut to 7,400, roughly the same number as before Haiti's earthquake in January 2010. But further reductions are unlikely in view of the political tumult during the first year of the presidency of Michel Martelly, a former musician. In February his prime minister, Gary Conille, offered to resign after just four months in office, which he spent mainly investigating corruption. Mr Martelly can do little until a successor is confirmed. On April 17th, 50 members of a rogue paramilitary force, claiming to represent a volunteer militia that has occupied an abandoned army barracks, disrupted parliament and forced it out of session. The president himself was abroad, recovering from an embolism. The government is in no position to dictate terms. Only the UN can restore Minustah's legitimacy.**

The increased resources and logistics mandated by the addition of offensive operations would be inadvisable until the UN shows itself capable of managing existing troops and resources; proceeding otherwise would constitute unnecessary risk to troops and budgetary strain for host nations and UN member states alike.



Force only a "Paper Option" AMS

Nichols, Michelle. "U.N. Study Finds Peacekeepers Avoid Using Force to Help Civilians." May 16, 2014. Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/us-un-peacekeepers-civilians-idUSBREA4F0M220140516> **Founded in 1851, Reuters is an international news agency transmitting news in 10 different languages around the world. Reuters reporter Michelle Nichols has reported around the world and focuses today on United Nations news.**

"The reality is that the United Nations cannot fully protect civilians while the troop contributing countries do not instruct their contingents to do all they can, including using force as a last resort when civilians are under attack before them," U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, Carman Lapointe, told the Fifth Committee on Tuesday.

[An internal report on the United Nations] found that operational and political constraints within missions were at odds with their legal authority and mandate to act and that some missions "perceived themselves as weak, outnumbered and stretched across vast areas, making the use of force only a paper option."

Other Issues Preclude Use of Effective Force by United Nations Peacekeepers AMS

Nichols, Michelle. "U.N. Study Finds Peacekeepers Avoid Using Force to Help Civilians." May 16, 2014. Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/us-un-peacekeepers-civilians-idUSBREA4F0M220140516> **Founded in 1851, Reuters is an international news agency transmitting news in 10 different languages around the world. Reuters reporter Michelle Nichols has reported around the world and focuses today on United Nations news.**

Stephen Lieberman, U.S. Minister-Counselor for U.N. management and reform, told the Fifth Committee the report indicated **"a broad lack of understanding by peacekeepers of what protection of civilians entails at the tactical level, a lack of commitment by mission leadership to use force in order to protect civilians, and persistent parallel lines of command between troop contributing countries and their capitals that precluded the warranted use of force."**



UN Peacekeeping Success Depends on Member States

When Member States Are Committed, UN Missions Succeed AMS

Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences. Ogunrofia, Bayo. "The Factors Behind Successes and Failures of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions: A Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo." 2012.

http://www.academia.edu/1902524/The_Factors_Behind_Successes_and_Failures_of_United_Nations_Peacekeeping_Missions_A_Case_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_Congo The author is a Graduate Student at the Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh, UK specializing in UN operations in the region.

Since the traditional peacekeeping method demand neutrality, impartiality, and consent of the states, the super-powers are limited in taking overt role in any peacekeeping operation, but they are prepare[d] t work through the UN as a proxy for justifying their geopolitical and economic interest. **States where the UN peacekeeping mission succeeded, like Macedonia, Suez Canal (Egypt-Israel crisis and DRC), it is because the super-powers, especially the United states, Britain, and France have primary interest, and as such are more committed to the 'peacekeeping' mission.** However, in states where UN peacekeeping failed, it is because one or more of the super-powers have only secondary interest in the states or regions. Secondary interest here suggests that if the state(s) or region is not strategic to the national interest of one or more super-powers, then they are not committed to making overtures such as sending troops and financial commitment to the operation. This is evident in Russian and Chinese attitudes to the peacekeeping mission in the DRC.

This inevitably suggests that the more the great powers have strategic interest in conflict regions of the world, the more they will be willing to actively participate in the peacekeeping missions, and the more they will be committed to ensure a successful peacekeeping outcome. In other words, when the great powers have little or secondary interest in a particular state conflict, they would have less interest in peacekeeping mission, and would be less concerned about the success of the mission. Although a certain measure of success may sometimes be achieved when a super-power does not have a fundamental interest at stake, it will not have the same incentive to participate in a peacekeeping mission. It is likely that if all super-powers are overtly and strongly committed to any UN peacekeeping operations and genuinely committed to resolving disputes in the trouble spots of the world without having any primary or secondary interest in the conflicts involved, the UN peacekeeping operations will be successful and sustain permanent peace in the affected state(s).



January 2015

Con: Depends on member states

United Nations peacekeeping forces often suffer from a lack of unanimity in goals more than anything else. With clear structural reforms and commitment from all member states, missions can achieve success without using offensive force.

UN jurisdiction is limited by member-states: Afghanistan. ASF

Dobbins, James. Jones, Seth G. Cran, Keith. Rathmell, Andrew. Steel, Brett. Teltschik, Richard. Timilsina, Anga. “The UN’s Role In Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq” RAND Corporation. 2005.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf

In recent years, even as the United Nations’ reputation for competent nation building has begun to recover from earlier setbacks in Somalia and Bosnia, the United States has failed to sustain the positive record set in its own Balkan operations. Whereas the United Nations has learned from its failures, the United States has failed to learn from its successes. The U.S. administration that took office in January 2001 initially regarded nation-building as an unsuitable activity for American forces. But by year’s end, the United States had overthrown the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and was faced with the need to install and support its successor. **Washington reluctantly agreed to support the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission to help secure the capital, Kabul, but rejected pleas from the new Afghan government and urgings from the United Nations that peacekeepers also be deployed to other major cities.** Additionally, Washington initially took the position that the mission of U.S. forces was exclusively one of counterterrorism, and that they were not to engage in peacekeeping or public security activities.

The deployment of peacekeepers is contingent on support from member states of the UN. This means that even if an offensive force is present, its success is contingent on the choices of the more powerful member states as to how they are deployed. The same limitations that apply to peacekeepers apply to the offensive force comprised of peacekeepers.



January 2015

Con: Depends on member states

Peacekeeping success is mostly dependent on national investment and efficient organization.

DAT

“Last Line of Defense: How Peacekeepers Can Better Protect Civilians.” Refugees International. 24 February 2010. Web. <http://www.refintl.org/policy/in-depth-report/last-line-defense>

Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.

Clear, forceful mandates and improved training will go a long way towards addressing peacekeepers’ challenges. However, these efforts will show no results if peacekeepers are left blind, overstretched, and immobile. **Peacekeeping missions routinely operate with a shortage of troops, civilian staff and equipment in some of the most insecure and logistically challenging environments in the world. It is essential that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Secretariat identify the resources that are required to fulfill protection activities effectively.** Once the needs are better understood, it will be necessary for UN member states to show a greater willingness to provide those tools.

Finally, it is clear that peacekeepers and the wider community of humanitarian actors — including UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) — must cooperate better to coordinate their activities when responding to a humanitarian crisis. One way to accomplish this is to hold senior mission leadership, as well as the humanitarian leadership that coordinates civilian protection activities (typically the UN High Commissioner for Refugees), accountable for ensuring constructive and ongoing engagement and dialogue between peacekeepers and the humanitarian community.

Real reform will only be possible if UN member states show their commitment to driving forward these changes. For this reason, the U.S. government has a crucial role to play. It can help craft strong, clear mandates with achievable objectives. **It can support the proactive use of force to protect civilians in harm’s way, and work with global training partners to ensure high standards of quality and consistency. The U.S. is also in a position to offer advanced military expertise and specialized equipment — such as appropriate armored vehicles and intelligence gathering equipment.** With these efforts, the U.S. could help make it possible for peacekeepers to better identify threats against civilians, respond more quickly to violent attacks and maximize the use of scarce resources in the field.

With current inadequate levels of investment, offensive operations stand little chance of logistic possibility, let alone operational success.



United Nations Peacekeepers Abuse Force

Peacekeeper Misconduct is the Problem AMS

Jacobson, Thomas. "U.N. Peacekeeping: Few Successes, Many Failures, Inherent Flaws." March-April 2012. http://www.idppcenter.com/UN_Peacekeeping_Failures.pdf The international Diplomacy and Public Policy Center provides current facts and expert opinions on international issues and public policy. As a monitor for the United Nations, Thomas Jacobson has written multiple United Nations updates and critiques.

The problems, failures, and abuses of foreigners serving as U.N. peacekeepers and personnel are numerous. They are lightly armed if at all, retreat if challenged or attacked, rarely if ever protect innocent civilians, and put civilians who flee to them for protection at deadly risk by abandoning them when their lives are at risk. They sexually exploit local women and girls, and often become the primary transmitters of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases to the population. Yet they are rarely punished for any crimes, rapes, or other offenses. Generally, they have a reputation of caring little about the people they are sent to protect.

The scandals involving sexual abuse by United Nations peacekeeping forces make it very difficult to justify the additional right to exercise offensive force. These scandals hurt the United Nations' credibility overall and raise serious questions about the validity of peacekeepers.

Peacekeepers Hurt Victims AMS

Jacobson, Thomas. "U.N. Peacekeeping: Few Successes, Many Failures, Inherent Flaws." March-April 2012. http://www.idppcenter.com/UN_Peacekeeping_Failures.pdf The international Diplomacy and Public Policy Center provides current facts and expert opinions on international issues and public policy. As a monitor for the United Nations, Thomas Jacobson has written multiple United Nations updates and critiques.

The Brahimi Report admitted, "No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor." After the massacre of 800,000 in Somalia, the UN Commission of Inquiry investigating that U.N. peacekeeping failure concluded, "the UN should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of States."



Peacekeepers Fail to Act AMS

Jacobson, Thomas. "U.N. Peacekeeping: Few Successes, Many Failures, Inherent Flaws." March-April 2012. http://www.idppcenter.com/UN_Peacekeeping_Failures.pdf The international Diplomacy and Public Policy Center provides current facts and expert opinions on international issues and public policy. As a monitor for the United Nations, Thomas Jacobson has written multiple United Nations updates and critiques.

On 7 October 2000, Hezbollah terrorists "disguised themselves as UN personnel, using uniforms and vehicles carrying the UNIFIL insignia," and lured three Israeli soldiers in an army jeep to the Israel Lebanon border.

Then the terrorists ambushed them, bombing the jeep and shooting at the soldiers. **Allegedly complicit real U.N. peacekeeping troops stood by and did nothing. The U.N., even at the highest levels, was most uncooperative in giving any helpful or truthful information about the incident.** Not until 29 January 2004, in a prisoner exchange with Israel, when what was left of their remains was returned in coffins, was it known for certain that Sgt. Adi Avitan, Staff Sgt. Benyamin Avraham, and Staff Sgt. Omar Suaed were murdered.

Peacekeepers Fail to Act at All, Offensive Action will Not Fix the Problem AMS

Lynch, Colum. "They Just Stood Watching." Foreign Policy. April 7, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/07/special_report_darfur_united_nations_peacekeeping_investigation With more than 3.5 million online monthly readers, Foreign Policy is one of the most credible names in international politics and global affairs, Foreign Policy delivers highly influential corporate, policymaker, and professional audiences in print and online.

Nnadi, the peacekeeper's commander, later told U.N. investigators that his forces had attempted to prevent the abductors from heading off with the civilians. The victims and bus drivers, though, said they were handed over without a fight. Several said they even saw the U.N. soldiers flashing "thumbs up" signs to the kidnappers as the buses drove off. The U.N. personnel peacekeepers, one of the bus drivers told investigators, "did nothing."

"[The peacekeepers] made no visible effort to prevent the abduction of IDP [internally displaced persons] conference participants from the convoy," an unreleased assessment by other U.N. personnel later concluded. "They just stood watching as the gunmen drove away the buses carrying the IDPs."

Many cases of United Nations failures are the result of inaction. In these cases, the right to exercise offensive force was not the problem. If peacekeepers are unwilling to step in to a conflict for defensive reasons, offensive force is irrelevant.



Peacekeepers Fail to Exercise Power AMS

Lynch, Colum. "They Just Stood Watching." Foreign Policy. April 7, 2014.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/07/special_report_darfur_united_nations_peacekeeping_investigation **With more than 3.5 million online monthly readers, Foreign Policy is one of the most credible names in international politics and global affairs, Foreign Policy delivers highly influential corporate, policymaker, and professional audiences in print and online.**

The mission's former spokeswoman, Aicha Elbasri, provided FP with the documents to draw attention to what she sees as UNAMID's failings and unwillingness to call out Khartoum for what she views as its deliberate targeting of Darfur's civilians and UNAMID peacekeepers. The documents -- which track the period from 2012 through the end of 2013 -- constitute perhaps the largest single leak of internal documents on an active U.N. mission in the world body's history.

"It is fair to say that UNAMID peacekeepers largely failed to protect Darfur civilians, and their presence didn't deter either the government or the rebels from attacking the civilians," Elbasri, a dual U.S.-Moroccan citizen, wrote last May in an end of mission report weeks after she resigned from the mission in protest. "They sometimes helplessly witnessed the attacks and harassment of civilians, some of which took place near UNAMID team sites."

Sexual Abuse by UN Peacekeepers AMS

Bowcott, Owen. "Report Reveals Shame of UN Peacekeepers." The Guardian. March 25, 2005. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/25/unitednations> **The Guardian is a British national daily newspaper. Founded in 1821, it was known as The Manchester Guardian until 1959. From its beginnings as a local paper it has grown into a national paper associated with a complex organizational structure and an international multimedia and web presence.**

The embarrassment caused by the misconduct of UN forces in devastated communities around the world - including Haiti, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Cambodia, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - has become an increasingly high profile, political problem.

Allegations have recently surfaced that troops sent to police Liberia were regularly having sex with girls aged as young as 12, sometimes in the mission's administrative buildings.

In the DRC, peacekeepers were said to have offered abandoned orphans small gifts - as little as two eggs from their rations, says the report - for sexual encounters.



UN Peacekeepers Abuse Victims AMS

Bowcott, Owen. "Report Reveals Shame of UN Peacekeepers." The Guardian. March 25, 2005. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/25/unitednations> The Guardian is a British national daily newspaper. Founded in 1821, it was known as The Manchester Guardian until 1959. From its beginnings as a local paper it has grown into a national paper associated with a complex organizational structure and an international multimedia and web presence.

[A recent study by Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein commissioned to examine the UN Peacekeeping force], released at the UN's headquarters in New York, adds: "The reality of prostitution and other sexual exploitation in a peacekeeping context is profoundly disturbing because the United Nations has been mandated to enter into a broken society to help it, not to breach the trust placed in it by the local population." There have even been reports of paedophilia committed by peacekeepers.

Entitled A Comprehensive Strategy To Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the document insists that UN interventions operate on the principle that they will not "in any way increase the suffering of vulnerable sectors of [a] population".

In the DRC, the report says, "sexual exploitation and abuse mostly involves the exchange of sex for money (on average \$1-\$3 per encounter), for food (for immediate consumption or to barter later) or for jobs".

Sexual exploitation by peacekeepers may threaten the security of missions, the study suggests, exposing them "to blackmail and violent retaliation". It also speeds the transmission of HIV/Aids.



January 2015

Con: Abuse force

UN Peacekeeping Troops and Scandals on Sex Crimes and Corruption. PSM

Newman, Alex. "UN "Peacekeeping" Troops Face Scandals on Sex Crimes, Corruption." . The New American, 15 Oct. 2013. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/africa/item/16746-un-peacekeeping-troops-face-scandals-on-sex-crimes-corruption>>.

United Nations so-called "peacekeeping" troops are once again at the center of global outrage. Among other scandals, the UN and forces under its command are facing lawsuits and fresh waves of criticism for **everything from corruption and lawlessness to spreading deadly diseases and even sexually abusing civilian populations in countries they occupy** — an ongoing problem with UN troops that has been documented around the world. The UN, however, claims to be essentially immune, sparking further anger as thousands of Haitians continue to die from cholera spread by its "peace" forces.

In recent days and weeks, scandal-plagued UN war-making forces — **dubbed "peacekeepers" in an Orwellian example of deceptive doublespeak** — have faced accusations on three primary fronts. **The first is a lawsuit filed in U.S. courts noting that the global entity's soldiers were responsible for a ferocious outbreak of cholera in Haiti** that has claimed almost 10,000 lives so far. Then there is a new report outlining widespread corruption within the organization's forces and the lack of accountability.

Finally, fresh accusations of UN troops raping and sexually exploiting civilians in occupied nations — a common occurrence, as *The New American* and countless other sources have documented — emerged out of Mali. So-called "blue helmets" with the UN **"peacekeeping" mission in the war-torn nation, dubbed the "United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali" (MINUSMA), for example, have been accused of rape and other serious misconduct.**



UN Workers Abuse Women in Congo. PSM

Lynch, Colum. "U.N. Says Its Workers Abuse Women in Congo." . The Washington Post, 27 Nov 2004. Web. 1 Dec 2014. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15363-2004Nov26.html>>.

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 26 -- **Sexual exploitation of women and girls by U.N. peacekeepers and bureaucrats in the U.N. mission in Congo** "appears to be significant, wide-spread and ongoing," according to a confidential U.N. report that documents cases of pedophilia, prostitution and rape.

The report by a U.N. peacekeeping official who recently visited Congo says that some **U.N. personnel paid \$1 to \$3, or bartered food or the promise of a job, for sex. In some cases, U.N. officials allegedly raped women and girls and then offered them food or money to make it look as if they had engaged in prostitution.**

Senior U.N. officials in New York said they have **received 150 allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. personnel in Congo.** The officials declined to provide names or nationalities of those charged with misconduct, saying they are under investigation. But U.N. officials familiar with the charges said that Tunisian and Uruguayan peacekeepers and a French civilian are among those accused of abuse.

"The situation appears to be one of 'zero-compliance with zero-tolerance' throughout the mission," according to the Nov. 8 report, which summarizes the findings of a U.N. mission to the region led by Prince Zeid Hussein, Jordan's U.N. ambassador. "It appears that the most frequent form of **sexual exploitation occurring in [the U.N. mission in Congo] relates to instances of prostitution with minors and adult women, with occasional instances of rape.**"

The abuse in Congo mirrors previous scandals at U.N. missions in Cambodia and Bosnia, where U.N. police from the United States, Romania and many other countries were implicated in sexual crimes and misconduct. In contrast to those episodes, the United Nations has sought to confront the charges publicly and admitted that policies devised to combat those activities have failed.

"I am afraid there is clear evidence that acts of gross misconduct have taken place," U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said at a Nov. 19 summit in Tanzania. "This is a shameful thing for the United Nations to have to say, and I am absolutely outraged by it."



January 2015

Con: Abuse force

Peacekeepers Abuse Power and Engage in Sexual Abuse. PSM

Deen, Thalif. "U.N. "Outraged" at Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers in Haiti." . Inter Press Service News Agency , 23 Jan 2012. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/01/un-outraged-at-sexual-abuse-by-peacekeepers-in-haiti/>>.

The Caribbean nation of Haiti, still struggling to recover from the devastating 2010 earthquake, is once again trying to cope with the sexual abuse of minors by U.N. peacekeepers – for the third time in five years.

The two cases of "sexual exploitation and abuse involving minors", reported last week, are traced to U.N. police officers serving with the U.N. Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

"The United Nations is outraged by these allegations and takes its responsibility to deal with them extremely seriously," U.N. spokesman Martin Nesirky told reporters Monday.

In view of the gravity of the situation – and the **recurrence of sexual abuse by peacekeepers in Haiti** – the United Nations has already dispatched a team of officials to the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince **"to investigate these allegations with the utmost determination"**.

MINUSTAH is emphasising the responsibility and accountability of the chain of command in both preventing and taking prompt action when such allegations arise, Nesirky said.

The U.N. peacekeeping department instituted a **"zero tolerance" policy toward sexual abuse, a new code of conduct for its more than 110,000 peacekeepers deployed around the world, and new training for officers and all U.N. personnel.**

But that has not deterred the continued sexual abuse of women and minors in peacekeeping missions worldwide.

The United Nations says it has done much to confront the problem since 1999, when U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia were reported to have been involved in a sex-trafficking ring.

In 2003, the United Nations issued a "zero tolerance" policy for sexual exploitation and abuse.



Areas with peacekeepers have more child prostitution, Fj

**United Nations Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development.
“Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”. August 26, 1996.**

Children may also become victims of prostitution following the arrival of peacekeeping forces. In Mozambique, after the signing of the peace treaty in 1992, soldiers of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) recruited girls aged 12 to 18 years into prostitution. After a commission of inquiry confirmed the allegations, the soldiers implicated were sent home. **In 6 out of 12 country studies on sexual exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict prepared for the present report, the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution.**

U.N Sexual Abuses in Africa, Fj

**Ahere, John. “Critical Analysis of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Africa”
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies.**

The UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa have been snared with scandals. **By December 2004, investigations had already turned up 150 allegations of sexual misconduct by peacekeepers and UN staff in MONUC despite the UN’s official policy of “zero-tolerance”. One found 68 allegations of misconduct in the town of Bunia alone.** UN insiders told The Times that two Russian pilots based in Mbandaka paid young girls with jars of mayonnaise and jam to have sex with them. They filmed the sessions and sent the tapes to Russia. The Moroccan peacekeeping contingent based in Kisangani — a town on the Congo River with no road links to the outside world — had one of the worst reputations. A soldier accused of rape was apparently hidden in the barracks for a year. **In July 2002 the rebel commander Major-General Jean Pierre Ondekane, who subsequently became Minister of Defence in a post-war transitional government, told a top UN official that all that MONUC would be remembered for in Kisangani was “for running after little girls”.**

Even Canadian troops have been guilty of atrocities: in Somalia, for example, a bound 16-year-old Somali youth, Shidane Arone, was beaten to death by UNOSOM II Canadian soldiers in March 1993.



The Legal Framework for Holding Abusers Accountable is Weak

UN peacekeepers often aren't exposed to host countries' justice systems. DAT

Ladley, Andrew. "Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability on International Peace Operations." *Politics and Ethics Review*, 1(1) 2005, 81-90. 2005. Web.

<http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/IntlOrgSp09/PEACEKEEPERABUSEIMMUNITYANDIMPUNITY.pdf>

The author is Adjunct Professor in the School of Government at the Victoria University of Wellington.

The inability to prosecute directly, but the possibility of prosecution back home, sounds like accountability. But is it? Certainly there is no absence of potentially applicable laws and rules. The established events in this example concerned adult UN soldiers and civilians having sex with children, some as young as thirteen. In most domestic legal systems these would be crimes – including rape and statutory rape; and commanders who actively hindered criminal investigations would be charged with obstruction of justice. For soldiers, any such conduct would also render them liable under their own military justice systems, which generally apply at all times and in all places of service, including in foreign countries under peace operation mandates. **Obviously, this same conduct is likely to constitute offences against the laws of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where they were committed – but the UN, and any state sending civilians or troops to the UN, might understandably be reluctant to expose its troops or nationals to the courts of the Congo.**

In the peacekeeping context, these same events are breaches of several UN Codes of Conduct, but the accountability to those Codes is limited to service issues, like pay and employment. So, there are 'laws' – but the framework is full of holes, producing, in the context of the Congo, a 'feeling of impunity'.



Troops' home nations are also ineffective at prosecution. DAT

Ladley, Andrew. "Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability on International Peace Operations." *Politics and Ethics Review*, 1(1) 2005, 81-90. 2005. Web.

<http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/IntlOrgSp09/PEACEKEEPERABUSEIMMUNITYANDIMPUNITY.pdf>

The author is Adjunct Professor in the School of Government at the Victoria University of Wellington.

Even if there are 'laws' of varying sorts prohibiting certain conduct, the accountability regime is inadequate in at least six main respects:

(1) To the extent that perpetrators might be liable to prosecution in their home countries for offences committed on UN service abroad, there are major inconsistencies between different countries' legal systems as to what exactly is an offence.⁵

(2) There are major gaps in legal jurisdiction as regards civilians, compared with military personnel.

(3) There are significant differences in jurisdiction, capacity and willingness of countries to hold their troops or civilians accountable.

(4) Even if there were uniform willingness to prosecute back home (and jurisdiction covering both military and civilians), it is often impractical to get reliable evidence to enforce criminal laws back home if the events took place abroad.

(5) The possibility of lifting UN immunity and subjecting a person to the local courts and punishment systems is often either impractical or would raise major other human rights questions about fair process and punishment.

(6) The UN's own sanctions are essentially 'employment-related', rather than criminal.

The end result is that people committing the same offence, on the same mission, but from different countries (or even with different commanders), might end up facing radically different accountability processes, including: no action, UN service-employment sanctions, being repatriated from the country of UN Operations, facing courts martial and, finally, the possibility of a criminal prosecution in the home country.

The instances of abuse wouldn't be as impactful if mechanisms to deal with it existed; the mechanisms, however, are lacking. This adds untenable levels of risk to expanding UN peacekeepers' in host nations.



January 2015

Con: Abuse force

Peacekeeper-contracted civilians are an even greater liability than the peacekeepers. DAT

Ladley, Andrew. "Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability on International Peace Operations." *Politics and Ethics Review*, 1(1) 2005, 81-90. 2005. Web.

<http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/IntlOrgSp09/PEACEKEEPERABUSEIMMUNITYANDIMPUNITY.pdf>

The author is Adjunct Professor in the School of Government at the Victoria University of Wellington.

In contrast, mechanisms for accountability in home states for civilians serving on international missions are either lacking in terms of jurisdiction and process, or wholly absent. As Chairman Steve Chabot noted to the US House of Representatives (30 March 2000), during debate on the introduction of American legislation to provide for jurisdiction in such cases:

Each year incidents of rape, sexual abuse, aggravated assault, robbery, drug distribution, and a variety of fraud and property crimes committed by American civilians abroad go unpunished because the host nation declines to prosecute these offences. **This problem has been compounded in recent years by the increasing involvement of our military in areas of the world where there is no functioning government, such as Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. Because in those places no government exists at all to punish crimes, American civilians who commit crimes there go unpunished.**

The absence of domestic authority to prosecute civilians working with American armed forces who commit crimes abroad has only very recently been dealt with under American law. However, even this has flaws – the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 2000 was only designed to cover civilians serving with military forces, not civilians serving as staff in an international mission.

Most states have still not provided for the possibility of local prosecution for offences committed by their civilian nationals on international missions. Domestic mechanisms for conferring jurisdiction over civilian wrongdoing in foreign states have developed on a piecemeal basis and it appears that a great many states have no possible jurisdiction to prosecute, at home, their civilians who commit crimes on UN peace operations.

Civilians (e.g. consultants) would see increased roles under more offensive conditions, leading to the harms and complications mentioned in this card.



Case studies: Haiti and sexual abuse. DAT

“First, Do No Harm.” The Economist. 28 April 2012. Web.

<http://www.economist.com/node/21553450>

Citing scientific evidence, in November the lawyers featured in the film filed 5,000 complaints to Minustah's claims office on behalf of cholera victims, seeking at least \$250m in damages. The UN's peacekeeping department says it is studying them. Until now, the claims office has dealt with smaller matters, such as property damage.

Minustah's agreement with the government states that bigger disputes should be handled by a special tribunal. So far, however, none has been set up. Since the force and its troops enjoy immunity from local courts—which most countries demand before offering soldiers to the UN—cholera victims have no other formal legal recourse. As a result, their lawyers are threatening to challenge Minustah's immunity in the Haitian courts if the UN does not address their claims. That could affect peacekeeping operations worldwide.

Minustah's reputation has been further tarnished by charges of sexual abuse. Two Pakistani soldiers were accused of raping a 14-year-old boy, and a group of Uruguayan peacekeepers allegedly sexually assaulted an 18-year-old boy and videoed the incident. **The justice system has worked somewhat better in these cases—a Pakistani military tribunal convened in Haiti convicted its soldiers last month, and the Uruguayans seem likely to face trial in their home country. But the Pakistanis were sentenced to just one year in prison.** A popular song at this year's Haitian Carnival included a line cautioning young men nearby the peacekeepers to watch their rears.

Minustah is the 8,000-strong peacekeeping force which was stationed in Haiti at the time of the cholera outbreak.



Peacekeeping Premise is Flawed

Foreigners Cannot Properly Execute Offensive Action AMS

Jacobson, Thomas. “U.N. Peacekeeping: Few Successes, Many Failures, Inherent Flaws.” March-April 2012. http://www.idppcenter.com/UN_Peacekeeping_Failures.pdf **The international Diplomacy and Public Policy Center provides current facts and expert opinions on international issues and public policy. As a monitor for the United Nations, Thomas Jacobson has written multiple United Nations updates and critiques.**

Obviously, it is difficult to justify U.N. peacekeeping as successful, wise, or in the safety and best interests of the people they are purportedly assigned to protect. By noble character and nature, a father will risk his life to protect his family, and a man to protect his community or nation. **But it goes against human nature to expect foreigners to risk their lives to protect people they don't know and to whom they have no relational connection or commitment.** U.N. peacekeeping creates the illusion of safety and doing something good, but is inherently flawed.

UN intervention weakens state sovereignty. ASF

Mirbagheri, Farid. [Director of Research at Centre for World Dialogue] “Conflicting Interests: The United Nations versus Sovereign Statehood” Centre for World Dialogue. *Global Dialogue* Vol. 2 Num. 2 Spring 2000 <http://www.worlddialogue.org/print.php?id=79>

Sovereign statehood and the realist tradition, its inevitable partner, **promote a system in which the powerful can maximise their interests while the weak are condemned to a backward “juridical” statehood.** Perhaps the United Nations can indeed make a better world, as US President Harry Truman announced so proudly at the conclusion of the San Francisco conference on 26 June 1945. But better for whom? **Perhaps the United Nations has made a better world for the powerful nations.** After all, in the fifty-five years since the founding of the United Nations they have managed to avoid repeating the mistakes which prompted two world wars last century. But it would hardly be plausible to claim, for example, that the United Nations has made a better world for the nearly one million Rwandans who were brutally massacred in the space of three months while the realist world of the powerful and its international agent, the United Nations, stood by and watched.

The logic that upholds the UN justification on intervention clearly only holds interest for the majority support, namely from powerful countries. Weaker countries will struggle to overpower intervention by larger international bodies, thus creating a worse world for the countries that have no international voice.



January 2015

Con: Peacekeeping premise flawed

UN Peacekeeping Activities does not have Administrative Capacity to Maintain an Army.

PSM

Ruggie, John. "No, the World Doesn't Need a United Nations Army." . The New York Times, 26 Sept 1992. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/26/opinion/26iht-edjo_0.html>.

Contrary to the new conventional wisdom, the proposals for a big UN army are premature and wrongheaded.

The recent expansion and diversification of UN peacekeeping activities - as in Namibia, Central America, Cambodia and Yugoslavia - **already overwhelm the organization's fiscal and administrative capacity.**

UN civilian officials **increasingly play the roles of human rights monitor, supervisor of electoral politics, aid specialist, administrator of a public agency, policeman.** UN military personnel increasingly protect civilian populations, safeguard relief efforts, negotiate with local authorities or warlords the circumstances of their day-to-day functions, and cope with the constant threat of armed attack.

Yet funding and logistics for these expanded mandates remain haphazard and inadequate. The United Nations has no standing stock of equipment, no capital reserve fund. No new operational doctrines have been **devised for the new peacekeeping mode, and training for it is virtually nonexistent.**

The United Nations' administrative apparatus for fielding the missions, monitoring their activities and responding to sudden and adverse shifts on the ground is **shockingly small in size and short on military expertise.**

It is a miracle that disaster has not yet befallen one of these peacekeeping missions and the troops from Australia, Austria, Canada, Fiji, Ireland, Malaysia, the Nordic countries, Poland and other middle and smaller powers that typically serve in them.



January 2015

Con: Peacekeeping premise flawed

A U.N. Standing Army will be Ineffective. PSM

Sheehy, Thomas. "A U.N. Army: Unwise, Unsafe, and Unnecessary." . The Heritage Foundation, 16 Aug 1993. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1993/08/em362-a-un-army-unwise-unsafe-and-unnecessary>>.

A campaign is underway in Congress to endorse the concept of a standing army controlled by the United Nations. Senator Joe Biden, the Democrat from Delaware, has introduced a resolution (S.J. Res. 112) to allow American troops to be part of such a force. He claims that the United States must abandon "the vainglorious dream of a Pax Americana and look instead for a means to regularize swift, multinational decision and response." **Biden's assertion is curious given a U.N. operation gone awry in Somalia, a confused U.N. mission in Bosnia, and chronic U.N. mismanagement and fraud. This is not a time to expand the power and influence of the United Nations. If anything, this is a time to be skeptical about U.N. effectiveness in settling conflicts around the globe.**

For this reason, the U.S. should not endorse the idea of a U.N. standing army. It could drag the U.S. into deadly and expensive conflicts having little to do with American vital interests around the world. **Moreover, a standing army will only increase the U.N.'s appetite for precipitous involvement in conflicts for which it is poorly prepared. To be sure, a standing army would be more readily available for deployment, but that may mean an overly hasty involvement of U.S. forces in far-away conflicts in which no U.S. interests are at stake.**

Advocates of arming the U.N. make a curious argument. They say that a U.N. army is necessary to keep America from becoming a global policeman. **Senator David Boren, the Oklahoma Democrat, has noted that, "while Americans want something done, they do not want to do it alone." In other words, in a standing U.N. army the U.S. supposedly will share the burden of international peacekeeping with other nations.**

Additional Burden for U.S. While a standing U.N. army may increase token international support for a peacekeeping force, it would also surely create a temptation for the U.S. to go along with questionable armed interventions by the U.N. **With some seventy areas of conflict or potential conflict world-wide, a U.N. standing army certainly would see much action. There are today fourteen U.N. peacekeeping operations underway, involving some 80,000 troops from 75 countries.**



January 2015

Con: Peacekeeping premise flawed

U.S. Should Oppose Support for Peacekeepers. PSM

Schaefer, Brett. "U.S. Should Oppose Return to U.N. Peace Enforcement." . The Heritage Foundation, 30 Apr 2013. Web. 1 Dec 2014.

<<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un-peace-enforcement>>.

The U.N. Security Council recently adopted resolutions to create an “intervention brigade” to supplement the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and to establish the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

The Security Council’s approval of the Mali mission where there is no peace to keep and authorization of offensive action by peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) violate the basic U.N. principle that peacekeepers are not war fighters. **The U.N. has eschewed peace enforcement for well-founded reasons based on past experience. The U.S. should oppose U.N. peace enforcement and instead support ad hoc coalitions and interventions.**

... Neither the DRC nor Mali is ripe for U.N. peacekeeping. The positive environment from a decade ago has been squandered by DRC President Joseph Kabila with ample help from spoilers inside and outside the country. There is little prospect for peace in Mali until a new government is elected that incorporates adequate representation from long-ostracized groups. While elections are scheduled for July, significant challenges persist that could derail them.

The Obama Administration has a responsibility not to support the most convenient options but rather to support efforts that are most likely to result in international peace and security. Instead of peace enforcement through U.N. operations, **the U.S. should explore and advocate alternatives that address these situations and support a U.N. mission only when the basic principles of peacekeeping are in place.**

... The U.S. should not let the pressure to act override prudence. Supporting the intervention brigade and MINUSMA were likely the least difficult options, but history indicates that U.N. peace enforcement is fraught with problems. Failing to learn from past lessons on peace enforcement will only make tragedies more likely in the future.



January 2015

Con: Peacekeeping premise flawed

Foreign forces cannot be seen as side-constrained occupiers. DAT

Phillips, James. “Keys to the Endgame in Afghanistan.” Heritage Foundation. 6 December 2001. Web. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/12/keys-to-the-endgame-in-afghanistan>

James Phillips is the Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

If introduced on a large scale, even in humanitarian or peacekeeping roles, American or British troops could be denounced as an occupying force. This would give Mullah Omar or a successor a renewed opportunity to tap into Afghan xenophobia and Islamic zealotry. **Even United Nations peacekeeping troops drawn from Muslim states could provoke a backlash if they were perceived to back a rival faction in a renewed civil war.** The Taliban also could be given a new lease on life if a new government comes to power in Islamabad and restores Pakistani support that President Pervez Musharraf withdrew after the Taliban refused to break its ties to bin Laden's terrorist network.

While this card covers the invasion of Afghanistan, its premise holds true for any attempt at increasing the role of peacekeepers: the more engagement peacekeepers see, the less they are seen as a “peacekeeping” force. Because UN peacekeepers are much more reliant on a notion of impartiality with respect to local populations than standard military forces, they cannot afford to be perceived as either occupiers or an extension of one side’s military capabilities.



January 2015

Con: Peacekeeping premise flawed

Use of force to protect human rights violates international law. ASF

Simma, Bruno. "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" *European Journal of International Law*. 1999. <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/567.pdf>

Contemporary international law establishes beyond any doubt that serious violations of human rights are matters of international concern. Impressive networks of rules and institutions, both at the universal and regional levels, have come into being as a result of this international concern. **In the event of human rights violations which reach the magnitude of the Kosovo crisis, these developments in international law allow states, acting individually, collectively or through international organizations, to make use of a broad range of peaceful responses.** According to the dominant doctrine in the law of state responsibility (developed by the United Nations International Law Commission), **the obligation on states to respect and protect the basic rights of all human persons is the concern of all states**, that is, they are owed *erga omnes*.

Consequently, **in the event of material breaches of such obligations, every other state** may lawfully consider itself legally 'injured' and is thus **entitled to resort to countermeasures** (formerly referred to as reprisals) against the perpetrator. **Under international law** in force since 1945, confirmed in the General Assembly's Declaration on 'Friendly Relations' of 1970,¹ **countermeasures must not involve the threat or use of armed force.** In the case of Kosovo, peaceful countermeasures were employed, for instance, by the European Union last year, with the suspension of landing rights of Yugoslav airlines within the EU. Leaving aside the question of whether this particular measure proved to be effective, it is somewhat surprising that a major Member State of the EU, at least initially, did not regard itself in a position legally to have recourse to this peaceful means of coercing the FRY to respect the human rights of the Kosovar Albanians. Yet this same state expressed no such doubts about the legality of its participation in the NATO threat of armed force which developed just a few weeks later.

This card is interesting as it assumes states are the actors, even if the use the UN as a means to action. This does bring up the question that if the UN acts independently, will this still be a violation of the declaration the evidence refers to? Logically speaking (and to defend this card), because peacekeeping operations need approval of the Security Council and member states, then this still seems to be state action and a violation of international law. Ultimately the use of force to protect human rights seems to be illegal.



Peacekeepers Not Able to Properly Exercise Offensive Force

By Nature UN Peacekeeping Not Prepared for Robust Operations AMS

Sloan, James. "UN Peacekeeping in Darfur: A 'Quagmire' that We Cannot Accept." June 3, 2014. E-International Relations. <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/03/un-peacekeeping-in-darfur-a-quagmire-that-we-cannot-accept/> Established in November 2007, E-International Relations (E-IR) is the world's leading website for students and scholars of international politics. E-IR has approximately 135,000 unique visitors a month (Q1 2013 average) from a worldwide audience of students and graduates. James Sloan is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, School of Law, and a former adviser to a UN peace mission.

The argument put forward in my book is, in a nutshell, that UN peacekeeping operations are ill-suited to operations requiring the use of offensive force: they lack the personnel, the equipment, and the effective leadership required. Moreover, the tradition that peacekeeping operations may only operate with the consent and cooperation of the government of the host state means that it is extremely difficult for a militarized peacekeeping force to be even-handed in its resort to force: if it were to use force against the host state—even if the government of the host state was acting contrary to the interests of its civilian population—it would lose that government's good will and its continued operation in the state would be extremely difficult.



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

UN Peacekeepers Not Prepared to Use Offensive Force AMS

Sloan, James. “UN Peacekeeping in Darfur: A ‘Quagmire’ that We Cannot Accept.” June 3, 2014. E-International Relations. <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/03/un-peacekeeping-in-darfur-a-quagmire-that-we-cannot-accept/> Established in November 2007, E-International Relations (E-IR) is the world’s leading website for students and scholars of international politics. E-IR has approximately 135,000 unique visitors a month (Q1 2013 average) from a worldwide audience of students and graduates. James Sloan is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, School of Law, and a former adviser to a UN peace mission.

With a view to ensuring that nothing in the nature of the Rwandan genocide occurred ‘under the noses’ of UN peacekeepers, the idea that peacekeeping operations should routinely be mandated to use offensive force in certain circumstances gained favour—despite the problems with earlier militarized peacekeeping operations. In 2000, the influential Brahimi Report on peacekeeping was published. On the question of the use of force by peacekeeping operations, it argued along the following lines: 1) the UN must never again stand by while civilians are killed, as had been the case with the Rwandan genocide; 2) peacekeepers must be made ‘robust’ and charged with taking sides—they must never again be mere ‘appeasers’; and 3) only once a sufficient number of well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers have been contributed by states should the Security Council establish and deploy an operation.

The first element of the argument is laudable: the UN must certainly not stand idly by in the face of mass atrocities. **However, matters fall apart when one gets to the second and third elements. Simply adding a line or two to the mandates of peacekeeping operations, requiring peacekeepers to take on the unimaginably difficult task of preventing genocide or civilian harm is wildly unrealistic.** The nature of UN peacekeeping does not lend itself to the use of force: peacekeeping forces must be donated by states (and may be withdrawn by them at any time), peacekeeping forces tend to have little in the way of sophisticated equipment (that, again, in many cases, must be donated), and the command structure of peacekeeping forces is frequently problematic. For example, an order from a commander from State A may be ignored by a subordinate from State B—if that subordinate is able to have the order overruled by a government official from State B. A version of this scenario is outlined in the Foreign Policy investigation of UNAMID.



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

Nations Will Be Reluctant to Place Peacekeepers in Harm AMS

Sloan, James. “UN Peacekeeping in Darfur: A ‘Quagmire’ that We Cannot Accept.” June 3, 2014. E-International Relations. <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/03/un-peacekeeping-in-darfur-a-quagmire-that-we-cannot-accept/> **Established in November 2007, E-International Relations (E-IR) is the world’s leading website for students and scholars of international politics. E-IR has approximately 135,000 unique visitors a month (Q1 2013 average) from a worldwide audience of students and graduates. James Sloan is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, School of Law, and a former adviser to a UN peace mission.**

The third element of the argument that emerged from the Brahimi Report, i.e., that the Security Council should wait until peacekeeping forces are sufficiently well-configured to be successful before establishing them or placing them *in situ*, is also problematic. **It presumes a Security Council that is sufficiently circumspect to put political considerations to one side, as well as UN member states that are willing to contribute sufficient financial resources and personnel to the endeavor—despite the risk of the loss of life. It ignores the reality that many states may consider the contribution of personnel to operations where the forces will be in harm’s way to be politically damaging (the US contributes no personnel to UNAMID) and may even be begrudging when it comes to donating equipment.** Moreover, it ignores the possibility that some members of the Security Council might consider it to be preferable to put in place an operation that is ill-suited to the task, rather than risk waiting until the time is right, lest they be seen to be doing nothing in the face of mass atrocity. Former Secretary-General Kofi Anan described the establishment of a militarized peacekeeping operation with a robust mandate, but little chance of fulfilling it, as creating an ‘alibi’ for the Security Council. Presumably, the idea is that if the UN is criticized for allowing another mass atrocity to occur, the Security Council can point to the fact that it did act: it established a militarized peacekeeping operation to prevent such an atrocity. In this regard, the title of the third article in the *Foreign Policy* investigation may be recalled: ‘A Mission That Was Set Up to Fail’.



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

Militarized Peacekeepers are a Contradiction AMS

Sloan, James. “UN Peacekeeping in Darfur: A ‘Quagmire’ that We Cannot Accept.” June 3, 2014. E-International Relations. <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/03/un-peacekeeping-in-darfur-a-quagmire-that-we-cannot-accept/> **Established in November 2007, E-International Relations (E-IR) is the world’s leading website for students and scholars of international politics. E-IR has approximately 135,000 unique visitors a month (Q1 2013 average) from a worldwide audience of students and graduates. James Sloan is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, School of Law, and a former adviser to a UN peace mission.**

Even if we lived in a world where the leaders deciding what direction the Security Council would take were circumspect and uninfluenced by politics, and member states—including, of course, the Security Council’s permanent members—were willing to donate sufficient funding, equipment, and troops to ensure the success of such operations, I am not convinced that assigning peacekeepers forceful tasks is a good idea. Imagine a mayor of a city with serious crime problems and an inadequate police force deciding that the way to protect the citizenry was to arm traffic wardens or ambulance attendants. While these newly robust city employees might very well prevent a number of crimes, it would not be long before they were no longer seen by the criminal population as unthreatening—instead, becoming the targets of the criminals. **Militarized peacekeepers are in something of a ‘no-win’ situation: where they use force, they become the target of various forces; where they do not use force (because they are vastly outnumbered and to do so would be the equivalent of committing suicide), there is a substantial risk that the local population—which, for better or worse, has come to think of the peacekeeping force as their protector—will see them as failures or cowards. Recall the title of the first article in the *Foreign Policy* investigation: ‘They Just Stood Watching’.**



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

Use of Force Would Contradict Purpose of UN Peacekeeping AMS

Hultman, Lisa. “Robust Peacekeeping: A Desirable Development?” <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/09/02/robust-peacekeeping-a-desirable-development/> Established in November 2007, E-International Relations (E-IR) is the world’s leading website for students and scholars of international politics. E-IR has approximately 135,000 unique visitors a month (Q1 2013 average) from a worldwide audience of students and graduates. Lisa Hultman is Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden.

While UN peacekeeping is effective if adequately composed, there are certainly limits to how much the UN can move towards more robust missions without introducing new problems. In March 2013, the UN peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) received a new mandate from the Security Council to neutralize armed groups with the help of an ‘intervention brigade’. Although Resolution 2098 carefully stated that this should be done “without creating a precedent of any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping”, this resolution can certainly be viewed as a potentially dramatic alteration of the principles of UN peacekeeping. **If UN peacekeepers are allowed to take an active stance against one side of the armed conflict, with the clear mission to neutralize these actors through the use of force, it is difficult to see this as anything else than moving away from the core principles of impartiality and the use of force only in self-defense.**

(...)

While robust mandates may be necessary for effectively protecting civilians, a move towards offensive mandates is risky. Not only are UN peacekeepers unsuited for such operations, but, more importantly, warring parties will change their perception of UN peacekeepers. Blue helmets will no longer symbolize impartiality. This is a problem in some missions already today, with warring actors deliberately attacking UN peacekeepers. Research shows that the risk for UN personnel to be killed is higher in operations with a peace enforcement mandate. **An extended perception that the UN takes active part in conflicts could be severely damaging for future operations. Nevertheless, some conflicts require robust action in order to address and contain the destructive dynamics that lead to civilian victimization.** Hence, the challenge for the future is to find the right balance of deploying strong UN missions that can effectively protect civilians, while at the same time maintaining an impartial position in the conflict. Civilian protection is a difficult, but not impossible, task. The track record of the UN is better than its reputation.



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

Past UN military force failed independently. ASF

Buer, Major Eric F. “United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOMII): A Comparative Analysis of Offensive Air Support” US Marine Corps. 2001.

[http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235146541_United_Task_Force_Somalia_\(UNITAF\)_and_United_Nations_Operations_Somalia_\(UNOSOM_II\)_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Offensive_Air_Support](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235146541_United_Task_Force_Somalia_(UNITAF)_and_United_Nations_Operations_Somalia_(UNOSOM_II)_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Offensive_Air_Support)

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, the United States-led operation in Somalia, began on the 9th of December 1992. Thus began one of the most controversial and precedent setting operations in United States foreign policy and military history. The United States- led mission was designated United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF). UNITAF was given the full political support of the United Nations, but the operation would be planned and executed by the United States. **The United Nations had previously attempted to restore peace and end the starvation that plagued the east African nation. The United Nations mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), which had begun in the fall of 1992, had fallen critically short of providing either the necessary entry force or adequate humanitarian sustainment to complete the assigned mission under United Nations resolutions.** The United States had provided logistic support and established a Joint Task Force (JTF), designated OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF, in conjunction with the formation of UNOSOM. **A critical weakness within UNOSOM and OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF was their ability to project significant air power.** UNOSOM and OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF would yield to UNITAF/OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in December of 1992.

This specifically notes that the UN led attempt to restore order and relief to Somalia in 1992 failed due to a lack of offensive air support. The UN required the US to take over the operation.



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

Peacekeeping Forces Unable to Complete Offensive Operations AMS

Bosco, David. “When Peacekeepers Go to War.” April 1, 2013.

**http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/28/when_peacekeepers_go_to_war
With more than 3.5 million online monthly readers, Foreign Policy is one of the most credible names in international politics and global affairs, Foreign Policy delivers highly influential corporate, policymaker, and professional audiences in print and online.**

Part of the problem with offensive U.N. operations is that the training and resources of the forces doing the fighting often doesn't match the mandate. It's one thing for the Security Council to authorize offensive operations from New York; it's quite another thing for peacekeeping commanders to manage them successfully on the ground. During the U.N.'s Bosnia operation in the 1990s, that gap between the Council's proclamations and the actual work of peacekeepers grew to tragic proportions.

If peacekeepers get bogged down while on the offense -- or, worse, commit abuses of their own -- political will for the operation will likely melt away. The countries contributing the troops for the enforcement brigade may think twice. It's doubtful that either the United States or cash-strapped European states will send their own forces to bolster peacekeepers in need of assistance.

Operations Add to Local Resistance AMS

News Record Co. “United Nations Authorizes Offensive Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” July 30, 2013. <http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations-authorizes-offensive-operations-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/> News Record is managed by Record media, an independent news source that uses experts from around the globe to report on important news.

Other experts worry about the long-term effects of having an offensive force under the command of the United Nations. Resolution 2098 explains the individual goals and purpose for FIB as, “to prevent the expansion of all armed [rebel] groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them.”

Pieter Vanholder, the DRC country director for the Life and Peace Institute, believes that attempting to accomplish these goals may result in unintended consequences. **Speaking to Al-Jazeera, Vanholder explained, “The brigade may be seen as a kind of occupation force. As a consequence it could become a push factor for some to join armed groups, adding to local resistance.”**



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

Children are forced into the armies of UN targets in the Congo. ASF

Krumova, Kremena. [Epoch Times Staff]. “Children in the Congo Increasingly at Risk of Recruitment” Epoch Times. November 29, 2012. http://printarchive.epochtimes.com/a1/en/us/nyc/2012/11-Nov/29/A04_EET20121129-NY-US.pdf

“When displacement happens, children lose sight of their parents. This is one of our biggest concerns,” said Alessandra Dentice, chief of Child Protection at UNICEF in Kinshasa. She is currently working with about 3,000 children recruited by armed groups across the country.

The UK-based organization SOS Children reported that 1 in 10 of the world’s child soldiers are found in the DRC—that is a total of about 30,000 child soldiers in the DRC. SOS also found that 15–30 percent of all newly recruited combatants in the DRC army are younger than 18 years old.

This means that the targets the affirmative case defends is inclusive of children. If children are part of the armed force that poses a threat to stability, then it is justified to kill them as part of the operation.

Shifting Peacekeeping Environment AMS

Osmançavuşoğlu, Emel. “Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Cold War Era.” Journal of International Affairs. 2000. <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/EmelOsmanCavusoglu.pdf> The Journal of International Affairs is a leading foreign affairs journal edited by the graduate students at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. It was established in 1947 as a nonprofit organization, and is the oldest university-affiliated periodical in the field.

Some of the challenges to effective peacekeeping are considered largely conceptual. In the past, peacekeepers were merely expected to separate hostile forces and observe cease-fires or truces. For the operation to be successful, it was essential that the parties to the conflict offered their collaboration and support. However, in recent conflicts, involving ethnic-based disputes, internal political struggle or the collapse of state institutions, the UN has been acting without the clear consent of the parties to the conflict. **The result is that the environment for peacekeeping is no longer benign. Peacekeepers increasingly work in a climate of continuing armed conflict, sometimes in places where there are poorly defined borders or cease-fire lines and no guarantees of respect for their safety or role.**



United Nations Peacekeeping: Problems with Peace Enforcement AMS

Osmançavuşoğlu, Emel. “Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Cold War Era.” *Journal of International Affairs*. 2000. <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/EmelOsmanCavusoglu.pdf> *The Journal of International Affairs* is a leading foreign affairs journal edited by the graduate students at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. It was established in 1947 as a nonprofit organization, and is the oldest university-affiliated periodical in the field.

Mats Berdal argues that "the fundamental distinction between enforcement and peacekeeping should be maintained ... combining peacekeeping with enforcement action in one operation, as is effectively the case with the United Nations's Operation in Somalia, carries with it considerable military and political risks." Indeed, the cases of Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia bring new challenges to the task of peacekeeping. Elevating peacekeeping to peace enforcement raises several issues. **Chief among them is whether the UN is endowed with adequate resources to undertake certain enforcement mandates. Another issue is whether the UN can develop a competent structure to undertake enforcement, including cases where the military risks are very high. A further problem is legitimacy, and whether the impartiality that is the key to UN peacekeeping operations can be maintained.**

Peacekeepers Exacerbate Hostility AMS

Kotomska, Malgorzata. “UN Peacekeeping Stretched to Its Limits.” *Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Accion Humanitaria*.” April 1, 2009. http://www.iecah.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=623:-un-peacekeeping-stretched-to-its-limits-&catid=34: analisis&Itemid=85 *El Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria* or (IECAH) is a private and independent entity created in 2000. The organization focuses on the construction of peace and humanitarian action.

Having said that, it seems rather obvious that sending peacekeepers to areas where there is clearly no peace to keep simply incites more hostility. If a mission is deployed where violence is rampant and no peace agreement in sight, peacekeeping starts to resemble war-fighting. As CIC's report points out, the use of force is considered part of most peace operations in order to protect civilians or in defense of a mandate; however, it cannot be a "baseline stance". When force becomes the norm, a mission is no longer a peace operation. This brings into question plans for the proposed deployment of a UN mission in Somalia, following the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1863, which would replace the current African Union force in the war-torn state. AU Peacekeepers in Somalia have fallen victim to continuous attacks by insurgents and calls for further violence against the troops have often been reiterated. Therefore, bringing in new peacekeepers will just provide further targets and, before any more troops are committed to that region, serious analysis of the strategy and the conflict itself needs to be worked out in order to truly make a difference.



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

Peacekeeping Forces: Continued Sexual Abuse AMS

Deen, Thalin. “U.N. ‘Outraged’ at Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers in Haiti.” Inter Press Service News. January 23, 2012. <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/01/un-outraged-at-sexual-abuse-by-peacekeepers-in-haiti/> **Founded in 1964, the Inter Press Service (abbreviated: IPS) is a global news agency. Its main focus is the production of independent news and analysis about events and processes affecting economic, social and political development. The agency largely covers news on the Global South, civil society, and globalization.**

The continued sexual abuse of minors in Haiti – and also in other peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Cote d’Ivoire – has alarmed the United Nations.

Allegations of abuse have dogged U.N. peacekeeping missions since their inception over 50 years ago.

The issue was thrust into the spotlight after the United Nations found, in early 2005, that peacekeepers in Congo had sex with Congolese women and girls, usually in exchange for food or small sums of money.

The U.N. peacekeeping department instituted a “zero tolerance” policy toward sexual abuse, a new code of conduct for its more than 110,000 peacekeepers deployed around the world, and new training for officers and all U.N. personnel.

But that has not deterred the continued sexual abuse of women and minors in peacekeeping missions worldwide.

The United Nations says it has done much to confront the problem since 1999, when U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia were reported to have been involved in a sex-trafficking ring.

As long as peacekeeping forces continue to abuse basic United Nations rules like the strict mandates against sexual abuse, allowing offensive operations is too great a risk.



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

When Authorized to Use Force, U.N. Forces Fail to Do So AMS

Nichols, Michelle. "U.N. Study Finds Peacekeepers Avoid Using Force to Help Civilians."

May 16, 2014. Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/us-un-peacekeepers-civilians-idUSBREA4F0M220140516>

Founded in 1851, Reuters is an international news agency transmitting news in 10 different languages around the world. Reuters reporter Michelle Nichols has reported around the world and focuses today on United Nations news.

United Nations peacekeeping missions routinely avoid using force to protect civilians who are under attack, intervening in only 20 percent of cases despite being authorized to do so by the U.N. Security Council, an internal U.N. study found.

"There is a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not intervening with force when civilians are under attack," the report by the Office of Internal Oversight Services said.

"Peacekeepers are absent from many locations when civilians come under attack, and when they are present, are unable or unwilling to prevent serious physical harm from being inflicted," the 26-page report said.

Con teams can make a powerful argument that the right to use offensive force is not necessary. Peacekeepers suffer from division, poor organization, a lack of funding, and many other weaknesses documented in this brief. This source shows that peacekeepers did not or were not able to exercise force even when allowed to do so. Clearly, this problem must be addressed before giving peacekeepers additional offensive freedoms.



January 2015

Con: Not able to properly exercise offense

Major Defeats by Peacekeeping Forces

Ineffectiveness of Blue Helmet Soldiers. PSM

Krastev, Nikola. "Behind The 'Blue Helmets' -- A Look At UN Peacekeepers." . Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 04 Jul 2010. Web. 1 Dec 2014.
<http://www.rferl.org/content/Behind_The_Blue_Helmets__A_Look_At_UN_Peacekeepers/2090367.html>.

Since the first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948 in the Middle East, 63 peacekeeping operations have been implemented. Sixteen of those continue to be actively pursued today, **doing everything from patrolling areas of recent violence, clearing land mines, and delivering aid to helping refugees and supporting free and fair elections.**

With thousands of blue helmets deployed in the world's hot spots at any given time, peacekeeping operations represent the single largest item in the UN's budget, with almost \$8 billion set aside just for 2010.

In recent years, the UN's peacekeeping operations have been dogged by allegations of corruption, abuse, and failure to act in situations of extreme violence.

The Srebrenica massacre, in which more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed by ethnic Serb forces in July 1995, took place despite being inside a UN-declared "safe area" and **in the presence of 400 Dutch UN peacekeepers, who failed to prevent the slaughter.**

A UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda also **failed to prevent the 1994 genocide** there, in which an estimated **800,000 people died.** Years later, Kofi Annan, who at the time served as head of the UN peacekeeping forces before going on to become secretary-general, expressed "bitter regret" over the experience.



Responsibility To Protect (R2P)

Responsibility to protect was designed to encourage military intervention. ASF

Pingeot, Lou. Obenland, Wolfgang. "In Whose Name?" Global Policy Forum. May 2014. https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/In_whose_name_web.pdf

R2P comes with many analytical gaps, problematic assumptions, and controversial solutions. **The doctrine remains ill-defined**, as underlined by debates among supporters who all claim to possess its "true" meaning. The confusion around R2P is well illustrated by disagreements on the role of military intervention in the doctrine. While some R2P proponents argue that military force is just one of many components and was never made to be the principle focus, others claim that it is at the core of R2P. **An examination of the concept's genesis suggests that R2P was indeed intended to justify military intervention by foreign powers on humanitarian grounds.**

R2P's understanding of the mechanisms behind conflicts and global policymaking is at times naïve and disconnected from reality. It adopts a morality-laden discourse that moves the debate away from objective concepts of legality to subjective perceptions of "right" and "wrong." But the emphasis on moral judgment tends to cloud rather than illuminate the understanding of conflict and violence. R2P portrays perpetrators of human rights violations and killings as insatiable and irrational, when they are in reality usually motivated by political goals. This "good vs. evil" **representation of conflict presents violence as slippery slope that leads inexorably to genocide, and it tends to discard opportunities for the negotiations and political compromise usually necessary to end violence.**

The doctrine used to justify military intervention tends to focus on reasons to intervene and shuts out peaceful compromise. This encourages military operations that may not be necessary and may actually escalate violence. It relies on subjective definitions for moral permissibility, and thus is a poor standard for what is objectively allowed in the international community.



January 2015

Con: R2P

The responsibility to protect is a blank check for super powers to exercise military force. ASF

Pingeot, Lou. Obenland, Wolfgang. “In Whose Name?” Global Policy Forum. May 2014. https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/In_whose_name_web.pdf

R2P is far from being universally applicable. The ICISS report acknowledges **that no military intervention under the R2P banner can be conducted against the will of the permanent five members of the Security Council or another major power. But while R2P can never apply to major powers, these powers happen to be the only ones capable of mounting a credible military intervention under R2P. The concept does not provide the means to hold major powers accountable. In the absence of mechanisms for accountability, the imperative of “saving lives” can provide justification for many actions, making R2P a slippery slope.**

When military intervention becomes justified under the simple banner of saving lives with no means for accountability, those who can sign off on that note have the right to intervene whenever they claim lives are at stake. This shifts the power of the offensive force of the UN to the major powers a disproportionate amount when compared to other member states



Non-Offensive Peacekeepers Are a Police Asset

Without offensive operations in their scope, UN peacekeepers become an adept apolitical extension of both local police forces and authorities. This allows them to function in politically-sensitive contexts, e.g. the running of elections. This also forces their role into “violence prevention,” which is often the most crucial aspect of broader security agendas.

UN peacekeepers are a valuable asset for the protection of national leaders. DAT

“Helping to Calm a Continent.” The Economist. 9 June 2012. Web.

<http://www.economist.com/node/21556608>

UN peacekeepers in Africa have long acted to calm things down after bloody dust-ups in the bush. It is a job they still do. In the Abyei region of Sudan, blue helmets are keeping combatants at arm's length, at times using their own vehicles as barriers. But elsewhere their role has expanded vastly. **Protecting civilians has become a big part of many missions, putting additional strain on peacekeepers as they find themselves in the role of policeman.** Argentine officers in Côte d'Ivoire chase local bandits in coffee plantations.

The protection of national leaders has become another tricky priority. Long gone are the days when the first UN mission in Africa failed to save Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese independence leader, from being murdered in 1961. In Liberia Indian policewomen in full garb are patrolling the gate to the president's office, while motorised Nigerian troops form part of the security detail. Tasks have spread in all directions. Bangladeshi troops in Liberia run job-creating computer classes. **In Somalia the UN alongside the African Union backs a land war against Islamist fighters. Conducting complex national elections, a vast logistical task in places with few roads, has become a UN speciality across Africa.**



January 2015

Con: Police asset

Peacekeepers are valuable extensions (and overseers of) local police forces.

“Helping to Calm a Continent.” The Economist. 9 June 2012. Web.

<http://www.economist.com/node/21556608>

Liberia requires fewer soldiers and more genuine policemen. Violence still flares at times. Nigerian troops disarmed local policemen last year when they started firing at demonstrators. **The demobilisation and reintegration of rebel troops has not gone well. A former child soldier with a dull stare who calls himself Domination says, “I still have nothing to my name.” But most Liberians applaud the UN. “Without them there would be fighting,” says a bar owner in the town of Ganta, in the east of the country.**

In neighbouring Sierra Leone the ambassadors visited the closest the UN has to a success story. They declared that heavy weapons bought by the police, a controversial procurement decision, had been transferred to the army. Peacekeepers left Sierra Leone in 2005, three years after the end of an 11-year civil war.



The integration of peacekeepers and civilians makes peacekeepers good policemen. DAT

Khan, Muhammad Quraish. "Former U.N. Peacekeepers." United States Institute of Peace. 20 June 2014. Web. <http://www.usip.org/publications/former-un-peacekeepers>

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) was established by Congress in 1984 as an independent, federally-funded national security institution devoted to the nonviolent prevention and mitigation of deadly conflict abroad.

Former U.N. peacekeepers are an emerging cadre within Pakistan's police who are precursors of professionalization and other positive changes in police culture.

Given their peacekeeping experience, they are torchbearers of human rights protection in policing, and believers in gender equality and the rule of law. They have also shown an ability to resist undue political pressure by government ministers, politicians and interest groups.

They form a resilient force when it comes to fighting the tide of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan.

This pool of trained resources may be utilized by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for the quick start of new peacekeeping missions.

The Government of Pakistan could also utilize them for police-reform initiatives, imparting training and demonstrating best practices.

Given the potential gains from police participation in U.N. peacekeeping, Pakistan's recent, self-imposed ban on police joining peacekeeping deployments in the future should be reversed.

The logical conclusion for Con teams is thus: increased focus on offensive operations inherently decreases the interface of peacekeepers and civilian duties, leaving them more ill-suited to their useful integration in civilian police forces. This is especially harmful where the net benefits of well-trained a police force is greatest (e.g. in Pakistan).



January 2015

Con: Police asset

One of peacekeepers' major advantages is their operational similarity to civilian police. DAT

Khan, Muhammad Quraish. "Former U.N. Peacekeepers." United States Institute of Peace. 20 June 2014. Web. <http://www.usip.org/publications/former-un-peacekeepers>

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) was established by Congress in 1984 as an independent, federally-funded national security institution devoted to the nonviolent prevention and mitigation of deadly conflict abroad.

U.N. peacekeepers returning to Pakistan are replicating the best practices of peacekeeping at home. They continue to identify themselves as U.N. peacekeepers while serving in the police by displaying their U.N. police medals and insignia on their uniforms. These former blue helmets encounter a Pakistani police culture that is persistently resistant to change. For instance, Police Order 2002, a forward-looking reform agenda promulgated that year, called for functional specialization in such areas as crimes against women, forensic sciences and community policy, as well as for elected civilian control over the police and greater public input through public safety commissions and police complaint authorities. This system was never fully implemented, and the police service continues to operate under the control of the civil service bureaucracy in many areas. Through a series of amendments to the order, the spirit of the reform was undermined by political interference, and many aspects of the woefully dated, colonial-era Police Act of 1861 were reintroduced.⁴ **However, former U.N. peacekeepers nonetheless function as agents of modernization in the police force. Owing to their international training and work with multiethnic police, they understand a democratic service model of policing that is missing from these traditional laws, originally enacted to "control" rather than serve the citizenry.**

Any militarization of peacekeeping forces risks upsetting the gains that the aforementioned peacekeepers have made in otherwise conservative police forces.



The UN should assist states' sovereignty, not usurp it. DAT

Weir, Erin. "Greater Expectations: UN Peacekeeping & Civilian Protection." Refugees International. July 2009. Web. <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a76aaf42.pdf>
Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.

In conflict situations civilians face a variety of threats, and many of them can not be easily addressed by military peacekeepers. With a mandate to protect civilians "under imminent threat of violence" peacekeepers can stop an attack that occurs in front of them, but can not arrest perpetrators or conduct investigations.

Those powers are the sole purview of the sovereign host state and its domestic security institutions, such as local police or gendarmerie. In most cases, however, violent conflict results in the breakdown of the rule of law. Police, judicial, and corrections systems, if they ever existed at all, become unreliable or non-existent.

In very rare cases — such as in Timor Leste and Kosovo — the breakdown of the state apparatus is such that the UN assumes custodianship of the country, effectively becoming the state. This is called an "executive mandate," and in these cases the UN has control of police and other security institutions within the country. But under ordinary peacekeeping mandates, as is the case with MINURCAT in eastern Chad and CAR, peacekeepers have little capacity to address the day-to-day insecurity caused by a lack of law and order.

Creative solutions — like the UN trained, Chadian controlled police force in eastern Chad (see pg. 18) — are being developed in order to address protection concerns generated by a lack of rule-of-law, without compromising state sovereignty. The U.S. should support these and other efforts to bolster local police and justice sector institutions in conflict-affected areas, through predictable, long-term funding.

Even in the unforgiving situations (e.g. Chad), the UN can still accomplish goals without offensives.



Further case study: Chad. DAT

Weir, Erin. “Greater Expectations: UN Peacekeeping & Civilian Protection.” Refugees International. July 2009. Web. <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a76aaf42.pdf>
Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.

The Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS) is one of the unique elements of the UN engagement in eastern Chad. This Chadian police force was created to work alongside UN peacekeepers to enhance security for refugees and humanitarian personnel in eastern Chad. **DIS officers have been vetted and given additional training by MINURCAT (in cooperation with other UN agencies, funds and programs) and is supported in the field by UN police mentors. However, this is still a Chadian force, under the command and control of Chadian authorities.**

The DIS was created to address the ongoing banditry and impunity that plagues eastern Chad, and particularly the threats to civilians and humanitarian agencies that have been the target of frequent attacks and carjacking. These police were drawn from the ranks of the existing Chadian gendarmerie and police, and have been deployed to police refugee camps and the surrounding areas within a ten kilometer radius.

The DIS concept was developed in response to the frustration expressed by EUFOR forces that they were equipped to handle civilian protection on the rare occasion of rebel incursions, but not able to resolve the basic law-and-order gap in the east. Peacekeeping patrols and the establishment of a wide, multinational presence throughout eastern Chad could reduce the likelihood of attack, but peacekeepers do not have the legal authority to arrest perpetrators or conduct investigations.

Similarly, the lack of credible policing and judicial capacities in eastern Chad meant that the government was similarly unequipped to fulfill this role. **By creating a police force under the command and control of the Chadian state, but with UN training, equipment and mentoring support, the UN hoped to create a capable, accountable community police force that could work in conjunction with UN peacekeepers to keep refugee camps safe.**

MINURCAT was the incoming UN peace operation in Chad.



Offensive Operations Are Unnecessary

African governments are investing heavily in their own military infrastructure. DAT

“Arms and the African.” The Economist. 22 November 2014. Web.

<http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21633901-continents-armies-are-going-spending-spree-arms-and-african?zid=301&ah=e8eb01e57f7c9b43a3c864613973b57f>

These questions resonate across Africa. **Last year military spending there grew by 8.3%, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), faster than in other parts of the world (see chart). Two out of three African countries have substantially increased military spending over the past decade; the continent as a whole raised military expenditure by 65%, after it had stagnated for the previous 15 years.**

Angola’s defence budget increased by more than one-third in 2013, to \$6 billion, overtaking South Africa as the biggest spender in sub-Saharan Africa. Other countries with rocketing defence budgets include Burkina Faso, Ghana, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The continent’s biggest spender by far is Algeria, at \$10 billion.

“Some countries are buying really amazing stuff,” says David Shinn, a former American diplomat, now a professor at George Washington University. Ethiopia last year took delivery of the first of about 200 Ukrainian T-72 tanks. Neighbouring South Sudan has bought about half as many. Coastal states such as Cameroon, Mozambique, Senegal and Tanzania are sprucing up their navies. Angola has even looked at buying a used aircraft-carrier from Spain or Italy.

Chad and Uganda are buying MiG and Sukhoi fighter jets. Cameroon and Ghana are importing transport planes to boost their ability to move troops around and deploy them abroad, which they have been ill-equipped to do. **For peacekeeping duties they generally ask friendly Western governments for help in airlifting troops, or charter civilian planes.**

As nations acquire their own resources, UN deployments (particular for potential offensive use cases) of foreign troops becomes increasingly unnecessary.



January 2015

Con: Offense unnecessary

Peacekeeper has been crucial to the preservation of UNDOF. DAT

Saab, Bilal Y. "The Incredible Shrinking Buffer." Foreign Affairs. 28 October 2013. Web. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140225/bilal-y-saab/the-incredible-shrinking-buffer>

But UNDOF's presence has been much more than symbolic. The force's role as a neutral and transparent coordinator and communicator between Israel and Syria effectively decreased the chances of escalation during past tense incidents. **In January 2003, for example, Israeli forces shot two Syrian soldiers in civilian clothing who had entered the area of separation and were approaching an Israeli fence, killing one and wounding the other. UNDOF intervened, returning the injured soldier and the body to Syria. Syria's and Israel's continuous support for the extension of the force's mandate indicates that both countries know just how much they have to lose from its withdrawal, especially in the current escalation-prone environment.** The problem today is that neither party -- especially the Syrian government -- can ensure the safety and security of the peacekeepers, or control extremist forces on the ground that could harm them.

Jihadist groups, for the moment, are either unaware of UNDOF or do not currently see fighting it as an urgent priority. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), arguably the strongest extremist group among the rebels, is busy unifying its ranks and consolidating its power in northeast Syria by taking on other radical groups and seizing strategic posts along the Syrian-Turkish border.

The whole benefit of UNDOF, a UN peacekeeping force, is its ability to have a military presence for a de-escalatory purpose. The additional benefit is that its soldiers are able to carry out their mandate without engagement with Syrian militants.



Offensive Forces Are Counter Productive and Ineffective

Use of military force promotes violence. ASF

Sylvan, Donald. (Department of Political Science Ohio State University) "Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance Increases for International Conflict and Cooperation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Nov 2 2002.

<http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/20/4/609.abstract>

Effects of sharp increases in military assistance on international conflict and cooperation on the part of recipient nations are investigated. Since traditional bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques are often conceptually inapplicable to this subject matter, a quasi-experimental design is used which relies on autoregressive moving average models and exponential smoothing forecasting mechanisms. **Twenty-five annual observations, from 1946 through 1970, of 15 Asian nations serve as the data base. Key findings are: (1) sharp increases in military assistance tend to change decidedly the recipient nation's international conflict and cooperative behavior; (2) in a substantial majority of cases examined, the direction of that behavior change is toward increased conflict and decreased cooperation; and (3) a two-year lag between military assistance and behavior change of recipient nations is statistically supported.** The effects of increased capabilities as well as bureaucratic politics, habit, expectation, and prior deals are offered as possible reasons for these results. The findings seem to refute the argument that giving military aid to a nation not involved in a war will help strengthen that nation and thereby avoid future conflict.



Poverty casues conflict. ASF

Atwood, Brian J. “The Link Between Poverty and Violent Conflict”. New England Journal of Public Policy.

2003. http://www.hhh.umn.edu/people/jbatwood/pdf/link_poverty_conflict.pdf

Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, in their 1997 study of neighborhoods and violent crime, examined race and class segregation in poor Chicago neighborhoods and its impact on “collective efficacy,” or social cohesion among neighbors. They found that **“alienation, exploitation, and dependency wrought by resource deprivation acts as a centrifugal force that stymies collective efficacy.”** **The greater the effect of this resource deprivation — a phenomenon the authors called the “concentrated disadvantage” factor — the stronger the correlation to the level of violence.**⁷

The study by Sampson and others focused on race and class issues within American society, which, because of its egalitarian ethos, may intensify individual feelings of alienation and exploitation. This may limit the study’s value in examining the effects of **poverty in developing nations**. But **“alienation, exploitation, and dependency” are highly relevant factors** there as well. **They cause social and political stress both within poor nations and between poor and rich regions, especially in an information age when social and economic discrepancies are more obvious.**

Governments in the developing world and donor agencies supporting their development agendas are facing much the same “centrifugal force” referred to in the Sampson study. The report of the Commission on Global Governance entitled “Our Global Neighborhood” was alluding to Sampson’s “concentrated disadvantage” factor when it stated that **“absolute poverty provides scant basis either for the maintenance of traditional society or for any further development of participation in civic life and governance . . . unfair in themselves, poverty and extreme disparities of income fuel both guilt and envy when made more visible by global television.”**⁸

It is important to note that even though the study Atwood references is based on data collected in Chicago, he gives explicit reasons as to why it is relevant throughout the world. This shows that poverty is a base cause for internal conflict of a nation. Offensive forces and military intervention cannot address these issues and thus cannot solve. The affirmative needs to prove solvency for any issue that causes conflict.



Lack of self-sustainability causes state failures. ASF

Atwood, Brian J. “The Link Between Poverty and Violent Conflict”. New England Journal of Public Policy.

2003. http://www.hhh.umn.edu/people/jbatwood/pdf/link_poverty_conflict.pdf

The report on state failure, prepared under the auspices of the University of Maryland by several scholars on behalf of the United States intelligence community, examined the correlation between several development factors and the failure of state institutions.¹⁰ Such failure correlated strongest with three factors: infant mortality rates, fragile democratic institutions, and dependency on imports. Each of these factors contributes to the “centrifugal force that stymies collective efficacy,” to use the language of the Sampson study.¹¹ Certainly, parents feel deprived when their children are dying of diseases that they know can be treated in the developed world. Fragile democracies that provide universal suffrage, but do not have the institutional capacity to manage social stress, are clearly vulnerable to collapse. Economies that cannot produce sufficient goods and services internally and service only their elite with imports are bound to have severe distribution of wealth issues. The report concludes: “Empirically the most striking pattern is that civil war is heavily concentrated in the poorest countries The key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development.”¹²

Adding an offensive force without addressing the root cause for state failures and internal conflict can only result in worsening a situation. We should direct our efforts to address these issues through other means of aid rather than military aid.

Intrastate conflicts have little to do with international factors. ASF

Stewart, Frances. “Root causes of violent conflict”. Education and Debate. Development Studied, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

2002. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/pdf/342.pdf>

Group motivation hypothesis—Since intra-state wars mainly consist of fighting between groups, group motives, resentments, and ambitions provide motivation for war.^{4,6,7} **Groups may be divided along cultural or religious lines, by geography, or by class. Group differences only become worth fighting for, however, if there are other important differences between groups, particularly in the distribution and exercise of political and economic power.**⁸ In this situation relatively deprived groups are likely to seek (or be persuaded by their leaders to seek) redress. Where political redress is not possible they may resort to war. Resentments inspired by group differences, termed horizontal inequalities, are a major cause of war. These group differences have many dimensions—economic, political, and social (see table). **Relatively privileged groups may also be motivated to fight to protect their privileges against attack from relatively deprived groups.**⁶



Internal conflict erupts for personal gain. ASF

Stewart, Frances. “Root causes of violent conflict”. Education and Debate. Development Studied, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

2002. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/pdf/342.pdf>

Private motivation hypothesis—War confers benefits on individuals as well as costs which can motivate people to fight.^{9 10} Young uneducated men, in particular, may gain employment as soldiers. War also generates opportunities to loot, profiteer from shortages and from aid, trade arms, and carry out illicit production and trade in drugs, diamonds, timber, and other commodities. Where alternative opportunities are few, because of low incomes and poor employment, and the possibilities of enrichment by war are considerable, the incidence and duration of wars are likely to be greater. This “greed hypothesis” has its base in rational choice economics.^{10 11}

This card functions well when you use evidence that peacekeepers are unwilling to act because it opens up the door for militia members and faction members to loot things such as unguarded aid routes. When we see that the peacekeepers are unwilling to act those aid routes become a more enticing loot point.

Resource constraints may lead to war. ASF

Stewart, Frances. “Root causes of violent conflict”. Education and Debate. Development Studied, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

2002. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/pdf/342.pdf>

Green war hypothesis—This points to environmental degradation as a source of poverty and cause of conflict.^{13 14} For example, rising population pressure and falling agricultural productivity may lead to land disputes. Growing scarcity of water may provoke conflict.¹⁵ This hypothesis contradicts the view that people fight to secure control over environmental riches.^{10 16}

Similarly to previous cards, underlying issues for conflict are necessary to address before using any form of offensive force. Offensive forces cannot solve any more than the status quo when the intervention areas are suffering due to these types of causes. Offensive force can only be used to conquer or pick sides.



Example: Peacekeeping mission in Sudan. ASF

United Nations. “Protecting civilians, monitoring human rights and supporting implementation of cessation of hostilities agreement”. United Nations. 2014.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/>

On 9 July 2011 South Sudan became the newest country in the world. The birth of the Republic of South Sudan is the culmination of a six-year peace process which began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

In adopting resolution 1996 (2011) on 8 July 2011, the Security Council determined that the situation faced by South Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) to consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development.

Following the crisis which broke out in South Sudan in **December 2013, the Security Council, by its resolution 2155 (2014) of 27 May 2014, reinforced UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate towards the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.**

This card just shows that there is an ongoing peacekeeping mission in Sudan, however it also notes that it strictly addresses the protection of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid. Look at the next analysis at the root cause of the conflict.

Root cause of problems in Sudan. ASF

Stewart, Frances. “Root causes of violent conflict”. Education and Debate. Development Studied, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.
2002. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/pdf/342.pdf>

The four hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. **For example, the conflict in the Sudan is an example of both horizontal inequality (with people in the south being heavily deprived) and powerful private gains that perpetuate the struggle.** While environmental poverty has plausibly been an important factor in the conflict in Rwanda, it does not seem to have been in the former Yugoslavia.

Though the publication of this article predates UN intervention in the region, it specifically notes and accurately predicts that the South has an independent agenda that is irresolvable. The ultimate conclusion was that it broke off and became its own country. UN intervention in Sudan began in 2005 and could not resolve the conflict through talks. There is literature that talks about the LRA viewing the UN as an inviting target in the region, promoting conflict.



January 2015

Con: Offense unnecessary

Bosnia is an example of group inequality. ASF

Stewart, Frances. “Root causes of violent conflict”. Education and Debate. Development Studied, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

2002. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/pdf/342.pdf>

Group inequality—There is consistent evidence of sharp horizontal inequalities between groups in conflict.¹⁷ Group inequalities in political access are invariably observed—hence the resort to violence rather than seeking to resolve differences through political negotiation. **Group inequalities in economic dimensions are common, although not invariably large (such as in Bosnia¹⁸).** Horizontal inequalities are most likely to lead to conflict where they are substantial, consistent, and increasing over time. Although systematic cross country evidence is rare, **one study classified 233 politicised communal groups in 93 countries according to political, economic, and ecological differences and found that most groups suffering horizontal inequalities had taken some action to assert group interests, ranging from non-violent protest to rebellion.**⁴

UN peacekeeping methods cannot be effective by any means in countries that have group inequalities. There is no legitimate political means, and even if there is, it is not perceived by the people as legitimate, resulting in internal armed conflict. The root causes of these issues ranges from groups being excluded from politics to economic gaps. Bosnia is one example where this has happened, attributing a substantial warrant as to why the UN failed there.

Pro Counters





Controversy within United Nations

United Nations Forces Differ on Best Approach to Offensive Action AMS

Global Policy Forum. "France and UN Plan Mali Peacekeeping Force." February 5, 2013.

[https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/mali/52242-france-and-un-plan-mali-peacekeeping-](https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/mali/52242-france-and-un-plan-mali-peacekeeping-force.html?itemid=id)

[force.html?itemid=id](https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/mali/52242-france-and-un-plan-mali-peacekeeping-force.html?itemid=id) **The Global Policy Forum is an independent policy watchdog that monitors the work of the United Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking. The GPF gathers information and circulates it through a comprehensive website, as well as through reports and newsletters. The GPF organizes meetings and conferences and we publish original research and policy papers.**

The U.N. has had mixed feelings about France's approach to Mali. In December, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed serious misgivings about the wisdom of France's initial plan to have African and European officers, and supported by the United Nations, back a campaign by the Malian army to retake the north by force from Islamist insurgents, saying that military force should only be used as a "last resort." Ban's hesitance reflected anxiety about the consequences of direct U.N. participation in a military operation against al Qaeda. While Ban has applauded the French military intervention as a necessary response to a sudden Islamist military advance towards the capital, Ban has resisted appeals for greater direct support for the mission.

"I am obliged to bring to the attention of the Security Council the assessment of the Secretariat that, if the United Nations were to provide logistics support to military forces engaged in an offensive operation, it would place civilian United Nations personnel at grave risk, and undermine their ability to carry out their current tasks," Ban wrote in a January 20 letter to the Security Council.

But the view inside the U.N. has not been monolithic. The U.N.'s chief peacekeeper, Herve Ladsous, a former French diplomat, has pushed for greater involvement in the French-led military operation, primarily through the provision of logistical support for poorly equipped African troops. In the end, the Security Council will decide what role the U.N. will play in Mali. So far, that remains unclear.



United Nations Security Accords Outdated

Putin Uses Security Accord to Prevent Intervention AMS

Arkedis, Jim. "It's Time for a New United Nations." September 17, 2013.

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/its-time-for-a-new-united-nations/279738/> Atlantic Magazine reaches leaders across all sectors—consumer, business, media, and government. Atlantic Media's innovative portfolio of digital, print, event, social, and mobile platforms engages an influential audience of over 30 million worldwide each month.

NATO's mission in Libya seems to have fundamentally changed Moscow's calculus. Russia's firm opposition to any resolution authorizing military action against its client-state derailed American, French, and British hopes of a "legal" intervention. Russian President Vladimir Putin went a step farther, pointing out the illegality of military action without a UN mandate:

Under international law the only body that can authorize using weapons against a sovereign state is the UN Security Council. Any other reasons and methods to justify the use of force against an independent and sovereign state are unacceptable and they can be seen as nothing but aggression.

This is, of course, a rich statement from the man who invaded the Republic of Georgia in 2008 with 9,000 troops and 350 tanks and nary a Security Council vote in sight. But if Putin's calculation is that standing for the sanctity of the Security Council is the best way to protect Russia against anything hinting of intervention, it's clearly his best trump card.

In other words, when it comes humanitarian, good governance, freedom and safety issues, it's time to admit something: The United Nations Security Council is now officially broken.



Force Necessary for Evolution of Peacekeeping Missions

Offensive Force Necessary for Change AMS

Fortin, Jacey. “UN Peacekeepers for Combat? In DR Congo, Blue Helmets To Get Serious About Intervention.” International Business Times. March 29, 2013.

<http://www.ibtimes.com/un-peacekeepers-combat-dr-congo-blue-helmets-get-serious-about-intervention-1160971> The International Business Times is an online news publication, comprising 10 national editions and seven languages. The publication, sometimes called IBTimes or IBT, offers news, opinion, and editorial commentary on business and business-related stories. It is ranked by Alexa as the fourth-most visited site among business newspapers.

The move to authorize an intervention brigade has been welcomed by many, though political reform and increased civil engagement will be key to long-term progress for the DR Congo.

U.N. Peacekeeping chief Herve Ladsous told VOA he hopes the new brigade will bring positive changes. “This of course, is a very new tool, because it means for the first time that there will be a peace enforcement capacity which will carry out targeted offensive operations, either in support of the Congolese army or unilaterally in order to neutralize the armed groups -- the negative forces that have created so much suffering over the years,” he said.



Offensive Operations Necessary AMS

Hamiz, Sadiya. “Nigeria’s Envoy says UN Needs to Embrace Innovative Tools in Peacekeeping Operations.” News Agency of Nigeria. October 31, 2014.

<http://www.nannewsnigeria.com/nigerias-envoy-says-un-needs-embrace-innovative-tools-peacekeeping-operations> The News agency of Nigeria (NAN) was established by the Federal government of Nigeria by Decree No. 19 of May 10, 1976 (Now News Agency of Nigeria Act CAP. N85, Vol. II, Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004) to gather and distribute news on Nigeria and cover events of interest to Nigeria at the international level for the benefit of the Nigerian media and the public.

In his remarks, Mr Dianguina Doucuore, representing Mali, who associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, said that peacekeeping operations had become more complex and that peacekeepers were operating in increasingly difficult environments.

Implementation of mandates to protect civilian populations as well as the safety of the UN personnel, he said is a big challenge.

In the case of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Doucuore said, deliberate attacks on contingents had become a daily reality.

“With this in mind, peacekeeping missions should be authorised to carry out offensive operations in order to protect themselves and civilians.”

Need for Protection of Peace Process AMS

International Peace Institute. “Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust.” August 2011.

http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3972~v~Making_UN_Peacekeeping_More_Robust_Protecting_the_Mission_Persuading_the_Actors.pdf The International Peace Institute (IPI, formerly the International Peace Academy) is an independent non-profit research and policy development institution based in New York. IPI specializes in multilateral approaches to peace and security issues, working closely with the Secretariat and membership of the United Nations.

Peacekeeping ought to be robust enough to convince two or more belligerents to stop a conflict and to be able to protect the political initiatives of the international community, its actors, and the local population without showing weakness. The level of robustness should not necessarily include force, but it should henceforth include the will, the organization, and the resources to never have to yield before violence and to have the capacity to react offensively each time the peace process or its actors are in danger.



The weakness of peacekeeping without force AMS

International Peace Institute. “Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust.” August 2011.
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3972~v~Making_UN_Peacekeeping_More_Robust__Protecting_the_Mission_Persuading_the_Actors.pdf **The International Peace Institute (IPI, formerly the International Peace Academy) is an independent non-profit research and policy development institution based in New York. IPI specializes in multilateral approaches to peace and security issues, working closely with the Secretariat and membership of the United Nations.**

The refusal to exercise force in order to achieve their objectives gives peacekeeping operations a profile which does not deter, and which may effectively tempt troublemakers. Independently of the consequences for the security of the mission, it gives Council mandates an ambiguity that Laura Pineschi sees as “not constructive but destructive.” In practice, deploying force without exercising it makes the mandate of operations difficult to understand if there is no doctrine to inform it.

Protection over Defense AMS

International Peace Institute. “Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust.” August 2011.
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3972~v~Making_UN_Peacekeeping_More_Robust__Protecting_the_Mission_Persuading_the_Actors.pdf **The International Peace Institute (IPI, formerly the International Peace Academy) is an independent non-profit research and policy development institution based in New York. IPI specializes in multilateral approaches to peace and security issues, working closely with the Secretariat and membership of the United Nations.**

To justify the recourse to these interventions, the legitimacy of the duty to protect should be substituted for that of the right to self-defense. This step forward should be established in a doctrine, which I will outline below, which establishes the notion of an intervention force as part of the missions; and gives the Security Council and the Secretariat the tools to limit its use to protection of the force, its mission, and the local population and exclude its use for pursuing the objective of the operation.

By definition, self-defense can only be defensive. Protection, on the other hand, can be seen as temporarily and locally offensive, when an outclassed unit of the peacekeeping force has to be relieved by an intervention operation. If protection is recognized as being a duty that justifies temporary and locally offensive actions then two things that have for a long time been seen as contradictory can be reconciled, giving the operations robust means of reacting against any aggression and prohibiting them from using those means to force the consent of the parties.

This piece does a great job of outlining the philosophical differences between self-defense and protection and makes a case for the need for robust peacekeeping operations.



Retaliation: An Effective Mechanism for Robustness AMS

International Peace Institute. “Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust.” August 2011.
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3972~v~Making_UN_Peacekeeping_More_Robust_Protecting_the_Mission_Persuading_the_Actors.pdf **The International Peace Institute (IPI, formerly the International Peace Academy) is an independent non-profit research and policy development institution based in New York. IPI specializes in multilateral approaches to peace and security issues, working closely with the Secretariat and membership of the United Nations.**

At the theater level, the weakness brought about by the scarcity of peacekeeping forces might lead the crisis manager to threaten the spoilers with measures involving retaliation in cases of aggression. However, such measures pose humanitarian, legal, and political problems that are difficult for the UN and even the European Union, even if this option seems quite natural to NATO.

The last fifteen years of peacekeeping operations have shown us the extent to which crises often bring to prominence those who are insensitive to international legitimacy, and who respect force alone. **Yet peacekeeping operations seek to end crises using the lowest possible level of force. This contradiction can only be resolved by providing peacekeeping forces with a mechanism enabling them to put pressure—if possible in person—on those leading the factions involved in the crisis.**

This would be a clear threat, which would constitute a radical departure from the principle of using the lowest possible level of force. This is not the same as a reaction capability, which, as we will see, all peacekeeping operations should have, so as to come to the aid of any of units in danger. It is rather a case of real punitive measures, which were shown to be essential in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and even Ituri.

The European Union does not currently have, and the UN will doubtless never have, such methods of retaliation at its disposal. Only NATO or an ad hoc coalition can supply such resources, since they are perceived as third parties quite distinct from the peacekeeping forces. Srebrenica also taught us that such methods need to be carefully articulated at the political level by the head of operations, and at the military level by the commanders of the peacekeeping forces. **It is therefore advisable that, when analysis of the spoilers recommended above proves it to be necessary, the development of peacekeeping operations will then explicitly include deterrence measures, which will be submitted to the approval of the Security Council, and born by implementation procedures tailored to the object in question and the peacekeeping doctrine put in place.**



Properly Trained Robust Forces AMS

International Peace Institute. "Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust." August 2011.
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3972~v~Making_UN_Peacekeeping_More_Robust__Protecting_the_Mission_Persuading_the_Actors.pdf **The International Peace Institute (IPI, formerly the International Peace Academy) is an independent non-profit research and policy development institution based in New York. IPI specializes in multilateral approaches to peace and security issues, working closely with the Secretariat and membership of the United Nations.**

Peacekeeping has been accused by Western militaries of having caused troops to lose their aggressiveness, making them ill-suited to actual combat. This judgment is often misunderstood outside the armed forces, where the attitude of "aggressiveness" is generally understood in a pejorative fashion, a connotation derived from the word "aggression." In the military, however, the term denotes a quality that means both combativeness and promptness in the capability to confront.

From the point of view of the UN, the systematic quest for the consent of the parties and the non-use of force are seen as a means of peacekeeping avoiding the undesirable effects of aggressiveness for which the military is generally criticized. But such attitudes are also quickly seen by the parties to the conflict as a lack of combativeness and reactivity in response to external aggression. In this respect, they undermine the robustness of the force.

Therefore, it is wrong to attempt to blunt the aggressiveness of peacekeeping units, especially those in charge of interventions to support units in difficulty. Rather, it is advisable to compensate for this by using strict combat discipline, keeping it within the limits of the rules of engagement. Any aggression against a peacekeeping unit must receive an immediate and appropriately severe response to gain the respect of the parties to the conflict. A unit held under pressure between combativeness and restraint will not lose its aggressiveness, and will remain fit for combat.

This piece outlines the necessary balance between aggression and good judgment in robust forces. Pro teams should acknowledge past problems with peacekeeping forces and provide effective methods of reform as described in the piece above.



Offensive Operations Are Not Common

Offensive operations are not precedent. ASF

United Nations. “MONUSCO Mandate”. UN - MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. March 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml>

On 28 March 2014, **the Security Council**, by its resolution 2147, extended the mandate of MONUSCO until 31 March 2015 and **decided that the renewed mandate would also include MONUSCO’s Intervention Brigade** — “on an exceptional basis and **without creating a precedent or any prejudice**” — within the authorized troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 formed police units.

At the same time, the Council noted the need for a clear exit strategy and decided that the Mission’s further reconfigurations and mandates should be based on the evolving situation and progress towards several objectives set out in accordance with its three priorities — protecting civilians, stabilizing the country, and supporting implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.

Here we see that the UN notes that their intervention into this situation is a specific call to action and should not be used as precedent. This means there should be some general global consensus in order for there to be an offensive force from the UN. This analysis avoids some of the harms the negative may attempt to use in claims of a slippery slope.



January 2015

Pro Counters: Offense not common

UN forces failed in Somalia due to offensive limitations. ASF

Buer, Major Eric F. “United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOMII): A Comparative Analysis of Offensive Air Support” US Marine Corps. 2001.

[http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235146541_United_Task_Force_Somalia_\(UNITAF\)_and_United_Nations_Operations_Somalia_\(UNOSOM_II\)_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Offensive_Air_Support](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235146541_United_Task_Force_Somalia_(UNITAF)_and_United_Nations_Operations_Somalia_(UNOSOM_II)_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Offensive_Air_Support)

The transfer of the mission from a United States-led and equipped force to a United Nations led and equipped force would cause a myriad of challenges. The lack of air forces and an expanding mission for UNOSOM II would lead to several decisive engagements with the Somali militias. This comparative analysis will examine the role of OAS operations in support of UNITAF and UNOSOM II. **OAS engagements in Somalia were limited, but the presence of OAS aircraft greatly impacted ground operations.** This analysis will look at OAS assets available, command and control, doctrine and command relationships within UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

If the UN had a body that encouraged offensive force, or at least was not resistant to it, then the potential for the effectiveness of OAS (offensive air support) would have not been limited, and UNISOM II could have been successful.



Precedent for Offensive Success

Success in the Congo AMS

Bosco, David. "When Peacekeepers Go to War." April 1, 2013.

http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/28/when_peacekeepers_go_to_war

With more than 3.5 million online monthly readers, Foreign Policy is one of the most credible names in international politics and global affairs, Foreign Policy delivers highly influential corporate, policymaker, and professional audiences in print and online.

Several press accounts (...) have described the addition of an offensive mandate to a peacekeeping force as "unprecedented." They are right in a narrow sense. The council has not previously designated particular units for offensive operations. **But there's important [...] precedent in Congo for U.N. offensive operations.**

The current Congo mission (which has gone by several names) is in fact the second major U.N. operation there. The first operated from 1960 to 1964 and struggled to keep the newly decolonized state intact even as it navigated intense Cold War politics.

(...)

By 1961, the Security Council had given peacekeepers permission to go on the offensive against separatists in the province of Katanga, who were operating in league with foreign mercenaries.

Significantly less verbose in those days, the Council authorized "the use of force, as a last resort" to suppress civil war and disturbances in the country. Several months later, the council urged the peacekeepers to "take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force."

(...)

The U.N.'s offensive in Congo included several distinct phases, including "Operation Rumpunch" and "Operation Morthor." The campaign, which featured Indian and Irish troops, was ultimately successful in defeating Katangan secessionists...



Abuses of Power are Overstated

Putting context to sexual abuse claims. DAT

**“Who Will Watch the Watchmen?” The Economist. 29 May 2008. Web.
<http://www.economist.com/node/11458241>**

For when it comes to its blue-helmets, the UN finds itself in a bind. Although it can, and does, investigate any serious complaints against them, it has no jurisdiction over the alleged culprits. Only their home states have the authority to try and punish them. Most peacekeeping troops come from the developing world—Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Jordan, Nigeria, Nepal and Ghana are the biggest contributors—and many prefer to sweep such incidents under the carpet. All the UN can do is to dismiss them and recommend their repatriation. As all peacekeeping troops enjoy absolute legal immunity, the host country cannot do anything either.

Civilian police attached to such missions are a different matter. Like other non-local UN civilian staff in the field, they enjoy only qualified immunity—for actions committed in the course of their official functions. **Rape and the abuse of minors would not fall into that category, of course. So such crimes could, in theory, be prosecuted locally. In practice, however, this is unlikely, as the kind of countries to which blue-helmets are sent have either appalling justice systems, or non-existent ones. Besides, finding witnesses willing to speak and assembling sufficient evidence are often virtually impossible in such chaos.**

Local police forces in occupied regions are often the only separator between a semblance of order and outright chaos. Weighing the harms vs. benefits of peacekeepers’ presence clearly demonstrates the continued need for their presence (the alternative is poorly-equipped or non-existent police with equal lack of accountability). Any abuse of power arguments thus go more to the abolition of UN peacekeepers’ presence altogether, a far more dubious prospect than what the Pro is advocating.



January 2015

Pro Counters: Abuse overstated

The UN is taking preventative action against abuse. DAT

“Who Will Watch the Watchmen?” The Economist. 29 May 2008. Web.

<http://www.economist.com/node/11458241>

The UN has been trying to strengthen its procedures. Under a revised “model memorandum of understanding” adopted last year, governments are now explicitly required “to bring the full force of their legal sanctions to bear” to enforce the UN's standards of conduct. What that will mean in practice has yet to be seen. But at least investigation procedures have improved. **Upon notification of a case of serious misconduct, the UN now not only informs the country concerned, but also invites it to investigate the incident in co-operation with its own Office of Internal Oversight Services. The new arrangement was applied for the first time to alleged abuse by Sri Lankan peacekeepers in Haiti last year. Over 100 soldiers now face court-martial.**

Deeming the new report “deeply disturbing”, Nick Birnback, the UN's spokesman for peacekeeping, said it was impossible to ensure “zero incidents” in such a big organisation. “What we can do is to get across a message of zero tolerance, which for us means zero complacency when credible allegations are raised, and zero impunity when we find that there has been malfeasance,” he said. That would indeed be a useful start.



Legal immunity does not mean UN troops are unaccountable. DAT

Burke, Roisin. “Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Jurisdictional Immunity.” *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* (2011), Vol. 16 No. 1, 63–104. Web. <http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/1/63.full.pdf+html>

The author is a doctoral candidate at the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law and teaching fellow at the University of Melbourne Law School.

This brings us again to the issue of whether it is truly necessary for the UN to secure the retention of exclusive criminal jurisdiction for the TCCs over military personnel in order for it to function? At this point a number of observations and tentative suggestions might be made. **First, it must be emphasized that even where immunity arises it is solely meant to be from host State law and not from international or sending State law.** Impunity with respect to crimes against local populations, such as sexual abuse, has often been the de facto result of the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of TCCs over military personnel. While concurrent jurisdiction with the host States is not desirable and would likely, in most instances, affect the functioning of UN operations, this would not hold true if there was some form of concurrent or complementary jurisdiction at international or a hybrid of sending State and international level. Immunity could be ‘qualified’, restricted to ‘on duty’ offences. **Furthermore, off-duty offences, a category in which many abuses would fall, in particular sexual offences, could be dealt with by the TCC but with complementarity at an international or hybrid level operating as a safety measure where the TCC is unwilling or unable to exercise its jurisdiction. This could possibly be done in the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial body, or by some form of on-site court-martial system²³² operated by the sending State and supported by the UN.** On-site courts martial would have the advantage of allowing greater access to victims, witnesses and evidence. The development of any system that requires the exercise of jurisdiction within a host State would require both its consent and assistance.²³³ Such a system would deny impunity and bring UN military contingent immunity more in line with current trends in international law, which favour restricted immunity, while not risking jeopardizing the functioning of UN operations.

A TCC is a troop-contributing country (the country which provided the UN with the soldier in question). This card simply illustrated that a practiced lack of accountability is a matter of execution within present legal limits, not institutional or legal failings on the UN’s part.



Often the “Power to engage in offensive operations” is enough to deter violence

Often Real force Not Necessary AMS

Schutte, Robert. “Minding the Gap: Approaches and Challenges to Robust Civilian Protection.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. December 2011. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/08776.pdf> **This Friedrich Ebert Stiftung publication features author Robert Schütte is Chairman of Genocide Alert, which is an ICRtoP member based in Koln, Germany.**

Protection by deterrence means that the very presence of blue helmets is in most cases sufficient to deter attacks on civilians and boost physical security in a given area of operations. While militais--mostly ill-equipped and loosely organized--shun direct confrontations with well-armed professional blue helmets, national authorities shy the exposure and the reporting fo assaults. **A peacekeeping mission's capacity to deter direct violence against civilians is to a large degree a function of two factors: first, its presence in endangered regions and second, its credibility to interfere, if needed by force, to curb violence against non-combatants. It is for this reason that the peacekeepers' capability to gather and process intelligence is as important as their number, equipment, and posture.**

Use this brief's information on UAVs to supplement this argument. UAVs provide ample intelligence for peacekeeping forces. This intelligence allows peacekeeping forces to understand the enemy while often deterring any violence by their mean presence.

Deterrence Only Credible if Offensive Operations Permitted AMS

Terrie, Jim. “The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC.” African Security Review. 2009. **Jim Terrie is a former senior analyst with the International Crisis Group's Africa Programme and research associate at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre.**

Tactically, the main flaw in the UN's military approach is the value placed on ‘deterrence through presence’ – the expectation that the mere presence of UN forces is sufficient to deter aggressors has more often than not proven to be false. **Deterrence is only valid if credible, and while credibility is partly contingent on force strength, it also relies on an adversary's belief that force will be used, often beyond the level of ‘minimum necessary force’ and pre-emptively if necessary.** An adversary's belief that it can ‘snipe’ at UN forces and that there will not be a strong response, greatly undermines the inherent threat that accompanies the deployment of armed peacekeepers.



Increased Flexibility Needed AMS

United Nations. “Delegates Argue Merits of Unmanned Arial Vehicles, Other Technologies as Security Council Considers New Trends in Peacekeeping: 7169th Meeting.” June 11, 2014. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11434.doc.htm> **This source contains a summary of the ideas presented at the 7169th United Nations Security Council meeting. It provides valuable insight into the Security Council mindsight and interests of key delegates.**

GERARD ARAUD (France) said classic theatres of deployment had become more ambiguous, and peacekeeping forces had a military, as well as a political, role in facilitating peace processes and addressing the root causes of a conflict. Civilian protection must always be at the fore, he said, pointing out that 20 years after the Rwanda genocide and many years after the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, United Nations peacekeeping had made considerable progress, including in the deployment of complex operations in “non-permissive” environments. **Robust mandates on the protection of civilians were essential as was the need for sufficient force capacity.** At the same time, peacekeeping operations should support the host State in preserving the objectives of transitions, especially in failed States. **Clearly, peace operations could not and should not substitute national or international efforts, or those of international donors and other partners. Rather, they should focus on ending crisis. Similarly, mandates should not only be strong, but also more flexible,** he said.

This source from the French delegate to the United Nations Security Council reinforces a key argument for Pro teams. The ability to use force in peacekeeping operations allows United Nations teams immensely more flexibility. This flexibility will allow peacekeepers to perform their duty.



United Nations Peacekeeping Reforms

Conduct and discipline reform AMS

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping. “Reform of Peace’eping Operations.” 2014. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/reform.shtml> **This website contians vital updates and reports on structural changes within the United Nations peacekeeping forces.**

Other reforms have been introduced in the field of conduct and discipline.

The Secretary-General imposed a zero tolerance policy following allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in host countries.

At the request of the Secretary-General, the then Permanent Representative of Jordan to the UN, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, produced a sweeping strategy, known as the Zeid Report [A/59/710] PDF Document. It recommended engaging troop and police contributors, other Member States and the wider UN system in a new conduct and disciplining architecture for peacekeeping.

In 2008, an UN-wide strategy for assistance to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel was adopted by the General Assembly in resolution A/RES/62/214 PDF Document.

Pro teams should respond to Con teams’ reports of failures in past peacekeeping missions with evidence that the United Nations peacekeeping force has changed. Past problems are not a reason to continue forward with a better and more flexible peacekeeping force.



No Clear Separation between ‘Peacekeeping’ and ‘Peace Enforcement’

Initial Use of Force Can Accelerate Other Priorities AMS

Terrie, Jim. “The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC.”

African Security Review. 2009. Jim Terrie is a former senior analyst with the International Crisis Group’s Africa Programme and research associate at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre.

Most of the militia leaders in the DRC that have surrendered and agreed to enter the disarmament programme have only done so after being confronted by resolute UN forces; before that they had a free hand to loot, kill and rape. This progress has not solely been a result of military force as there have also been political and social incentives, but contra de Waal’s assertion, force is but one element of promoting progress and when sanctions are enhanced by incentives the overall effect is seldom negative. **The use of force doesn’t necessarily negate other options and may reinforce them.**

The early experience of MONUC and many other missions also shows that...sometimes if [the force] doesn’t fight it can do nothing. Certainly an initial application of force can lead to escalation; however, this should be expected and planned for. **This is where the principle of minimum force is problematic, as incrementally and reactively increasing force from a low base is far more difficult than initially using the ‘maximum necessary’ level of force and then decreasing as compliance is achieved.** This was one of the key lessons of the non-UN interventions in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Operation Artemis in Ituri. While UN forces may not be as technically capable as first world armies, they often have considerable capability and experience that can be brought to bear against most belligerents in complex conflicts. It is however, important to acknowledge that the decision to escalate should be a deliberate one and UN forces should be prepared, equipped and supported to do so. A mission that deploys with no capability or expectation that it will have to create some dominance initially is likely to face serious problems if not failure and this has been the case on numerous UN missions.



January 2015

Pro Counters: Peacekeeping vs. enforcement

Problematic Separation Between Peacekeeping and Enforcement AMS

Terrie, Jim. “The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC.”

African Security Review. 2009. Jim Terrie is a former senior analyst with the International Crisis Group’s Africa Programme and research associate at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre.

Defining how far UN forces can or should go in applying force is problematic. There is no neat division between ‘robust peacekeeping’ and peace enforcement. At various times the difference tactically is likely to be indistinguishable in a complex conflict with a high degree of fluidity in belligerent forces. UN commanders on the ground need to be guided by their mandate and ROE but be prepared to use the forces at their disposal prudently but with deliberate purpose. MONUC’s Eastern Division, under General Cammaert, was able to demonstrate these principles effectively on numerous occasions.

However, these actions were largely a confluence of numerous factors of leadership, necessity and opportunity. While they provide some precedence it is unlikely that the experience has or will have sufficient impact on the development of UN peacekeeping overall. Each UN mission will have its own parameters and constraints from which the mission commanders will have to determine if and how to apply force robustly. **While there is definitely scope for UN forces to apply robust peacekeeping in other situations, the degree to which such an approach can expand and become doctrinally embedded in the UN is greatly restricted by UN’s political and institutional constraints upon the effective use of force.**



Causes For Conflict Are Not Universal

Green War Hypotheses has contradictory empirics. ASF

Stewart, Frances. “Root causes of violent conflict”. Education and Debate. Development Studied, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

2002. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/pdf/342.pdf>

Green war hypothesis—Here the evidence is contradictory. It seems that both **environmental poverty and resource riches can be associated with conflict.**^{13 16 25} **Environmental stress tends to make people prone to violence** as they seek alternatives to desperate situations (as in Rwanda), **while resource riches give strong motivation to particular groups to gain control over such resources** (as in Sierra Leone).

Con Counters





Ethical Concerns

Dangers of Authority to Kill AMS

Picco, Giandomenico. "The U.N. and the Use of Force." October 1994. Foreign Affairs. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50322/giandomenico-picco/the-un-and-the-use-of-force> Since its founding in 1922, Foreign Affairs has been the leading forum for serious discussion of American foreign policy and global affairs.

Finally, there is the importance of morality as an anchor for the Secretary General. Even if the institution of the Secretary General could manage a Chapter VII use-of-force operation, it would then be the decision of his office to authorize intentional killing. This power is quite another matter than the tragic but unintended deaths that may accompany peacekeeping operations. In carrying out an offensive use of force, U.N. soldiers, identified aggressors, and civilians might all be casualties in unexpectedly high numbers. **The authority to order killing, far from strengthening the institution of the Secretary General, would render it no different in the eyes of suspicious combatants than major nation states and their alliances.**

Aside from legal immunity, the UN is also difficult to investigate. DAT

Reinisch, August. "Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations." United Nations. 2009. Web. http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa_e.pdf

The author is Professor of International Law at the University of Vienna.

Private law contracts entered into by the United Nations regularly contain arbitration clauses. In the case of tort claims, such as those resulting from harm suffered as a result of peacekeeping operations or vehicular accidents, the United Nations usually agrees on similar forms of dispute resolution. Staff disputes within the United Nations are settled by an internal mechanism in the form of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, established in 1949 (General Assembly resolution 351 A (IV) of 9 December 1949). In 2009, this system will undergo a major reform leading to the establishment of a two-tier judicial system with a United Nations Dispute Tribunal and a United Nations Appeals Tribunal.

In addition to immunity from suit, the General Convention provides for the "inviolability" of United Nations premises and property which basically means that they are exempted from any search, requisition, confiscation, or other forms of executive, administrative, judicial or legislative interference. The same inviolability applies to the archives of the United Nations.

Hindrances to evidence gathering (i.e. for the investigation of criminal acts) is thus legally codified as part of UN operations.



Authority Problems with Current UN System

Confused Chain of Command AMS

Picco, Giandomenico. "The U.N. and the Use of Force." October 1994. Foreign Affairs. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50322/giandomenico-picco/the-un-and-the-use-of-force> Since its founding in 1922, Foreign Affairs has been the leading forum for serious discussion of American foreign policy and global affairs.

In the present international system, decisions on the use of force reside with nation states. Accordingly, the Security Council, where states dominate, is the organ within the U.N. framework that decides when force is to be used.

To date the Security Council members have shown reluctance to provide the institution of the Secretary General with the resources necessary to a Chapter VII use of force assignment, standby funds, appropriately trained troops, and adequate command, control, and intelligence systems. The result is that the Secretary General has managed use-of-force operations with tools better suited to Chapter VI peacekeeping ventures. This gap has led to questionable results in Somalia and Bosnia. **The case of Bosnia, in particular, proves how uneasy member states are about relinquishing the management of force to a nongovernmental institution like the U.N. Secretary General. And the confused chain of command that we have witnessed in the Balkans has helped neither the credibility of the institution nor the effectiveness of the international effort.**



January 2015

Con Counters: Authority problems

UN's official stance on Haiti cholera epidemic indicates systemic accountability gaps. DAT

Chan, Rosalyn, et al. "Peacekeeping Without Accountability." Transnational Development Clinic, Global Health Justice Partnership, and L'Association Haitienne de Droit de l'Environnement. Yale University. 15 October 2013. Web. http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Clinics/Haiti_TDC_Final_Report.pdf

The Transnational Development Clinic is a legal clinic, part of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization at the Yale Law School.

Cholera victims and their advocates have subsequently called on the U.N. for reparations to remedy the situation and requested meaningful accountability mechanisms to review claims, to no avail. Meanwhile, the national and international executive summary response to the epidemic has been underfunded and incomplete. In the years following the outbreak, the U.N. has denied responsibility for the epidemic. **The U.N. has repeatedly relied on a 2011 study by a U.N. Independent Panel of Experts, which concluded that at the time there was no clear scientific consensus regarding the cause of the epidemic. However, these experts have since revised their initial conclusions. In a recent statement, they unequivocally stated that new scientific evidence does point to MINUSTAH troops as the cause of the outbreak.**

MINUSTAH is the UN peacekeepin



Introduction of Offensive Force Causes Division

Dispute over Definition of Peacekeeping Force AMS

Brooks, Courtney. "Explainer: UN Move to Give Peacekeepers First Ever Mandate." Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. December 3, 2014.

**<http://www.rferl.org/content/un-peacekeepers-combat-resolution/24941095.html>
RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established. The RFE/RL broadcasts to 21 countries in 28 languages, including Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Russia.**

[The resolution to give a one-year mandate to a UN peacekeeping brigade in the mineral-rich eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to use force against a group known as the M23 rebels] would grant peacekeepers **their greatest authority to engage in combat in the history of the United Nations.** Peacekeepers currently cannot open fire unless they are attacked. The newly empowered "intervention brigade" -- part of the 20,000-troop mission in DRC -- would be authorized to "search and destroy," as an anonymous diplomat told Reuters.

Jeffrey Laurenti, a UN expert at the New York City-based Century Foundation, says the mandate will be a "very different kind of presence" than the UN has ever deployed before.

(...)

Of the brigade, he says, "This cannot be considered a UN peacekeeping operation now."

Offensive Force Contrary to UN Principles AMS

Brooks, Courtney. "Explainer: UN Move to Give Peacekeepers First Ever Mandate." Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. December 3, 2014.

**<http://www.rferl.org/content/un-peacekeepers-combat-resolution/24941095.html>
RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established. The RFE/RL broadcasts to 21 countries in 28 languages, including Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Russia.**

"I think there's a huge debate in [Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's] office and also in [the Department of Peacekeeping Operations] about this general trend toward more aggressive operations. And I think that it creates divisions all the way through the UN system," Gowan says.

"There are some UN officials who feel that it's really giving up the basic principles of peacekeeping and endangering the reputation of the organization."



A Desperate Action AMS

Whalan, Jeni. "UN Peacekeepers Cross the Line of Warfare in the Congo." April 23, 2013. ABC. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-23/whalan-congo/4645862> **The Drum website and its sister program on ABC TV focus on commentary from the nation's leading thinkers. Dr Jeni Whalan is a lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at the University of NSW specialising in peace operations, the UN and Australian foreign policy.**

But there is an air of desperation about the Security Council's authorisation of combat operations in the Congo's east. The new intervention brigade will operate within the existing MONUSCO operation, which - despite being one of the UN's largest and most expensive peacekeeping forces - has thus far failed to stem the violence or address the conflict's root causes.

As respected New York think-tank Security Council Report put it recently:

Many Council members have expressed their scepticism about the capability of the new intervention brigade to neutralise armed groups and restore stability in the eastern DRC.

Nevertheless, it seems that lacking any alternative ideas or political resolve to invest in addressing the root causes of conflict in the region, Council members are willing to endorse a course of action put forward by the regional actors.

If true, a lack of ideas and political resolve seems a dangerous basis indeed on which to redefine peacekeeping, with potential repercussions for people and nations far beyond the DRC.



Thin resources and ambiguous mandates make offensives irrelevant. DAT

“Last Line of Defense: How Peacekeepers Can Better Protect Civilians.” Refugees International. 24 February 2010. Web. <http://www.refintl.org/policy/in-depth-report/last-line-defense>

Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.

The UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is a telling example of the cost of unclear mandates. UNMIS was deployed and resourced primarily to support the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but its mandate included language to protect civilians under “imminent threat of violence.” **In an outbreak of violence in May 2008, thousands of people were displaced and the town of Abyei was destroyed. Local communities and international humanitarian actors were outraged that UNMIS had failed to prevent the crisis. Yet, the peacekeepers did not feel that they had the resources required to respond, and the terms of the mandate led many people within the mission to deny that this sort of protection was their responsibility.**

The lack of clarity is made even more challenging by the fact that peacekeepers do not have a standard doctrine on how to conduct protection activities. This forces peacekeepers to improvise tactics in the field. **Traditional military doctrines and training were built mainly to defend territories, not to protect individuals. While a refugee camp is more straightforward to defend, it is much more difficult to plan an operation to protect civilians in far-flung communities.**

The higher-risk nature of offensive operations meshes poorly with the ambiguous directives of UN peacekeepers in the field.



January 2015

Con Counters: Offense causes division

The introduction of offensives would marginalize female peacekeepers. DAT

**Wolf, Amelia m. “The U.S. Role in Recruiting and Retaining Female Peacekeepers.” Council on Foreign Relations. 8 october 2014. Web.
<http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2014/10/08/the-u-s-role-in-recruiting-and-retaining-female-peacekeepers/>**

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher.

The role of women in peacekeeping operations is vital, not only because they contribute to the same extent as men, but they are more suitable to carry certain essential tasks. **This includes interviewing and working with victims of sexual and gender-based violence, relating to and working with child soldiers, and assisting female ex-combatants with demobilization and reintegration into civilian life, for example.** In her latest book, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*, Severine Autesserre found that the lack of female peacekeepers in the DRC—making up just 2.26 percent of peacekeeping troops, primarily in administrative and medical positions—diminished the capacity of agencies on the ground to respond to sexual abuse. “The mass rapes that took place in August 2010 in Luvungi illustrate the negative effect of the lack of female soldiers among the peacekeepers,” Autesserre wrote. **According to a UN investigation, one reason local populations did not alert UN peacekeepers patrolling the area during the three-day assault was because the women could not find any female peacekeepers with whom they would be comfortable to raise the issue of sexual abuse.**

Offensives present two issues. The first is contributing nations’ continuing hesitance to send women into combat roles—something which would become a real possibility with the introduction of combat operations for UN peacekeepers. The second issue is of resources: given consistently limited resources, any offensive operations would likely entail the diversion of existing humanitarian resources, which fund the operations at which female troops are particularly adept.



Offensive Operations will Discourage Nations from Supplying Peacekeepers

Dangers of Offensive Operations AMS

News Record Co. “United Nations Authorizes Offensive Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” July 30, 2013. <http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations-authorizes-offensive-operations-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/> News Record is managed by Record media, an independent news source that uses experts from around the globe to report on important news.

As rebel groups, Rwanda, and the DRC compete for control of the area, the U.N. finds itself at a crossroads concerning its peacekeeping operations. Not only does FIB have to prove its effectiveness, the U.N. must decide if authorizing offensive action is a potential tool to use in the future. **Furthermore, most countries that supply troops for peacekeeping missions do so with the expectation of limiting casualties. Placing peacekeepers in a fighting role may make supplying troops less attractive for U.N. member states.**

UN forces and nation building are better on a small scale. ASF

Dobbins, James. Jones, Seth G. Cran, Keith. Rathmell, Andrew. Steel, Brett. Teltschik, Richard. Timilsina, Anga. “The UN’s Role In Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq” RAND Corporation. 2005. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf

It would appear that the low-profile, small-footprint approach to nation- building is much better suited to UN-style peacekeeping than to U.S.-style peace enforcement. The United Nations has an ability to compensate, to some degree at least, for its “hard” power deficit with “soft” power attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality. The United States does not have such advantages in situations where America itself is a party to the conflict being terminated, or where the United States has acted without an international mandate. Military reversals also have greater consequences for the United States than for the United Nations. **To the extent that the United Nations’ influence depends more on moral than physical power, more on its legitimacy than its combat prowess,** military rebuffs do not fatally undermine its credibility. To the extent that America leans more on “hard” than on “soft” power to achieve its objectives, military reverses strike at the very heart of its potential influence. These considerations, along with recent experience, suggest that the United States would be well advised to resume supersizing its nation-building missions and to leave the small-footprint approach to the United Nations.

The increase in troops do not benefit the UN because the UN derives its power and success more from its ability to be viewed as an unbiased diplomatic body.



Member nations are hesitant to send troops to heavily-contested areas. DAT

**Hempson III, Donald A. "Avoiding the Scourge of War: the Challenges of United Nations Peacekeeping." Origins, vol. 5, issue 1. Ohio State University. October 2011.
Web. <http://origins.osu.edu/article/avoiding-scourge-war-challenges-united-nations-peacekeeping>**

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In 1992, the United States was authorized by the United Nations to deploy the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to Somalia and to use "all necessary means" to provide a safe operating environment for international relief workers. UNITAF was given an enforcement mandate that was not typical of peacekeeping missions at that time.

Despite deploying more than 37,000 highly trained and well-equipped troops, UNITAF faced an operating environment openly hostile to international intervention of any kind and a famine that was accelerating the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

By 1993, UNOSOM and UNITAF were rolled into UNOSOM II, a U.N. peacekeeping mission with much the same mission as its predecessors, but more directly under U.N. control and with a larger operating environment. With approximately 22,000 troops, the U.N. peacekeeping mission was doing more with less and beginning to suffer the consequences of diminishing political will among its member states.

By 1994, following mounting and high profile casualties—most famously for Americans the events of the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, depicted in the book and film *Black Hawk Down*—the United States and several European powers began withdrawing their troops, signaling the collapse of international commitment to peacekeeping in Somalia.

UNOSOM II was decommissioned in March 1995, citing "troop withdrawals, budget restrictions, and military actions by Somali factions" as the reason for the mission's failure. In three years, the various U.N. peacekeeping missions in Somalia had been unable to restore peace or provide the necessary humanitarian aid to a devastated population. Second-generation peacekeeping was beginning on very poor footing.

Offensive operations' greatest use is in the most hostile environments. The problem is that nations are initially loathe to send their troops to fight for interests which are not directly their own. Even if offensive operations have a good chance of success, the question then moves to who will carry them out, given the general hesitation of nations to supply troops.



January 2015

Con Counters: Discourage supply

UN intervention threatens state autonomy. ASF

Clancy, Mary Alice C. Hamber, Brandon. “Trauma, Peacebuilding, and Development: An overview of key positions and critical questions”. INCORE and IDRC. September 9, 2008. http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Topics/Dealing_with_the_Past/Resources/Clancy_Mary_Trauma_Peacebuilding_and_Development.pdf

Moreover, although the latest definition of “peacebuilding” implies partnerships with local actors, this is often challenging. **Local partners remain poorly integrated into many “peacebuilding” strategies. Failure to adequately integrate local actors into peacebuilding strategies is particularly problematic for many reasons**, two of which are outlined here. First, as Chesterman (2004) has pointed out **in relation to the UN, there is a fundamental contradiction in preparing populations for democratic self-rule by imposing a form of “benevolent autocracy”**. Second, as Brinton Lykes argues in her paper, **integration strategies that fail to carefully grasp the differences in power between groups and individuals within a community, or simply conceive ‘communities’ as being without power risk perpetuating and/or exacerbating extant power differentials.**



Drone Precedent Set By UN Is Bad

The precedent for drone use by the UN stems from the DRC, which shouldn't be used. ASF

Karlsrud, John. Rosén, Frederik. "In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and the Use of Drones to Protect Civilians" Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 27, pp. 1-10. Fall 2013. <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/download/sta.bo/85>

There is no doubt that the 'MONUSCO drones' represent a defining moment in the history of UN peacekeeping and aerial surveillance. The UN would also like to expand the use of drones to other countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, and South Sudan (Lynch 2013). **Close attention is thus being paid to how the 'MONUSCO drones' will work out.** DRC, however, may not be the best country to start testing the use of drones in peacekeeping. **Certain regions of the country are covered with rainforest so dense that neither cameras nor infrared optics are able to penetrate it.** Surveillance drones can be useful in areas where the vegetation is less dense, **but tropical weather conditions in eastern DRC will put the drones to the test during the rainy season.** There will also be many other lessons to draw regarding contracts and contract management, storage, analysis, and dissemination of drone-collected material.

Drone use in the DRC should not be used to allow for alternative surveillance because the DRC use does not give us a holistic picture on the impact of drones to an entire operation. They only operate in sections where it is convenient.



January 2015

Con Counters: Drone precedent bad

Drone use sets unsustainable burden on peacekeepers. ASF

Karlsrud, John. Rosén, Frederik. “In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and the Use of Drones to Protect Civilians” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 27, pp. 1-10. Fall 2013. <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/download/sta.bo/85>

While this intuitively sounds like a positive development, **increased situational awareness would also put additional pressure on commanders by expanding the range of strategic options.** In a typical peacekeeping environment where smaller violent incidents frequently take place, **real-time awareness may place an extra burden on decision-makers to determine whether or not to engage - compared to situations with less available information where errors and mistakes may be excused** by non-transparent or confusing environments. **The expanded scope of strategic choices produced by more detailed situational awareness will demand more comprehensive decision-making processes,** affecting the responsibilities of officers. **Peacekeepers will have less leeway for failing to respond to atrocities if knowledge is available in real time;** this will significantly lower the acceptance threshold for civilian casualties.

This mandates peacekeepers engage more often, making them more vulnerable, and ultimately undermining their efforts. As more engagements occur, the risk factor for civilian casualty increases, and as more information flows, the acceptance for non-action decreases.



United Nations Lacks Resources for Offensive Operations

World Community Will Not Supply Enforcement Resources AMS

Osmançavuşoğlu, Emel. “Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Cold War Era.” Journal of International Affairs. 2000. <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/EmelOsmanCavusoglu.pdf> **The Journal of International Affairs is a leading foreign affairs journal edited by the graduate students at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. It was established in 1947 as a nonprofit organization, and is the oldest university-affiliated periodical in the field.**

The world community is unwilling to provide the UN with resources to undertake enforcement tasks. Without the political support of the five permanent members of the security council and, in particular, the logistical, financial and political support of the United States, no operation has ever been completed successfully. Passing resolutions under UN Chapter VII without providing the organisations with adequate resources for the mandate drains the process of credibility. A force equipped for peace enforcement would not enjoy the same acceptance as a friendly and impartial force.



Troop contributions and quality are too inconsistent to guarantee success. DAT

Weir, Erin. “Greater Expectations: UN Peacekeeping & Civilian Protection.” Refugees International. July 2009. Web. <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a76aaf42.pdf>
Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.

UN peacekeeping missions are notoriously slow to deploy, and the quality of the forces and equipment is inconsistent. This is largely due to the fact that the UN has no independent military capacity and depends entirely on the voluntary troop contributions of member states to make up the mission requirements. **It is also often the result of an inflexible, numbers-based approach to the accumulation of troop contributions, which has made it difficult for countries with advanced or non-traditional military structures to contribute troops to UN missions.**

Even after appropriate contingents have been identified, each Troop Contributing Country (TCC) then has to negotiate its own agreement with the UN, which dictates what those forces will be used for within the mission. This often limits where particular contingents can be deployed in the field, and the level of danger that they can be exposed to.

Forces acquired in this piecemeal manner have very different training standards and combat capabilities, and the philosophies of their commanding officers often differ greatly. In military terms, the different capabilities, philosophies, training and contractual limitations make robust military action challenging. This is exacerbated by the fact that contingent commanders often defer to the instructions from their respective capitals rather than yielding entirely to the direction of the Force Commander, a fact which compromises the Force Commander’s authority, and would be unheard of in typical military operations.



January 2015

Con Counters: UN lacks resources

Offensive operations discourage developing nations from contributing. DAT

Wang, Ben Yunmo. "The Dragon Brings Peace? Why China Became A Major Contributor To United Nations Peacekeeping." Stimson Center. 12 July 2013. Web. [http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/the-dragon-brings-peace-why-china-became-a-major-contributor-to-united-nations-peacekeeping-/](http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/the-dragon-brings-peace-why-china-became-a-major-contributor-to-united-nations-peacekeeping/)

The Stimson Center is a nonprofit and nonpartisan think tank that finds pragmatic solutions to global security challenges.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense: "Chinese peacekeeping troops have built and repaired 8,000-odd km of roads, repaired and constructed more than 230 bridges, defused over 8,700 landmines and other explosives, transported 430,000 tons of materials, maneuvered 7 million km and cured 60,000-plus patients." **These projects are viewed by officials and analysts in Beijing as an important facet of soft power.**

China's engagement in peacekeeping also enables the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to obtain valuable experience through peacekeeping. Engagement in military operations other than war - including peacekeeping in addition to anti-piracy, disaster relief and humanitarian aid - strengthens the PLA's crisis response and strategic communication capabilities. **Most major troop-contributing countries, such as India and Bangladesh, consider the opportunity to obtain military experience in relatively low-risk U.N. mission environments as a major incentive to participate.**

With offensive operations on the table, the incentive to send troops for most developing nations disappears. This is a major negative impact on overall peacekeeper numbers.



Offensive Force is a Short Term Solution to a Long Term Problem

Forces Threaten International Peace AMS

United Nations. “Delegates Argue Merits of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Other Technologies as Security Council Considers New Trends in Peacekeeping: 7169th Meeting.” June 11, 2014. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11434.doc.htm> This source contains a summary of the ideas presented at the 7169th United Nations Security Council meeting. It provides valuable insight into the Security Council mindsight and interests of key delegates.

ASOKE KUMAR MUKERJI (India) said that by mandating peace operations to address internal conflicts, the Council was compromising the Charter principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence. Mixing traditional peacekeeping mandates with interventionist ones, as with MONUSCO, exposed traditional peacekeepers to the dangers posed by internal armed conflicts. **By deploying peacekeepers to tackle them, the Council was endorsing a short-sighted and unsustainable approach to the maintenance of international peace and security. He called on the Council to reconsider the use of interventionist mandates until all troop-contributing countries were given an opportunity, under article 44, to participate in its decisions on such operations.**



Peace Achieved by Force Is Not Lasting AMS

Global Security. “Military Operations (including Possible Combat Actions) In Support Of Diplomatic Efforts To Restore Peace Between Belligerents Who May Not Be Consenting To Intervention, And Who May Be Engaged In Combat Activities.” 2014. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_93-8_chap3.htm GlobalSecurity.org is the leading source of background information and developing news stories in the fields of defense, space, intelligence, WMD, and homeland security. Launched in 2000, GlobalSecurity.org is the most comprehensive and authoritative online destination for those in need of both reliable background information and breaking news. GlobalSecurity.org, is well-respected, trusted and often-referenced in the media, both domestically and internationally.

Peace enforcement cannot solve the underlying problems in most areas of potential application. The insertion of forces to stop combat may be effective in making the continuation of violence impossible; it cannot, in and of itself, create the conditions for lasting peace, which involves the political embrace of peace as more attractive than war. The insertion of outside force may break the cycle of violence and convince the combatants that resistance to the peace enforcers is more painful than compliance to an imposed peace. Since these conflicts are normally very deeply rooted and desperate, the shock effect of outside force may prove to be no more than a break between rounds of fighting.

Con teams should point out the difference between using United Nations peacekeeping forces to negotiate and using these forces to impose a nonexistent peace. Lasting peace cannot be achieved through force.



Offensives don't accomplish the UN's long-term goals. DAT

Hempson III, Donald A. "Avoiding the Scourge of War: the Challenges of United Nations Peacekeeping." Origins, vol. 5, issue 1. Ohio State University. October 2011. Web. <http://origins.osu.edu/article/avoiding-scourge-war-challenges-united-nations-peacekeeping>

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Cut off, denied close air support because of improperly filed forms, and concerned for the welfare of 30 Dutch peacekeepers held hostage by Bosnian Serbs, the Dutch commander in Srebrenica negotiated surrender. The subsequent massacre of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim boys and men by Bosnian Serbs discredited UNPROFOR and disgraced the international community.

In the aftermath of this fiasco, NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb locations and a United States-led negotiation mission resulted in the November 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, creating the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). UNMIBH embodied a new model of peacekeeping as a response to communal and ethnic conflicts.

The Yugoslav experience taught the United Nations that peacekeeping requires a demonstrated commitment and a composite force capable of legitimizing institutions critical to the security of the population and the long-term viability of the state. This entails a broad range of functions that now include election monitoring, political and judicial reforms, resettlement of refugees, investigation and prosecution of war crimes, civil reconstruction projects, education, literacy programs, skills retraining, and economic rehabilitation.

Simply put, second-generation peacekeeping demands a broader range of actors with more developed competencies and a longer-term, more forcefully articulated commitment to conflict resolution.

Given the emphasis on conflict resolution, it is not in the UN's best interests (or the world's) for the un to be yet another agent prolonging conflict.

Contentions





Pro Contentions

Contention One: The United Nations peacekeeping forces have lost their effectiveness.

The effectiveness of the United Nations as an institution has continued since its creation in 1942. As the United Nations fails to protect citizens in areas of interest, this debate has grown larger and larger leading many to call for the creation of a standing army or demand the right of offensive force for peacekeepers. This conclusion is the result of the observation of many United Nations failures. One particularly memorable example is the 1995 Bosnia Massacre. An article published by the New York Times in 1999 relates how United Nations **Secretary General Kofi Annan laid out in a somber, self-critical report today the tragic story of how the United Nations allowed the Bosnian Muslim "safe area" of Srebrenica to be overrun in July 1995** by Bosnian Serbs, who then systematically killed thousands of the town's men and boys. **The fall of Srebrenica became a damaging symbol of the United Nations' failure at peacekeeping in a new era of civil wars, and it demonstrated the inadequacy of a system that allowed political considerations to color military decisions when troops were under the command of the United Nations. "The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever," the report concludes.**

The report places blame primarily on peacekeepers failure to take action “effectively condemning the organization's tendency to try to remain neutral in a civil conflict.”

This is one example of an instance where peacekeepers stood by in the time of conflict. To prevent further instances, countless foreign officials have called out for increased offensive flexibility. For example, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power has **contrasted the U.N.'s performance with that of regional organizations, such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States**, which she said have been willing to take on robust protection mandates. **She suggested the U.N. could draw lessons from Rwanda's leadership in particular, as well as that of other countries like Ethiopia and Nepal. Rwandan troops are in demand as peacekeepers, and currently about 5,500 of them are deployed with U.N. and AU missions, mainly in Darfur, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.**

Kasper Agger, of the U.S. based **anti-genocide organization the Enough Project, has observed the Rwandan troops with the AU mission in the C.A.R. He reports:**

"I think they've done a good job. I mean they've been willing to put themselves on the line to protect civilians, to protect humanitarian workers.

Truck drivers transporting essential supplies into C.A.R. told VOA **that when Rwandan soldiers were deployed to guard their convoys, they took the job seriously. For example, they would stay with any trucks that broke down instead of abandoning them, as other peacekeepers had.**



Contention Two: International Forces call for increased offensive capabilities.

In response to critiques of peacekeeping forces, several members of the United Nations have called for an emergency peace service with increased offensive capabilities. According to Forward.com, a daily newspaper that has become a central part of New York's immigrant press as a defender of trade unionism and moderate, democratic socialism, The envisioned U.N. Emergency Peace Service would be 15,000 to 18,000 strong and include not only military and police personnel but also engineers, relief workers and judicial experts. [This proposed force] has a measure of bipartisan support and legislation recommending its creation may be taken up by the House International Relations Committee this fall.

“We feel the U.N. does not have an adequate rapid response structure, and this could be the solution,” said Brian Baluta, a spokesman for Republican Rep. James Walsh of New York. Walsh, a former Peace Corps member, is co-sponsor of the bill supporting the U.N. force, along with Maryland Democratic Rep. Albert Wynn. Backers of the U.N. Emergency Peace Service, known as Uneps, say that their main objective is not to replace the growing number of U.N. peacekeeping missions but rather to address the lag time between deciding to send a mission and actually deploying the troops. The process can take months, and it often includes time-consuming negotiations among U.N. member states and within the U.N. bureaucracy.

Contention Three: Citizens deserve better protection.

In response to peacekeepers' failure, many humanitarian organizations have taken a stand on the importance of effective peacekeeping. For example, Refugees international reports that:

“The very presence of peacekeepers creates expectations among local people that they will be protected if violence erupts. The failure to meet these expectations can result in a breakdown of wider mission legitimacy that will make it extremely difficult for peacekeepers to accomplish other, long-term peacebuilding objectives.”

Peacekeepers guarantee citizens some protection by their very presence. Allowing these missions to deploy without the needed flexibility to use force is a betrayal of these citizens. For this reason, my partner and I affirm the resolution that United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.



Con Contentions

Contention One: United Nations' failures are due to other problems within the peacekeeping forces.

Author Bayo Ogunrofia, a graduate student at the Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh conducted an analysis of United Nations peacekeeping and found that in “states where the UN peacekeeping mission succeeded, like Macedonia, Suez Canal (Egypt-Israel crisis and DRC), it is because the super-powers, especially the United states, Britain, and France have primary interest, and as such are more committed to the 'peacekeeping' mission.” However, Ogunrofia found that “in states where UN peacekeeping failed, it is because one or more of the super-powers have only secondary interest in the states or regions. Secondary interest here suggests that if the state(s) or region is not strategic to the national interest of one or more super-powers, then they are not committed to making overtures such as sending troops and financial commitment to the operation. This is evident in Russian and Chinese attitudes to the peacekeeping mission in the DRC.”

When great powers have a large stake in the conflict, they will participate actively and help to achieve a successful outcome. However when no great powers are invested, the peacekeeping missions often suffer from under-funding and a lack of essential supplies to complete the mission. For this reason, United Nations peacekeeping forces must be reexamined and reformed to allow the success of future missions without the introduction of offensive force.

Contention Two: United Nations is not equipped to handle offensive force.

United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, Carman Lapointe explains: "The reality is that the United Nations cannot fully protect civilians while the troop contributing countries do not instruct their contingents to do all they can, including using force as a last resort when civilians are under attack before them," U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, Carman Lapointe, told the Fifth Committee on Tuesday. In fact, An internal report on the United Nations] found that operational and political constraints within missions were at odds with their legal authority and mandate to act and that some missions "perceived themselves as weak, outnumbered and stretched across vast areas, making the use of force only a paper option."

Stephen Lieberman, U.S. Minister-Counselor for U.N. management and reform, told the Fifth Committee the report indicated "a broad lack of understanding by peacekeepers of what protection of civilians entails at the tactical level, a lack of commitment by mission leadership to use force in order to protect civilians, and persistent parallel lines of command between troop contributing countries and their capitals that precluded the warranted use of force."



Clearly, the United Nations peacekeepers are not even able to exercise offensive force, suggesting once again the need for other reform within the forces.

Contention Three: Deep-seated structural reforms are necessary before the power to exercise force can be considered.

Recent scandals involving United Nations peacekeeping forces have tarnished the reputation and highlighted the need for reform within the peacekeepers. According to a report by the Guardian, the embarrassment caused by the misconduct of UN forces in devastated communities around the world - including Haiti, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Cambodia, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - has become an increasingly high profile, political problem.

Allegations have recently surfaced that troops sent to police Liberia were regularly having sex with girls aged as young as 12, sometimes in the mission's administrative buildings.

In the DRC, peacekeepers were said to have offered abandoned orphans small gifts - as little as two eggs from their rations, says the report - for sexual encounters.

Scandals like the various instances of sexual abuse make it hard for affected citizens to trust peacekeepers—a problem that will only be exacerbated by the reckless introduction of force.

In fact, according to analysis by Foreign Policy, in many instances United Nations peacekeepers have failed to exercise even the powers they are given. Peacekeeping commander Nnadi, later has told U.N. investigators that his forces had attempted to prevent the abductors from heading off with the civilians. The victims and bus drivers, though, said they were handed over without a fight. Several said they even saw the U.N. soldiers flashing "thumbs up" signs to the kidnappers as the buses drove off. The U.N. personnel peacekeepers, one of the bus drivers told investigators "did nothing."

"[The peacekeepers] made no visible effort to prevent the abduction of IDP [internally displaced persons] conference participants from the convoy," an unreleased assessment by other U.N. personnel later concluded. "They just stood watching as the gunmen drove away the buses carrying the IDPs." These frightening allegations which are supported in multiple instances of United Nations peacekeeping reports suggest a need for bigger changes within the peacekeepers. If these forces refuse to exercise any of their powers to protect citizens, or in many instances, abuse the power they are given, these problems must be addressed immediately. Introducing the power of offensive force will not solve the deeper issue of under-funded and un-motivated peacekeepers.